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Abstract 
This research delves into the phenomenon of computational propaganda on social media, 
and draws on social media specialists from some of South Africa’s best performing brands 
to explore potential strategies political parties can employ to mitigate against crises that 
occur as a result of computational propaganda.  
 
This research is of importance given that South Africa is entering its first ever National 
Elections since the identification of computational propaganda as a threat to electoral 
processes. To date, there is no research that explores this within the South African 
context. 
 
The research entailed semi-structured interviews with eight social media managers, 
selected using the purposive non-probability sampling method. In addition to this, the 
research interviewed a communications head from South Africa’s largest political party in 
order to assess what strategies are already in place. These two sets of data were 
consolidated resulting in four potential strategies to mitigate against the risk of 
computational propaganda. The four potential mitigation strategies are grouped into two 
approaches, the first approach relates to preventative measures political parties can take, 
namely protecting brand identity and aligning communications. The second approach 
related to defensive measures political party brands could take in the event of a 
computational propaganda event, namely online reputation management and integration of 
communication. 
 
The research further uncovered contextual considerations political party brands must take 
into account before employing strategies to mitigate against crises that arise as a result of 
computational propaganda. 
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Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, 17 December 2010 (Lageman, 2016) Mohammed Bouazizi, a 26 year 
old fruit vendor and breadwinner to a household of seven people (Abouzied, 2011), takes 
his fruit cart to the local souk to begin the day’s trade. While making his way to the market, 
Bouazizi is approached by police officials, with whom he has a confrontational verbal 
exchange (Ryan, 2011b). Bouazizi later arrives at the market and is confronted again by 
police officials where the situation escalates quickly when Mohammed can only give $7 for 
a $10 fine. This act results in him being slapped in addition to the confiscation of his 
electronic scales and fruit cart (Abouzied, 2011). Frustrated that his livelihood had been 
taken away, Bouazizi later walks to the nearest government offices in his town to seek 
recourse to no avail. An hour after senior officials refuse to attend to his complaint, 
Bouazizi sets himself alight in frustration (Lageman, 2016). Shocked bystanders captured 
the spectacle and uploaded the content for distribution on Facebook, which was Tunisia’s 
only uncensored platform at the time (Ryan, 2011a). This moment became a symbol of the 
frustration North African youth felt as a result of socio-economic inequality and 
disenfranchisement (Salih, 2013), and would be the spark to a fire that would be later 
known as the Arab Spring (Toko, 2012). Starting in Tunisia, the Arab Spring became a 
civilian revolutionary movement that engulfed Algeria, Jordan, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria 
and Bahrain (Salih, 2013), becoming one of the first civil society movements that spanned 
a multitude of countries simultaneously without having any central coordinating structures, 
making it one of the first revolutionary waves to reflect the changing power relations partly 
with the assistance of new communication networks like social media (Tudoroiu, 2014).  
This scenario illustrates the power social media can posses in democratising political 
influence. It also may be seen as a positive from civil society’s perspective, as it helped to 
overthrow traditional structures of political influence by giving it back to the general public 
(Salih, 2013). But what happens when nefarious forces sow division and manipulate this 
power? Enter a new social media and political phenomenon known as computational 
propaganda, which is the act of using social media’s power to spread inflammatory 
misinformation (Woolley and Howard, 2016). 
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The latest global research on social media indicates that the world’s social media audience 
has grown to over 3 billion users daily (We Are Social, 2017). This rise in daily usage 
numbers around the world indicates that social media has begun to become a ubiquitous 
form of communication over the past two years (Katzman, 2016). While many benefits 
have come as a result of the growth of such platforms, there are some detrimental effects 
of this growth. One such effect is that social interactivity can present great reputational risk 
because it allows information to be shared at great speed with great reach, often with the 
page or profile owner-losing context, tone, and control (Carter, 2017). 
 
While most existing crisis communication research is focused on the general public and 
their response to brands or complaint behaviour, political parties are no strangers to the 
rigors of social media. Whereas commercial brands are pitted against irate customers, the 
emotive and ideological nature of politics may lay political parties and figures victim to 
online aggression at levels beyond those experienced by brands (Woolley and Howard, 
2017). Rost, Stahel and Frey (2016, p. 26) indicate that online aggression aimed at people 
and institutions of public interest has become a growing phenomenon, and it will continue 
to grow as digital civil society attempts to “enforce norms and contribute to the formation of 
latent interest groups”. Due to the ideological nature of politics and the norm of online 
aggression against them, political figures have begun to fall victim to a form of junk news 
called “computational propaganda”.  
Computational propaganda can be viewed as a digital form of information dissemination 
wherein parties or their adversaries use social media and online aggression to propagate 
damaging, often untrue information in attempts to create false narratives. Woolley and 
Howard (2016) define computational propaganda as “the assemblage of social media 
platforms, autonomous agents, and big data tasked with the manipulation of public 
opinion”. Automated bots are key to the manipulation of public opinion; these are 
automated social media accounts run by computer script, that are able to deploy 
messages, replicate and disseminate information at scale (Neudert, 2017). 
 
While evidence suggests that computational propaganda is a growing worldwide 
phenomenon, South Africa has also been impacted. For example a ‘white monopoly 
capital campaign’, wherein Bell Pottinger, a United Kingdom based public relations 
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agency, set up Gupta-aligned bots that suggested white owned businesses in South Africa 
were more implicated in state capture and more harmful than Gupta-owned businesses  
who were involved in state capture (ANCIR, 2017).   
 
South Africa is not the only location which is been affected by computational propaganda. 
The phenomenon has affected political processes the world over, with Brazil’s 2014 
elections being the earliest documented case. In this case, incumbent Brazillian President 
Dilma Rousseeff was forced into a run-off election at the hands of centre right candidate 
Aecio Nevez with the assistance of a multimillion dollar budget spent on misinformation 
using social media bots deployed on facebook, twitter and whatsapp (Arnaudo, 2017). The 
developed world has also not been left unaffected; in Europe during the French 
presidential election, scholars from Oxford’s Computational Propaganda project found that 
up to a quarter of all political links shared on twitter were found to contain political 
misinformation which was ideologically extreme or merely opinion presented as facts 
(Farand, 2017). In addition to this, further investigation into the use of botnets during the 
French election uncovered  Russian interference with the intent to destabilise the 
European Union.   
 
France is not the only European country to fall victim to botnets and computational 
propaganda. The effects of internet misinformation have also impacted electoral processes 
in Germany, where the growing right wing and their anti-immigration populist leaders 
gained audiences as a result of bot networks that were deployed to spread populist far-
right sentiment (Neudert, 2017). Italy, however, determined the computational propaganda 
threat to be so great that an online task team was assembled to report junk news sources. 
Most recently, the most notable instance of computational propaganda emerged in the 
American presidential elections where a consultancy named Cambridge Analytica was 
found to be harvesting data from 87 million Facebook users’ accounts to serve them with 
politically motivated content based on those users’ psychological profile (Greenfield, 
2018). Cambridge Analytica’s project, which was done without facebook’s consent, 
brought to light the large extent of politcial meddling taking place online, as their project is 
believed to have help mobilise neo-conservatives in getting to the polls in the 2016 US 
presidential elections, and thereby playing a critical role in Donald Trump’s presidential 
campaign victory (Lewis and Hilder, 2018). 
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 While the impact of digital marketing and social media in the American election may come 
as a surprise, it’s important to note that digital marketing and social media have been an 
area of investment for political parties since Barack Obama’s successful presidential social 
media campaign in 2008 (Aaker and Chang, 2009).  Subsequently,  investment in recent 
elections have been substantial, for example, Republican candidate Senator Ted Cruz’s 
2016 campaign made a human captial investment of 40 data scientists, digital marketers 
and web developers. In addition, $4.4 million dollars of the $13 million digital marketing 
budget was paid to Cambridge Analytica during the Republican primaries (Kroll, 2018). 
Ultimately, the Cambridge Analytica scandal brought the phenomenon of computational 
propaganda to the forefront in global mainstream media, given that it was the first large-
scale instance where Facebook, the world's largest social network, admitted that it was 
used for political meddling, to the extent that Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg admitted 
to having his own personal data leaked during presentations to the US Senate (Jenkins, 
2018). 
 
In the white paper entitled “Why does junk news spread so quickly across social media?” 
Howard and Bradshaw, (2018) indicate that the growth of the computational propaganda 
phenomenon and junk news are a result of a number of factors including the rise of social 
media as a news source, growing mistrust the public have in the political elite and the way 
algorithms curate information optimised for engagement. Two other drivers of 
computational propaganda are (1) the use of pay per click advertising to generate revenue 
(wherein salacious and misleading headlines referred to as clickbait generate a high 
amount of clicks in return for money) (Howard and Bradshaw, 2018); and (2) filter bubbles, 
where users have reduced exposure to opposing information due to algorithms serving 
them the information it deems them most likely to consume (Pfeffer, Zorbach and Carley, 
2014) . All these elements have conspired to create what we’ve come to know as a “post 
truth” world (BBC, 2017) 
 
This post-truth scenario creates difficulties for political parties and those falling victim to 
computational propaganda. Howard and Bradshaw (2018) indicate that it is challenging to 
design or regulate social media in a way that reduces electoral interference.  
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They further argue that a solution would most likely require a multidisciplinary approach, 
consisting of technological tools to manage platforms and oversight from civil society and 
government. What this solution does not take into account, however, is the ever-changing 
attacks on people’s perceptions through communication, which suggests that a 
communication solution should also be found. The status quo suggests that political 
parties require communication defences that are just as fast, dynamic and adaptive as the 
attacks to which they fall victim. 
 
1.1.1 Problem Statement 
Although social media crisis communications have been an area of focus amongst 
communications scholars with the advent of web 2.0, computational propaganda has only 
come to the fore since 2012.  Succinctly defined, Computational Propaganda is the use of 
algorithms and automation to distribute misleading information via social media. Instances 
of this form of political manipulation have impacted democratic processes in many 
countries globally (Woolley and Howard, 2017). As already discussed, in the case of Brazil 
and South Africa, twitter bots spread misinformation, and in America and Europe, stolen 
Facebook data was used to target and psychologically manipulate voters (Woolley and 
Howard, 2017). Hence, Computational Propaganda involves sophisticated social media 
strategies to sway voters (Wickenden, 2018).  
Zhang et al. (2013) point out that the success of computational propaganda depends on its 
agents’ ability to create and deploy bot networks that are difficult to differentiate from 
humans online. In addition to social bot networks, agents of computational propaganda 
have also been found to use paid media to spread disinformation, as recently discovered 
by Facebook’s investigation into Russian use of paid Facebook adverts to influence 
election outcomes in America and Europe (Thompson and Vogelstein, 2018).  
The automated nature of Computational Propaganda may mean that existing strategies 
defining and diagnosing digital brand risk and destruction may not be sufficient. In light of 
the growing influence of Computational Propaganda and growing social media users, 
South Africa needs to deploy mitigation strategies in the upcoming 2019 elections. Theory 
on digital brand risk, and computational propaganda is still in its infancy, so it is unclear 
how South Africa might ameliorate the risks.  
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Therefore, in this research I have explored how South African political parties can mitigate 
the impact of Computational Propaganda during the South African elections. It is important 
to note that risk mitigation can take on two forms: reducing risk at the hands of the agents 
of Computational Propaganda, and reducing brand risk by attending to stakeholder’s 
perceptions once the computational propaganda has occurred, the latter is the focus of 
this study. 
 
1.1.2 Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this study is to help political parties avoid malicious online brand attacks by 
asking: 
Q: How can the brand risk of Computational Propaganda be mitigated by political party 
brands in online brand contexts? 
The potential answer to this question will be proposed based on an answer to the following 
sub-questions: 
1. How does Computational Propaganda manifest itself online? 
2. What strategies are political parties using to mitigate Computational Propaganda risks? 
3. Which digital brand risk mitigation strategies can political brands employ to mitigate the 
brand consequences of computational propaganda? 
The research proposed is of importance because a failure to identify and use relevant 
mitigation strategies against Computational Propaganda may cause political brands to lose 
their brand equity and, even worse, erode the legitimacy of their governance.  
1.1.3 Research objectives 
The objectives of the research conducted is to; 
• Explore the nature of how Computational Propaganda manifests online. 
• Investigate what strategies political parties are using to mitigate against 
Computational Propaganda risks. 
• Discover which digital brand risk mitigation strategies political parties can employ to 
mitigate against the brand consequences of Computational Propaganda. 
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1.1.4 Theoretical Framework 
This research is grounded in the modernist effectiveness model (Torp, 2015), wherein 
communication is a form of expression that occurs in a marketplace of different voices 
competing to persuade (Mumby, 1997). The research also draws on Verhoeven and Ihlen 
(2015) who argue that research is not only intended for administrative use at the 
organisational level, but also serves to supplement administrative perspectives with an 
approach that allows society to step back and evaluate the dynamics of societal and 
political influence. Ihlen and Verhoeven’s theory draws on elements of the critical theorist’s 
approach which value reflexivity and critical thought (Craig, 1999) – two aspects of 
research that will be used as a counterpoint to the modernist intent of exploring mitigation 
strategies for the communication crisis that is Computational Propaganda. Mumby (1997) 
indicates that democracy is central to the communication ethic of critical theory. A critical 
approach is important when interrogating phenomena that have influenced or changed the 
political power dynamic.  
 
While the modernist view will be used to explore functional ways in which Computational 
Propaganda may be mitigated, a lens of Critical modernism will balance the research, 
because it is critical, but not a complete rejection of modernism, instead it is a manner of 
questioning the mode of rationality that has come to be synonymous with the modernism 
(Mumby 1997). 
 Social media in the political context, suffers a tension between its ability to empower the 
disenfranchised, on one hand, and on the other hand, its ability to be used as a tool for 
mass misinformation, manipulation, and political meddling (Karolak, 2017). Therefore, my 
research is cognisant of the complex relation between communication, power, identity, 
society and systems of domination explored by critical modernism theorists (Deetz, 1992. 
Cited in Mumby, 1997). 
Beyond research paradigms, this study aims to close a knowledge gap that has risen out 
of the difference between the prevailing technological, political and communication 
context, versus existing theory. On one hand, political brands exist in the communication 
context of web 2.0, where communication can be shared on social media platforms at 
great reach and speed.  
8 
 
They also find themselves in a technological context wherein bad actors are automating 
social media bots to disseminate propaganda en masse in order to damage political 
brands. Furthermore, there is little to no regulation of social media platforms, ultimately 
putting political brands at risk of brand damage. 
On the other hand, existing theory indicates that brand building is important to political 
parties, while Computational Propaganda has a propensity to create communications 
crises, which negatively affect brand equity. Since private organisations have been 
employing brand risk mitigating strategies for some time, it is clear that political brands 
also need to deploy such strategies, and that we need to fill the knowledge gap on 
mitigation strategies. Platforms may not be willing to act on instances of Computational 
Propaganda, and bot agents may not be stopped, but political brands could try to manage 
perceptions of individuals coming into contact with Computational Propaganda by 
employing strategies employed by private organisations. 
 
1.1.5 Research Methods 
The research aims to conduct semi-structured interviews with eight social media managers 
to explore their opinions on brand risk mitigation strategies as a result of computational 
propaganda, followed by an interview with South African political party representatives to 
assess what mitigation strategies are in place for computational propaganda in the forth 
coming 2019 National Elections. The proposed research is not only qualitative, but also 
exploratory as it serves to gain insights on how political party brands are reacting to risks 
of Computational Propaganda and then provide suggestions on how they may respond 
(Creswell 2014). The relatively unpredictable nature of social media and the new nature of 
Computational Propaganda mean that insufficient studies are available that allow an 
outcome to be predicted, hence the need for a non-prescriptive, exploratory approach to 
provide broad guidelines for dealing with Computational Propoganda. 
 
1.1.6 Limitations of the study  
 
There may be gaps in how literature reflects the manifestation of computational 
propaganda and how this exists in the South African context.  
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In addition to this, the nature of South African politics means the sample size of political 
party communications practitioners is small with only two parties potentially having any 
experience in dealing with computational propaganda.  
 
A second limitation of this study is the emergent nature of computational propaganda, 
which means that some concepts presented in this study will evolve with time, ultimately 
affecting one’s interpretation of the outcomes. One such example is the use of the terms 
misinformation and disinformation. During the research and data gathering phase of this 
study, the interchangeable use of misinformation and disinformation emerged as a 
common trend in the literature reviewed, resulting in this practice being taken up by the 
author. One such example is Sergey Sanovich’s, 2017 paper investigating the role of bots 
in Russia. Sanovich’s paper titled “Computational Propaganda in Russia: The Origins Of 
Digital Misinformation,” has a citation recommendation within the same paper indicating 
that the title be cited as “Computational Propaganda in Russia: The Origins Of Digital 
Disinformation”, despite the content only referencing misinformation (Sanovich, 2017). 
Wardle and Derakhshan (2018) attempt to delineate between the concepts by identifying 
intent as being the key differentiator between the two. In the UNESCO journalism 
education handbook titled “Journalism, Fake News & Disinformation,” Wardle and 
Derakhshan (2018) propose that “Misinformation” is information that is false, disseminated 
by people who believe it to be true, whereas “Disinformation” is information that is false 
where people disseminating the information know it to be false. This matter should be 
taken into account when reviewing any content relating to Computational Propaganda, as 
even academics at the forefront of this research like Phillip Howard and Samuel Woolley 
have used the term misinformation to describe propaganda distributed by bots, which is an 
intentional action and ultimately disinformation. 
 
Finally, the assumption of this study is that social media practitioners from the private 
sector lead social media best practice, but this does not necessarily mean they are 
equipped or have any experience in dealing with individuals who are ideologically 
motivated and intent on wilfully damaging brands. Given that the research aims to provide 
insights, the small sample size, unique context and use of the purposeful non-probability 
sampling method mean that the research may not be generalisable. 
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1.1.7 Outline of the Report 
Chapter two provides context relating to political brands and how parallels can be drawn 
between political brands and commercial ones; it also outlines the nature of digital brand 
social media crises and crisis communication, followed by existing crisis communication 
risk mitigation strategies. Chapter three provides an in depth rationale pertaining to the 
research approach in conjunction to an outline of how the research within this report was 
undertaken. Chapter four sets out to uncover the findings gleaned from the primary 
research. Based on the findings recommendations for political parties are provided. 
 
1.1.8 Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the context of the research to be conducted, along with its relevance 
and the research lens through which the study will be viewed. The following chapters will 
delve into literature reviewed for the sake of the study, followed by the research 
methodology and data analysis. Finally the research will culminate in the findings and 
recommendations regarding of mitigation strategies for computational propaganda. 
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2 . Chapter 2 
2.1 Literature Review 
2.1.1 Introduction 
This study aims to explore communication-based mitigation strategies that political parties 
can deploy when facing the threat of computational propaganda. Therefore, in this chapter, 
the literature on political parties as brands and digital brand risk is explored in order to  
investigate the nature of social media and crises that come as a result of it. Thereafter 
Computational Propaganda and existing risk mitigation strategies employed in 
communication will be outlined. 
 
2.1.2 Political Parties as Brands 
In order to understand the relevance of digital brand risk, the importance of brands to 
political parties is discussed. A brand can be defined as a name, term, sign, symbol or 
design intended to identify the goods and services of one seller, or group of sellers and to 
differentiate them from those of competitors (Keller, 2013). While the physical attributes of 
a brand are described in this definition, the all-encompassing nature of brands and the 
extent to which they influence marketing effectiveness is best outlined by Keller’s (1993) 
model of Consumer-Based Brand Equity. Within this four step model, brand effectiveness 
is based on sentiment, and that brands can reach the ultimate goal of brand resonance by 
answering four questions in relation to the consumer, namely, (1) who is the brand, (2) 
what is the brand, (3) what is the brand’s relevance in consumers’ lives, and (4) how does 
the brand make the customer feel. Consumer-Based Brand Equity is defined as the 
differential effect brand knowledge has on consumer response to the marketing of the 
brand. Based on Keller’s definition, Consumer-Based Brand Equity is a function of 
knowledge and experience over time. This knowledge and experience can either positively 
affect or negatively affect the customers’ response to a brand. Ultimately, brands can allow 
an organisation to gain supporters and fend off attempts by competitors.  
 
Keller (2013) suggests that a brand can improve customer’s feelings towards products, 
improve repeat purchase and make competitors actions less effective.  
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Brands are not only trademarks or reputations, but also complex intangibles whose 
character emerges from a blend of attributes. If one considers the attributes of the 
Customer Brand Based Equity model one can surmise that building an organisation’s 
brand is important for building relationships with consumers/audiences. Audiences as 
voters are also important to political parties, which Butler, Collins and Speed ( 2011) 
describe as the complex sum of three main parts which are party, person and policy. Pich, 
Armannsdottir and Spry (2018) argue that the application of corporate brand theory to the 
political arena has helped political parties to develop desired identities in order to create 
credible offerings to stakeholders. Therefore, political party brand management has begun 
to generate a return on investment from a reputational capital and social capital 
perspective. However, the brand can build or damage voters’ trust, especially in the 
context of social media and crisis communication, because crises may erode loyalty 
amongst political party members and make organisations vulnerable to tactics of 
competing political entities. 
 
The notion of political parties as brands has become a prominent area in the growing field 
political marketing (Harris and Lock, 2010), which according to Lees-Marshment (2003) is 
a powerful way in which parties can foster deeper relationships with voters. Mensah (2017) 
indicates that the prominence of political branding has come about as a result of political 
convergence where parties are increasingly moving to the centre in order to focus on 
voters’ needs, coupled with a decline in ideology politics. The ideology-centred politics is 
similar to the mostly outmoded practice of product and sales marketing, which serves 
customers based on what the organisation believes, is valued by the customer. Downer 
(2016) reinforces this assertion by indicating that the shift in politics to voter needs is akin 
to a shift towards the market-oriented marketing perspective where businesses research 
customer’s needs and market their products or services according to these needs. 
Drawing on Keller’s (1993) definition of brand equity, Downer (2016) further points out that 
the shift to viewing political parties as brands indicates a shift to an emphasis on a long 
term view on marketing decisions. 
Ahmed, Lodhi and Ahmad (2017) also affirm the relevance of brands in the political 
context, arguing that brand management helps parties learn about voter preferences. 
Branding assists voters by providing benefits by which they are able to evaluate their 
political choices. O’Cass and Voola (2011) more directly point to the link between political 
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party and brand, arguing that party managers, politicians and members relate to their 
perception of their brand and how the brand links to a set of capabilities which set the 
party apart in the political arena.  
 
Based on the above literature, it is clear that concepts of marketing and brand equity are 
easily imported into the political space, even though the brand literature does not account 
for religion, social class and social change, which in recent times have seen a resurgence 
of prominence within the political landscape, most especially as it pertains to the rise of 
right wing populism and religious extremism (Wood, Daley and Chivers, 2018). Mensah 
(2017) nevertheless argues that class, religion and social change are not any more 
significant than other interests and behaviours that are subject to influence 
 Given that brand equity is important to political parties, they are susceptible to the brand 
risk just as commercial brands are, so it is important to explore mitigating strategies 
against this phenomenon. The concept of social media and brand risk will be further 
explored in order to provide context into the nature of this phenomenon and to explore 
whether there is scope for potential mitigation strategies.  
 
2.1.3 Web 2.0 and Social Media  
According to Castells (2007) and Manovich (2009), two-way networked sociality arrived 
with the advent of web 2.0 during the turn of the millennium. Web 2.0 is often referred to 
as the successor to the “read only web”, or web 1.0 which existed from 1989 to 2005 
(Choudhury, 2014) and was characterised by data posted to websites for users to simply 
view, read or download. During this period user contribution and feedback was not 
available to most internet users and websites on the internet resembled traditional mass 
communication platforms in terms of their one-to-many orientation (Mangalore and 
Shivalingaiah, 2014).  
In contrast to the read only web, the read-write web, or web 2.0 as it is commonly referred 
to (Dougherty 2004), was built to harness the power of network effects (O’Reilly, 2006) 
and transitioned one-to-many communication into many-to-many communication. 
Choudhury (2014) argues that Web 2.0 facilitates participatory, collaborative, distributive 
practices, and has distinct, characteristic relationships to technology such as wikis, 
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podcasts, RSS feeds and Application programming interfaces (Mangalore and 
Shivalingaiah, 2014).  
The advancement from web 1.0 to web 2.0, characterised by mass participation and 
openness, have played a critical part in the new political context in which Computational 
Propaganda has thrived. Social media networks are at the centre of the new political 
context, since they allow for interactivity where participants can send, receive and process 
content, thus levelling the playing field such that users can give each other feedback in 
realtime, instead of just consuming mass media (Aula, 2010). Carr and Hayes (2015) 
describe social media as internet-based channels of mass-personal communication, 
facilitating perceptions and interactions among users. Their definition touches on social 
media’s unique duality in that it can be personal and mass communication at the same 
time, while also allowing anyone to become a publisher. Social Media however, is not just 
the ability for users to provide immediate feedback; these networks are more than the sum 
of their parts and represent a new paradigm of openness, community and democracy. 
 
Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) further illustrate the collaborative power of social media that 
has risen out of web 2.0, arguing that social media networks are internet applications 
which build on the ideological and technological foundation of web 2.0, thus allowing 
creation and exchange of user generated content. Key to this web 2.0 ideology, as well as 
the creation and exchange of user-generated content are levels of openness amongst 
different social media platforms. Deng, Fang, Monod and Qi (2018) distinguish between 
three levels of social media openness, i.e.  (1) open platforms such as Twitter by default 
allow any users to connect without permission and see and share content posted; (2) 
semi-open platforms such as Instagram allows users to primarily engage only with the 
followers they select; and (3) closed networks such as Facebook which require users’ 
permission before connections are made. The importance of openness is critical to the 
study of Computational Propaganda as this directly impacts on how easy or difficult it is to 
identify Computational Propaganda.  According to Kramer (2017) Twitter’s openness 
allows developers to access its Application programming interface, which in turn allows 
network analysis of connections between accounts. By contrast, Facebook’s closed nature 
does not allow for network analysis and therefore it is more difficult  to uncover and expose 
Computational Propaganda. 
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While the perks of relationship technologies include collaboration and participation at no 
cost to the end user, the pitfalls of web 2.0 and social media include less control by its 
users and reduced data security since these platforms increase the flow of personal 
information onto the networks where data is hosted and controlled (Grabner-Kräuter, 
2009). Data vulnerability and its effects are further compounded by the monetisation 
models used by large social networks like Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. These social 
networks allow users to access content and worldwide networks at no cost, but due to the 
cost-intensive nature of the infrastructure to run these networks, social networks are 
monetized by using their depth of freely acquired user data and selling it as audiences to 
advertisers. This monetization model has turned social networks into “defacto data 
brokers, who go about aggregating data on users for the purpose of implementing 
powerful advertising platforms” (Venkatadri et al., 2018, p. 89). Krishnamurthy, Willis and 
Naryshkin (2009) point out that mainstream social media sites, when used on default, have 
great potential for data leakages. Venkatandri et al. (2018) corroborate this assertion, 
explaining that social media networks have been a vector for privacy attacks due to bad 
actors that are able to predict an individual’s attributes based on small pieces of users 
information which are easily acquired online. An illustration of this scenario can be found in 
Facebook’s recent instances of data leakages wherein the world’s largest social network 
by daily users fell victim to manipulation by bad actors (Facebook, 2018). The most 
prominent instance being 2018’s Cambridge Analytica scandal, where researchers 
violated Facebook’s terms of service by gathering 87 million users’ personal data (Wagner, 
2018) which was acquired via friends who had completed a quiz application (Cadwalladr 
and Graham-Harrison, 2018). These records were subsequently used to develop 
psychographic profiles of users in order to deliver specific pro-Donald Trump adverts to 
them (Meredith, 2018). 
E-proponents have long argued that Web 2.0 platforms such as social media have the 
potential to reconnect citizens with governments and open up new civic spaces online 
(Ward, 2017). This argument is in line with Kaplan and Haelein’s (2010) definition of Web 
2.0 which highlights the ability for users to create content, help set the agenda and, 
ultimately, create a shift in power. Social media use in the Arab spring (Salih 2013) and the 
resultant revolutionary wave, which helped to rearrange power relations in the North 
African, and Middle Eastern region (Tudoroiu, 2014) are a testament to social media’s 
ability to open up civic spaces online. However, Kaplan and Haenlein’s thoughts are in 
stark contrast to traditional management scholars who possess a modernistic worldview 
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like Anshul, Pathak, Safiullah and Singh (2017) who believe that social media is a form of 
digital media that provides political marketers with a marketplace where they compete to 
drive public opinion in a desired direction, ultimately suggesting that political marketing is 
still a discipline in which narratives can be controlled . 
The initial rise of web 2.0 technologies led scholars to believe that social networks gave a 
communication platform to the general public, ultimately dis-intermediating traditional 
communications organisations and handing power over to users (Rust and Oliver, 1994). 
However, consensus is changing as knowledge regarding how social media users’ data is 
being used increases. Although users of social media have helped to “transform 
everything from political arrangements to business models, organisations and 
philosophies” (Fitzpatrick, 2012), the power has actually shifted from social media users to 
social media platforms that are now able to influence their users’ perceptions through the 
power of their data and algorithms, which were initially developed to benefit advertisers. 
Martin (2018, p. 30) succinctly touches on this paradigm in the MIT Technology Review, 
arguing that  “Facebook, Google and Amazon all have business models that require them 
to scoop up large amounts of data about people to power their algorithms, and they derive 
their power from this information”. The power of social media platforms create tension for 
political parties trying to set the agenda in that these traditional arbiters of power are pitted 
against a society that has relatively more control and has grown increasingly sceptical of 
the political elite’s motives. However the tension is layered on top of social media 
platforms whose algorithms have potential to influence users and invariably set the agenda 
(Unver, 2017), especially when they are manipulated by bad actors, all of which pose 
potential threats for political party brands. A larger question, which falls outside the ambit 
of this research, is the intention versus business model debate, which asks if social media 
platforms are deliberately facilitating negative political messaging to maximise user 
engagement and thus increase revenue; this business model invariably leads to more 
extreme emotional messaging on social networks (Unver, 2017). 	
2.1.4 Digital Brand Risk  
Hofman and Simeon (2013) define brand risk as any element that can diminish total brand 
value. They also indicate that this destruction can take on many guises by pointing out that 
brand risk ranges from malicious attacks to self-inflicted action, both of which affect brand 
value negatively.  
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Patrick Marrinan, in an interview with GfK-Marketing Intelligence Review (Hupp, Robbins 
and Fournier, 2018), corroborates Hofman and Simeon’s assertion by indicating that Brand 
Risk is any event, condition or action that has potential to negatively affect a brand’s value 
in the market. In creating their mathematical model of Brand Risk, Florea, Munteanu and 
Postoaca (2016) point out that consistent analysis of brand risk and brand profit are 
integral to the success of an organisation, as these are two of the most important 
indicators of brand equity, which in turn is a key but intangible attribute of any organisation.  
 
 While it is not possible to outline all brand risks, an exploration into nature of digital brand 
risk is imperative for the purpose of this study. In an outline of the nature of Digital Brand 
Risk, Hofman and Simeon (2013) borrow from David Abraham’s (2007) Brand Risk model  
to delineate four areas of brand risk faced online, i.e.  identity risks, nature of presence 
risks, equity risks, and reputation risks. Identity risks entail using a brand’s trademark, 
usernames and domain names to take advantage of the high levels of traffic brands 
receive online. Presence risk is similar to identity risk and occurs when competitors take 
advantage of a brand's identity and attributes to attract potential buyers, only to sell their 
own competing products. Equity risks entail damage sustained to a brand when its 
functional and emotional benefits do not meet expectations of customers (Abrahams, 
2007). Hofman and Simoen suggest that equity risks can have the most detrimental impact 
on brands as emotional connections take time to cultivate and are not easily regained 
(Hofman and Simeon, 2013). The fourth and final brand risk is that of reputation when a 
brand does not deliver according to expectations and falls short of legal or ethical 
requirements.  
 
Reputational and equity risks are two of the most detrimental risks for any organisation 
because reputation and equity take extremely long to build, which is why they have 
become targets of attack by actors in the political space in recent years (Hofman and 
Simeon, 2013). Theory pertaining to brand risk, unfortunately, does not explore the nature 
of sabotage by external actors. This shortfall is however covered by the theory of brand 
destruction (Bokor, 2014), which is the seizure of power by consumers. Although 
communicating on social media lends itself to self-inflicted communication crises, the 
phenomenon of brand destruction is described by Bokor (2014, p. 40) as “the intentional 
destruction of a brand by a gatekeeper, opinion leader, consumer group or internet users, 
and may come as a result of conflicting worldviews or a conflict with a brand”. Bokor builds 
on research conducted by Krishnamurthy and Kucuk (2009) who investigated the rapid 
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growth of anti-branding websites, which came as a result of growing customer influence 
initiated by the advent of the internet. Kucuk and Krishnamurthy (2009, p. 1120) explain 
that “[a]nti-brand web sites are online spaces that focus negative attention on a specific 
targeted brand. Such sites use visual expression, memorable domain names, and critical 
language to create a negative online identity for the targeted brand”. 
 
 
They further argue that anti-branding differs from complaint behaviour because complaint 
behaviour attempts to improve or affect change in future business transactions, whereas 
anti-branding aims to create a negative brand image with no intention of future 
transactions (Krishnamurthy and Kucuk, 2009). Kucuk’s other research postulates that 
brands attract anti-brand behaviour based on the level of brand equity they attain, he also 
goes on to put forth response strategies to anti-brand behaviour based on a brand’s level 
of equity (Kucuk, 2008). Kucuk’s typology thus points to the type of mitigation strategies, 
even when dealing with bad actors that seek no resolution, that could be relevant to how 
political parties address Computation Propoganda, and the bots-as-bad-actors. While 
there is a growing amount of research relating to anti-branding from a website perspective, 
Bokor’s wider reaching Brand Destruction on social media theory has not gained 
significant traction, most likely because attacks by customers or the general public is 
considered to fall within the ambit of crisis communication. Kucuk (2008) shows that the 
literature often obscures the difference between anti-branding and complaint or evaluation 
platforms. The issue with this however is that existing crisis communication theory does 
not take into account the vindictive actions of competitors, or other automated bad actors 
who generate firestorms with no intention of achieving resolution or enacting a behavioural 
change. 
 
2.1.5 Computational Propaganda  
Researchers at the forefront of Computational Propaganda research and founders of 
Oxford’s Computational Propaganda Project, Samuel Woolley and Philip Howard, have 
undertaken a two-year project to analyse social media platforms, national security 
incidents and political crises around the globe. The ground-breaking, extensive research 
into Computational Propaganda has led them to define it as: “[t]he use of algorithms, 
automation and human curation to purposefully distribute misleading information over 
social media networks” (Woolley and Howard, 2017).  
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Given that Computational Propaganda research is still in its infancy, researchers 
worldwide have cooperated to form the Computational Propaganda Project and hence 
opposing perspectives are not yet prominent. However, the literature does cover some 
different perspectives on the use of algorithms, automation and human curation, which are 
key elements within Computational Propaganda. 
 
2.1.5.1 Algorithmic filtering 
Research undertaken by We Are Social indicates that the world’s population of three billion 
social media users spend up to three hours and 57 minutes a day on social media (We Are 
Social, 2018). While one dimension of this stickiness relates to our ability to connect to the 
content and people closest to us (Mosseri, 2018). The other dimension of this stickiness 
comes as a result of algorithms designed to keep users engaged on platforms, by serving 
tailored content and adverts based on user interests. Early Facebook investor and advisor 
to Mark Zuckerberg, Roger McNamee (2018) crystalizes this assertion by indicating that 
these algorithms have allowed social media platforms to commoditise user attention to the 
extent that the technology community often refer to advertisers as social media’s true 
customers, while social media users are referred to as the product. For this reason, 
Howard (2018) suggests that social media’s ubiquity, coupled with users’ ability to 
veraciously consume content, creates an ideal target for political operators to manipulate 
and deceive, especially when taking into account the highly automated nature of newsfeed 
algorithms and their predisposition for serving users with tailored, engaging content, which 
is sometimes inflammatory, and often emotive and polarizing (Brady et al., 2017). 
 
In “Gatekeeping Algorithms with Human Ethical Bias”, Dr Martijn Van Otterlo (2018) draws 
on Eli Pariser’s work which investigates the rise of internet filters that narrow the amount of 
information we see based on preferences (Pariser, 2011). Van Otterlo (2018) indicates 
that algorithms have the potential to create filter bubbles which can reinforce people’s 
biases; conversely, he also indicates that disallowing some content may be seen as a form 
of censorship given the size of Facebook’s more than 1.7 billion active users.  Ciampaglia 
(2017) is a little more nuanced in his assessment of algorithmic filtering and points out that 
biases are a natural element of social behaviour and to exist in a world with limited 
attention spans, social media platforms need to tune their algorithms for engagement and 
popularity signals. He does however acknowledge that algorithmic bias coupled with the 
‘homophilistic’ structure of social networks are a cause for concern given their potential to 
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create echo chambers. Finally, he indicates that solutions for filter bubbles are a moving 
target for computational social scientists due to the fact that social media platforms are 
continuously tuning their algorithms. 
 
The concern related to filter bubbles is in stark contrast to the future envisioned by 
scholars such as Professor Yochai Benkler (2006) who, during the rise of Web 2.0, 
theorised about a future “networked information economy” where platforms like Wikipedia 
would bring about the democratisation of information due to the rise of user generated 
content and social production or decentralised, consensus based information. Akin Unver 
(2017) reinforces this idealistic notion by pointing out that the rise of digital connectedness 
was supposed to do good for democracy by helping to give representation to 
disenfranchised segments of the population.  
 
One might argue that Yochai Benklers idealistic prediction was made before the rise of 
platforms like Facebook, which, due to the sheer number of its user base, is viewed in 
developing countries as the internet itself (Mirani, 2015).  Benkler’s prediction also 
assumes that the internet simply connects people, whereas Howard, Woolley and Calo 
(2018, p. 81) believe this is not the case because the web 2.0 internet connects people 
through a layer of technology or “an interface, platform, or network which someone has 
designed”. They further argue that algorithms may be prone to reinforce the biases of their 
creators. 
  
Unver (2017) agrees with Howard, Woolley and Calos’s (2018) assertion, arguing that 
algorithms have created polarisation and confusion within online communities through the 
oversupply of information. These concerns are a central tenet to the study of algorithmic 
bias (Garcia-Gathright, Springer and Cramer, 2018), but it also points to how algorithms 
can assist in the ‘weaponisation’ (Ahmed, Kuchler and Garrahan, 2018) of social media.   
 
In contrast to the popular critiques around algorithms, Messing and Westwood (2014) 
question the growing apprehension towards algorithmic filtering. They argue that selective 
exposure was inherent in watching television, reading the newspaper and consuming web 
1.0, and this reduced the public’s exposure to ‘counterattitudinal’ content well before 
algorithms gained prominence. Messing and Westwood (2014) go further to indicate that 
social media users, with their connections to colleagues, friends, family and 
acquaintances, are more likely to come into contact with diverse political views and 
21 
 
opinions. Most importantly, their research suggests that social sharing of political articles 
act as social endorsement, because more people with diverse views read it since social 
endorsements are a stronger predictor of news selection than news source. Flaxman, Goel 
and Rao (2016) subsequently conducted research using browsing data to investigate the 
veracity of both the filter bubble and social endorsement theory. They found a higher 
ideological segregation amongst articles discovered via social media channels, however, 
they also found that the websites visited were associated with high exposure to direct 
visitors with opposing perspectives, ultimately finding in favour of both sides of the debate. 
 
Algorithmic filtering remains an area of great debate within both the computational social 
science and technological arena (Ciampaglia, 2017). Unfortunately, scientists’ ability to 
come to a definitive understanding of its effects may not be feasible given that these 
algorithms are proprietary, change constantly, and form a critical part of social networks’ 
revenue generation models (Hosanagar and Jair, 2018). For this reason, how these 
algorithms work and their effects may remain hidden under a veil of secrecy. 
 
 
2.1.5.2 Automation  
According to Woolley and Howard (2017), bots are automated programs integral to the 
spread of Computational Propaganda and are built to perform simple, repetitive, robotic 
tasks rapidly. Due to their wide-ranging abilities, bots have been used successfully to 
spread misinformation. However, Anstead, Carr, Halford, Murthy, Powell, Tinati and Weal 
(2016, p. 4955) view bots as a “subcategory of algorithmic media elements, because they 
are programmed to intervene in the way knowledge and information is communicated”. 
Combining these two positions, Unver (2017) suggests that bots and algorithmically-
generated search results can operate in tandem to disrupt the flow of information with 
incorrect or old information.  
 
Ultimately these theoretical perspectives indicate that bot nets and algorithmic filtering 
have worked hand-in-hand to spread misinformation on social networks due to the bot’s 
ability quickly disseminate inflammatory content widely so users can engage. Engagement 
ultimately leads to more users seeing the content as a result of how social network 
algorithms were designed. While the 2016 American presidential election was a watershed 
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moment which saw the evolution of Computational Propaganda techniques (Howard, 
2018), automation in the form of bots have long been identified as an early tool for the 
spread of misinformation on social media. The earliest documented large-scale instance 
originated in Russia when 14 million tweets targeting Ukrainian citizens were published by 
1.3 million fake accounts between February 2014 and December 2015 (Woolley and 
Howard, 2017).  
 
Phillip Howard (2018) outlines five tactics employed by bot nets to achieve nefarious 
political ends on social media. The first tactic is termed Zombie Electioneering, which is 
the use of bots to give the appearance of wide support for a political candidate by 
automated commenting, scripted dialogue and other means.  The second method, termed 
astroturfing is the technique of making an electoral campaign appear to originate from a 
grassroots effort, appearing to have public consensus where there is none. Third is 
hashtag jacking, which is the practise of appropriating a candidate’s hashtag to distribute 
spam and undermine support. Retweet storms are the fourth commonly used tactic which 
entails simultaneously reposting or retweeting posts or tweets by hundreds or thousands 
of other bots. The last tactic employed is strategic flagging, which is the use of bots to flag 
legitimate content as inappropriate, which can lead to erroneous deletion by social media 
platforms (Howard, 2018) .  
 
Automated bot networks have become a popular weapon in the Computational 
Propaganda arsenal. Ciampaglia (2017) points out that social bots, despite being 
responsible for the spread of large amounts of misinformation, can be employed to positive 
ends. Howard and Kollanyi (2016) reinforce this notion by pointing out that bots can 
perform tasks that range from legitimate actions like sharing news, updating feeds, 
responding to customer queries, and fact checking, which suggests that good bots can be 
deployed in the fight against misinformation. As reassuring as this suggestion might be, 
empirical research conducted by Murthy et al. (2016) points out that creating and 
deploying bots effectively requires technological, social, economic, and temporal capital, 
which suggests that only people, institutions or organisations with large financial resources 
are able to implement successful fact-checking or counter propaganda campaigns using 
automation. 
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2.1.5.3 Curation 
According to Santini et al. (2018) bots are the most widely investigated manipulation 
agents when it comes to computational propaganda, but trolls who curate and propagate 
content can also be used to create noise. Research conducted by Oxford’s Computational 
Propaganda project indicates that social media curation by trolls formed a fundamental 
part of Russia’s Internet Research Agency’s misinformation attacks during the 2016 US 
Presidential election (Francois, Ganesh, Howard, Kelly and Liotsiou, 2018). A key finding 
of the research, which drew on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Instagram data between 
2015 and 2017, is that a total of 195 032 content pieces were posted on these platforms, 
and resulted in more than thirty million shares, thirty eight million likes, and three million 
comments (Francois, Ganesh, Howard, Kelly and Liotsiou, 2018).  
These posts, which were made to appear as being posted by concerned American 
citizens, received exponentially more traction that misinformation adverts and bot 
propagated content run at the same time (Salinas, 2018). The difference between this 
campaign and regular bot networks was that some posts referred to Russian troll farms 
with messages of denial, while other accounts complained about the various social media 
platforms’ political biases when faced with the prospect of being suspended. These 
dynamic responses to common complaints about bots made the trolling appear to be more 
authentic and effective due to being operated by humans (Howard et al., 2018). 
 
In a summary of worldwide computational propaganda events which was compiled by 
Oxford’s Computational Propaganda project, Woolley and Howard point out that some of 
the most powerful forms of computational propaganda involve the coupling of algorithmic 
distribution and human curation (Woolley and Howard, 2017). The findings of Francois, 
Ganesh, Howard, Kelly and Liotsiou’s 2018 report reinforce this assertion by pointing out 
that the success of the Russian’s organic campaign came as a result of Russian’s Internet 
Research Agency’s use of click farms and their fluency in American trolling culture. Santini 
et al. (2018) indicate that there is a growing trend of combining human action, big data, 
and automation to refine the application of Computational Propaganda. The level of 
sophistication due to dynamism inherent with having humans curate content suggests that 
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a single technological, legal or platform-based measure is not enough to reduce the effects 
of computational propaganda, but a multi-disciplinary approach may be required. 
 
2.1.6 Online Reputation Management 
The interactive collaborative nature of web 2.0 has created an environment where a 
brands’ meaning is no longer what corporate organisations say they are, but are rather a 
negotiated construct between brand users and the creators of these brands (Ligas and 
Cotte, 1999). In Managing Online User Brand Risk, Verwey and Muir (2014) make mention 
of web-based power struggles between marketers and consumers who challenge 
accepted branding truths and paradigms, which has given rise to the discipline of Online 
Reputation Management, more commonly known as ORM. By definition, Online 
Reputation Management is the practice of monitoring media, detecting relevant contents, 
analysing what people say about an entity and if necessary, interacting with customers 
(Amigo, Artiles, Gonzalo, Spina, Liu and Corujo, 2010). Coupled to this definition, Amigo et 
al. (2010) point out that negative comments in online media can seriously harm 
organisations and therefore ORM has become increasingly important. Portmann (2012) 
takes the basis of the Amigo et al. definition and provides a more succinct and proactive 
definition for online reputation management; he points out that online reputation 
management is not only the task of monitoring but also addressing or rectifying 
undesirable or negative search engine results pages, or mentions on social media. 
According Cerebra, one of South Africa’s leading social media management agencies, in 
the South African context Online Reputation Management is a two-stage process where 
the task of monitoring, detecting and analysing content falls within the ambit of the social 
media analyst function, while the job of addressing, interacting and responding falls under 
the responsibility of the community manager (Beale, 2012).   Cottica, Melançon and 
Renoust (2017) outline the importance and dynamism inherent in community management 
by indicating that successful online communities employ professionals sometimes called 
community managers or moderators who mediate conflict, police unwanted behaviour, and 
influence emergent social dynamics because online communities encompass interactions 
by many individuals.  
 
25 
 
These definitions and descriptions suggest that community managers are often on the 
front lines, defending and protecting brand equity when organisations face brand risk 
situations on social networks and online communications channels. Syme (2014) 
corroborates this and goes on to show that individuals managing social media for brands 
are required to be communications professionals, with creative sensibilities and 
backgrounds in marketing. Syme (2014) also points out the ability to recognise the warning 
signs of a crisis, create triage responses, respond in brand voice, understand crisis cycles 
and operate under pressure as being key abilities of social media or community managers. 
Ultimately, the contributions of Syme (2014), Cottica, Melançon and Renoust (2017), 
Beale (2012), Portmann (2012) and Amigo et al. (2010) indicates the insight, skill and 
value social media community managers can bring to political brands when dealing with 
crises that arise as a result of Computational Propaganda.   
 
2.1.7 Risk Mitigation Strategies 
Taking Bokor’s (2014) assertion “that brand destruction is the intentional destruction of a 
brand by internet users” into account, one can view computational propaganda as a form 
of brand destruction through the use of algorithms and automation. Given that 
Computational Propaganda can create communication crises, it may be possible to use 
existing crisis communication strategies to deal with Computational Propaganda, which is 
the premise of this study. 
 
A number of risk mitigation strategies exist in communications at the moment that may act 
a basis for which to respond to brand risk and Computational Propaganda.Hirschman’s 
(Hirschman, 1970) work on public choice theory titled “Exit, Voice and Loyalty” provides a 
basis for understanding stakeholders’ perceptions and encourages maintaining a dialogue 
with disgruntled stakeholders as this is good for the organisation’s defensive marketing 
efforts. Singh’s Dissatisfaction Response Theory (Singh, 1990) builds on Hirschman’s 
theory and brings into focus how different individuals will react in situations where a brand 
falls short of expectations. 
 
The Dissatisfaction Response Styles Theory indicates certain levels of dissatisfaction can 
be positive, but it also allows us to focus on the stakeholders that are willing to go to great 
lengths to tarnish brands. (Coombs, 2007) puts forth that a crisis can be defined as a 
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sudden and unexpected event that serves to disrupt organisational operations, ultimately 
posing both financial and reputational threats. Coombs (2007) further notes that crisis 
communication begins with attending to concerns of stakeholders from a physical and 
psychological perspective, an assertion that highlights the importance of managing 
perceptions.  
 
Coombs reinforces Benoit's (1995) notion by describing crises as socially constructed 
situations. The key take away from these theories is that it is not facts, but stakeholders’ 
interpretations that matter in a crisis and that these interpretations should be managed 
depending on context (Coombs, 2014). Coomb’s Situational Crisis Communication Theory 
(SCCT), a framework that determines how organisations should respond in times of crisis, 
has become a seminal work in the crisis communication field; scholars have adapted 
SCCT for application in web 2.0 contexts, giving rise to the Blog Mediated Crisis 
Communications model (BMCC) and the Social Mediated Crisis Communication model 
(SMCC) (Cheng, 2018). Coombs’ SCCT and the subsequent SMCC model posited by Liu, 
Austin and Jin (2011) may mean that while a brand may not want to give credence to fake 
news by engaging the agents of Computational Propaganda, it may want to assess the 
perceptions of its followers that come into contact with this propaganda and take action 
(Timothy Coombs and Jean Holladay, 2014).  
 
While existing crisis communications strategies have merit, they do not account for web 
2.0 and the inherent speed, reach, impact and complexity of crisis communications in a 
connected world (Veil, Buehner and Palenchar, 2011). This gap has given rise to the 
concept of online reputation management, which entails assessing stakeholder sentiment, 
identifying discourses and detecting online communication threats (Steenkamp and 
Rensburg, 2016) . Online communication threats are said to differ from communications 
crises of old as they are characterised by high volumes of negative word of mouth, 
disseminated with extreme speed, often with intense indignation and no specific criticism 
(Pfeffer, Zorbach and Carley, 2014). Aula (2010) argues that the interactive nature of 
social media dictates that participation and continuous efforts to create shared meaning is 
encouraged during crises. Aula ( 2010) further states that the unique nature of social 
media crises will result in a general shift from a world of careful planning and strategy, to 
one of continuous uncertainty and risks. 
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2.1.8 Conclusion 
The outlined environment and existing academic theory means that positive brand equity 
can help ensure the long-term survival of political organisations. However, the 
unpredictable nature of social media coupled with computational propaganda can expose 
gaps in existing crisis communication practises because they have a basis in theory 
conceptualised in a time before web 2.0. 
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3 . Chapter 3 
3.1 Research Methodology 
3.1.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the methods with which to explore mitigation strategies for 
Computational Propaganda. Firstly the research approach and rationale will be outlined, 
followed by a description of the sampling strategy; thereafter the method of data collection 
and analysis will be provided. The chapter will close with ethical considerations and 
trustworthiness of interviews conducted to explore mitigation strategies for computational 
propaganda. 
 
3.1.2 Research Approach 
Given that this research serves to explore mitigation strategies for political brands that may 
face Computational Propaganda, it is important to note that although brand value is a 
quantifiable concept, the equity of a brand is often based on subjective concepts like 
judging, feeling and resonance (Keller 2013). As a result, the extent to which 
Computational Propaganda affects a brand in this context cannot be quantified by 
numerical analysis, nor can the effects of mitigating factors. The subjective nature of this 
topic means that the research relies on qualitative data based on the opinions of 
experienced respondents in order to maintain credibility.  
 
According to Creswell (2014) researchers use the qualitative method to probe a topic 
when variables and base theory are unknown. Flick (2015) reinforces this notion by 
indicating that qualitative research is less focused on testing what is known, and instead 
aims to discover new aspects. According to Garner, Kawulich and Wagner (2012) 
qualitative research is concerned with understanding the process, social and cultural 
contexts which shape various behavioural patterns, it strives to create a coherent story as 
seen through the eyes of those who are part of the story. In order to do this, qualitative 
research seeks insights through structured in-depth analysis that is mainly interpretive and 
subjective (Garner, Kawulich and Wagner, 2012). 
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 Creswell references Janice Morse when outlining additional criteria for using a qualitative 
research design; Morse (2011) indicates that a qualitative approach is best employed 
when (1) there is a lack of theory relating to a concept, (2) existing theory may be 
inappropriate, (3) there is a need to explore a phenomenon, or (4) when the nature of the 
phenomenon is not suited to a quantitative approach or cannot be quantified. To this end, 
the phenomenon of Computational Propaganda is a relatively new, which invariably fulfils 
one area of Morse’s criteria, i.e. the lack of theory on the concept. The intention to explore 
strategies, which can mitigate computational propaganda’s effects, dictates that the 
research undertaken was exploratory and thus qualitative. This research report gathered 
insights on how some of South Africa’s most experienced social media managers tackle 
social media crises that arise as a result of Computational Propaganda by gathering their 
opinions on the subject matter. The research approach drew on these social media 
managers’ experience, context, skills and perspectives in order to explore the mitigation 
strategies political parties could implement when facing the threat of Computational 
Propaganda.   
 
3.1.3 Sampling Strategy 
3.1.3.1 Sample Population 
Harper,Laws and Marcus (2007) define sampling as the process of selecting respondents 
within a population, whereas Alvi (2016) defines a population as being all the members 
who meet particular criterion for specified investigation. According to Flick (2015), 
qualitative researchers select participants purposively and integrate small numbers of 
cases based on their relevance, because qualitative research aims to grasp subjective 
meanings of issues from participants’ perspectives. It also brings latent meanings of 
situations into focus so the practises and lives of participants are known. For this reason, 
the researcher is not  required to produce a statistical representative sample as one would 
when conducting quantitative research. Therefore, large sample sizes are not as critical to 
qualitative research as they are to qualitative methods. 
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Given the sequential nature of the research, this study drew on two sample populations: 
the first sample population drew upon social media managers in South Africa, while the 
second sample population drew on political party representatives operating in the 
communications functions of their organisations. Within both these sample populations, 
people have different backgrounds with varying levels of expertise, so a clearly defined 
sample is necessary. 
 
3.1.3.2 The Sample 
The research sample was selected using the purposive, non-probability method wherein a 
population of social media practitioners and political party representatives were drawn 
upon and sampled for in-depth interviews (Creswell 2014). Purposive, non-probability in 
this instance indicates that respondents who were selected to participate in the primary 
research, were selected intentionally using substitute criteria such as work experience and 
areas of expertise within their field of work, and due to this, only certain members of the 
population have been selected to take part in the research (Wagner, Kawulich and Garner, 
2012). Initially, the intent was to interview political party agents, and then based upon their 
insights, approach social media managers for guidance on how to mitigate against 
Computational Propaganda. Unfortunately, due to unavailability of political party agents, 
the opposite occurred. 
 
For the first stage of research the purposive, non-probability approach was taken to select 
eight social media professionals for in-depth interviews (Creswell, 2014). The required 
sample were social media professionals that have had five year’s social media experience 
in addition to experience managing social media accounts of brands represented in 
Ornico’s (2017) African Brand Index, which ranks the top 20 best performing brands on 
social media. Within this ranking system, broadcasters, banks, telecommunications and 
automotive industries received the most representation, which may be a result of these 
industry’s high levels of engagement, large follower sizes and high user involvement. The 
respondents were selected using a snowball sample in which members of a social media 
manager’s forum were asked to refer social media managers who had experience working 
on the telecommunications, bank, broadcast and automotive brands in the Africa Brand 
Index list. The rationale behind selecting social media managers who have experience 
from working on South Africa’s twenty best brands according to Ornico’s 2017 Africa 
Brand Index was based on the notion that the private sector has led innovation at the 
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intersection of brand equity and social media, and is likely to have the most relevant 
insights for political brands facing crises in the space. Large private sector brands with 
large followings are also more likely to have encountered different types of complaint or 
hostile behaviour, which may further assist their political counterparts.  
 
The second sample of respondents were also arrived upon by using the purposive, non-
probability approach. While the initial sample included political party agents responsible for 
managing social media at four of South Africa’s largest political parties, only two parties 
agreed to participate, ultimately this sample was reduced to one due to availability 
problems. 
 
To this end, the research sample for political parties is the Head of Communications in the 
Gauteng branch of South Africa’s largest political party, the ANC. This communications 
officer who actively manages the social media account of the party in the Gauteng offered 
insights on how the ANC was dealing with computational propaganda during these in-
depth interviews. South Africa’s largest party (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2014) is 
relevant to the research because incumbent parties are most susceptible to being victims 
of computational propaganda based on trends from global Computational Propaganda 
research (Woolley and Howard, 2017).  
 
3.1.4 Data Collection 
In-depth interviews were selected as the method of data collection in this research study. 
According to Boyce and Neale (2006), in-depth interviews are a qualitative research 
technique which entails conducting intensive individual interviews with a small number of 
respondents in order to explore new issues in depth. These interviews were conducted 
face-to-face using nine supervisor approved semi-structured interview questions for the 
social media managers and six supervisor approved semi-structured interview questions 
for the political party’s Head of Communications. Cohen (2006) indicates that semi-
structured interviews allow the researcher to follow topical trajectories that may stray from 
interview guides if the researcher determines it to be appropriate. In Mastering the Semi-
Structured Interview and Beyond, Anne Galletta (2013) touches on the strengths of semi-
structured interviews by pointing out that they can help attend to complexity and 
phenomena in need of contextualisation. In addition, Galleta notes that semi-structured 
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interviews are sufficiently structured to address specific dimensions of the research 
question, while leaving space for participants to offer new meanings to the topic of study. 
 
The pitfalls of semi-structured interviews are numerous and the ability to mitigate against 
these pitfalls is highly dependent on the skills of the individuals conducting the interviews. 
Creswell (2014) indicates that the results of in-depth interviews can be negatively 
impacted by the researcher’s presence, which may bias responses; alternatively, data 
captured may be adversely affected by the researcher’s inability to encourage articulation 
on the part of the respondent. Galletta (2014) suggests it is important that the researcher 
pays attention to the respondent’s narrative as it unfolds. Furthermore, the researcher 
must guide respondents with further inquiry while refraining from leading respondents, 
which is ultimately an extremely delicate balance. Respondents of this research study 
were interviewed in neutral public environments; interviews were recorded on two devices, 
while field notes were taken to note respondent’s interactions. Great care was taken to 
extract unique perspectives that may have arisen as a result of answers to initial 
questions, without leading respondents to desired answers. 
 
3.1.5 Data Analysis 
A number of methods can be used to analyse data collected. Woods and Gaber (2016) 
correctly point out that selecting procedures that best meet the philosophic orientation of 
the research is the responsibility of the researcher. However, the researcher must ensure 
methodological rigour regardless of the approach taken. Marshall and Rossman (1999) 
define data analysis as a process of ordering, structuring and providing meaning to a mass 
of collected data. Miles, Huberman and Saldaña’s (2014) approach to content analysis of 
qualitative data, which entails data reduction, data display, verification and coding was 
chosen as a method to analyse the output of the interviews with the social media 
managers. Content analysis is the procedure for analysing textual material of whatever 
origin, it aims to classify the content of texts by categorizing statements, sentences or 
words (Flick, 2015). Creswell (2014) indicates that the intent behind content analysis is to 
make sense out of text and data, which involves segmenting and taking data apart.  
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Elo and Kyngäs (2008) indicate that there are two distinct approaches to content analysis, 
where theory exists, a deductive approach is taken, whereas an inductive approach is 
taken when research is exploratory. The inductive approach focuses on specific units of 
analysis, which are later combined into larger segments or categories.  
According to Flick (2015), when using the inductive approach the content analysis method 
follows four distinct phases. The first phase entails transcribing and summarising the 
content, summarising allows one to omit unimportant or redundant passages. This phase 
is commonly known as the reduction phase. The second phase termed coding, entails 
assigning a code to each recurring subject matter. Coding is essentially a way of grouping 
concepts in categories in order to uncover themes. The third phase entails classifying or 
indexing subject matter under themes outlined in phase two. The fourth phase entails 
presenting the themes in a manner that answers the research question. 
Finally, once the themes from semi-structured interviews were identified, these were 
overlaid with responses from the political party communications officer in order to assess 
existing gaps in the political party’s approach and suggest mitigation strategies that may 
be employed by them. 
 
Although great care was taken to collect and analyse data correctly, one pitfall of the 
research conducted was that data collection and analysis occurred separately. Separating 
the data collection from the data analysis process means that the research conducted 
does not benefit from collecting new data to fill in gaps or test new hypotheses that 
emerge during analysis (Miles, Huberman and Saldaña, 2014). Miles, Huberman and 
Saldaña (2014) suggest a process of concurrent data collection and analysis, which allows 
the researcher to think about existing data and creating strategies for collecting new and 
better data.  
 
3.1.6 Ethics 
Beyond the written consent required by interviewees, the sensitive nature of politics within 
the South African context dictates that it is necessary to represent political party 
representatives and social media managers as anonymous, in keeping with their rights to 
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privacy in accordance with points 11.1 and 11.2 of the University of Johannesburg code of 
academic and research ethics (2007). 
 
An ethical consideration that significantly affects the study’s validity is the ability to test the 
efficacy of computational risk mitigation strategies proposed by social media practitioners. 
It is not possible to test mitigation strategies without engaging in Computational 
Propaganda itself, which contains an element of misinformation. Doing so may have 
damaging effects on individuals that come across it, so this was not done, in accordance 
with point 5.3.2 of the University of Johannesburg’s academic code of conduct (2007) 
 
3.1.7 Trusworthiness  
In order for research to be persuasive and trustworthy it’s important to show that the 
methods and conclusions of the research are credible, transferable, dependable and 
confirmable. Guba (1981). According to Guba (1981), credibility in the context of 
qualitative research refers to the truth-value of a study and the confidence one can have in 
the truth of the research findings, whereas confirmability relates to objectivity or neutrality 
in undertaking the research. Both credibility and confirmability were attained through the 
triangulation of sources (Turner and Turner, 1970), wherein two different populations were 
interviewed. In addition to this, respondents with different perspectives were interviewed 
individually, over different periods of time, in a variety of settings.  
Guber (1981) indicates that two other elements of quality research is the ability for 
academics to transfer findings to other contexts and consistently coming to a similar 
conclusion if research is repeated through stable measurement. These two concepts are 
described as transferability and dependability respectively. The dependability of this study 
was ensured by an auditable trail of data starting with an interview schedule and 
recordings of social media managers and political communications officers based on 
supervisor approved interview questions. These recordings were referred back to the 
respondents after the interviews for their approvals. The respondents subsequently signed 
research consent forms and following this, interviews were thematically coded at both 
stages of the research undertaking.  
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3.1.8 Limitations of the Study 
There may be gaps in how literature reflects the manifestation of Computational 
Propaganda and how this exists in the South African context. In addition to this, the nature 
of South African politics means the sample size from political party’s is small given that 
only one political party agent availed themself to provide insights into how they deal 
Computational Propaganda. The assumption of this study is that social media practitioners 
from the private sector lead social media best practice, although private sector brands are 
often recognised for their excellence, it does not necessarily mean they are equipped or 
have any experience in dealing with individuals who are ideologically motivated and intent 
on wilfully damaging brands.  
 
Furthermore, the unfortunate deviation from the original research design means the 
interviews conducted with the social media managers do not benefit from the context 
created by the interview with the political party’s representative. Despite this, it is important 
to note that the political party agent’s responses were captured without their knowledge of 
the social media manager’s answers. Any alignment or correlation between the social 
media manager’s responses and those of the political party representative indicates that 
the political party is engaging in some positive practices. 
 
In addition to the limitations illustrated above, the data collection and analysis phases were 
done one after the other, which present a problem from a research optimisation 
perspective. According to Miles, Huberman and Saldaña (2014), the data collection from 
the data analysis process means that the research conducted does not benefit from 
collecting new data to fill in gaps or test new hypotheses that emerge during analysis. 
Given that the research aims to provide insights, the small sample size, unique context 
and use of the purposeful non-probability sampling method mean that the research may 
not be generalisable. 
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4 . Chapter 4 
4.1 Exploring mitigation strategies for computational 
propaganda 
4.1.1 Introduction 
The research data codified in the following passages originate from eight interviews 
conducted with social media managers who have experience operating in a wide range of 
industries from telecommunications, banking, broadcasting, automotive, petrochemicals, 
retail, and airlines. The respondents surveyed all have a minimum five years of social 
media working experience, having operated as hands-on community managers and 
subsequently played strategic roles leading social media teams. This selection ensures 
respondents have the right balance of hands-on experience attending to comments, 
queries, complaints and crises; mixed with the ability and experience from operating at 
strategic levels on the social media accounts of South Africa’s biggest brands.  
 
In order to attain a wide range of perspectives, social media managers who work both for 
corporates and agencies were interviewed. According to Mike Stopforth, founder of 
Cerebra, one of South Africa’s most awarded social media agencies, outsourcing 
corporate social media is a short term solution (Mike Stopforth, 2014) and over the long 
term, corporates should insource this function. Recently, insourcing has become a trend 
amongst large organisations and has led the rise of the social media community 
management function taken internally. While social media agencies have long operated at 
the cutting edge of social media management, it is important to incorporate perspectives of 
those managing social media accounts within organisations, because political parties may 
be taking the same approach due to the sensitive nature of their work. To that end, three 
respondents represented internal corporate-based social media teams, while five 
respondents were agency-based. Job titles amongst respondents surveyed include, Social 
Media Account Director, Group Online Media Manager, Head of Social Media, Social 
Media Director, Social Media Strategist, Digital Social Media Content Manager, Social 
Content Lead, and Social Media Brand Manager.  
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After the interviews were conducted they were transcribed for analysis, which entailed 
outlining common themes and ascribing codes to these themes.  
The data was then organised and displayed according to each respondent’s answers so 
as to illustrate patterns, the rationale being that commonalities in responses might present 
possible mitigation strategies that political parties can further explore and bring light to 
important issues that should be considered when coming into contact with computational 
propaganda. What follows is a code matrix showing main themes uncovered in interviews. 
Interview Code Matrix 
Question Respondents 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 
1         
2 ACCS,ORM 
OBJ 
OBJ, ORM OBJ, 
ORM, 
BRAND 
ORM ORM, 
ACCS, 
OBJ 
ORM, OBJ ORM,  OBJ, STRAT, 
ENGA, 
SMMC, 
ACSC, ORM 
3 RSK, 
PRACT 
RSK RSK RSK RSK RSK   
4 BRAND, 
ITCM, 
PRACT, 
SMMC 
INTCOM, 
PRACT 
SMMC, 
INTCOM 
SMMC, 
INTCOM, 
ACCS, 
ENGA 
PRACT,  SMMC, 
ENGA, 
PRACT, 
INTCOM, 
PRACT 
INTCOM, 
PRACT 
5 STRAT, 
BRAND, 
SMMC, 
CALM 
 BRAND, 
CALM, 
SMMC. 
OBJ 
BRAND, 
ACCS, 
ENGA 
ACCS, 
CALM, 
OBJ, 
BRAND 
BRAND, 
ORM, 
ALFIL, 
STRAT 
BRAND, 
SMMC, 
CALM 
STRAT, 
SMMC, 
OBJ,BRAND, 
CALM   
6 AUTO AUTO ENGA AUTO, 
ALFIL 
BRAND AUTO AUTO AUTO, 
ENGA 
7 CALM CALM, 
BRAND 
CALM, 
BRAND 
PRACT, 
BRAND, 
CALM 
 PRACT ALFIL ALFIL, 
INTCOM, 
PRACT 
8 INTCOM, 
BRAND 
INTCOM, 
BRAND 
INTCOM SMMC, 
PRACT 
SMMC PRACT, 
SMMC, 
BRAND, 
INTCOM 
INTCOM, 
CALM, 
BRAND 
CALM, 
INTCOM 
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9 ENGA ENGA ALFIL ENGA, 
CENS 
CENS CENS ENGA ENGA 
 
The table below provides descriptions to the codes contained in the matrix above. 
 Code Matrix Descriptions 
Code Description  
ACCS Accessibility: Ability for users to openly engage political parties 
ALF Algorithmic Filtering: Algorithms that filter information served to social 
media users based on their interests or what users are most likely to 
engage with. 
AUTO Automation: Use of digital technology to perform repetitive tasks, 
commonly used to refer to bots. 
BRAND Brand Identity: Brand image, tone, personality, logo and graphics. 
Elements by which brands are commonly identified. 
CENS Censorship: Suppression of communication 
CALM Communication Alignment: Similar policy-based messaging from all 
members of a political organisation 
RSK Digital Brand Risk:  Any element that can diminish total brand value 
online.  
INTCM Integrated Communication: Communicating the same message across 
media channels in channel-relevant way. 
ORM Online Reputation Management: Detecting and analysing content then 
interacting online with consumers based on this analysis. 
OBJ Operational Objectives: Objectives that concern the day-to-day social 
media management. 
PRAC Proactive Communication: Proactive engagement with customers via 
social media. 
SMMC Social Media Crisis Communication: The process of responding to crises 
on social media with the intention of de-escalating such crises. 
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ENGA Social Media Engagement 
STRAT Strategy: Long-term plan social media plan intended to reach a specific 
aim. 
 
What follows is a discussion of the research data based on the themes presented, this will 
be contrasted against responses received from a regional head of communications from 
South Africa’s largest political party. The main themes arising from the semi-structured 
interviews centred around issues of Brand Identity, Communications Alignment, 
Communication Integration, Social Mediated Online Reputation Management. Ancillary 
themes centred around Engagement, Algorithmic filtering and Censorship versus Freedom 
of Speech; while the ancillary themes did not feature prominently there were deemed 
important to include given the framework of critical modernism that has been employed for 
this study.  
 
The interviews with social media managers revealed a strong interplay amongst certain 
themes, so for the purpose of coherence, the themes uncovered in the content analysis 
have been grouped as follows. 
Preventative measures: 
• Brand Identity 
• Communication Alignment 
 
Defensive measures: 
• Online Reputation Management 
• Communication Integration 
 
Contextual Considerations: 
• Algorithmic filtering and engagement 
• Freedom of speech and censorship. 
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4.1.2 Preventative Measures 
The overarching commonality between respondents was that they worked in general to 
prevent communications crises. These themes relate to measures political parties can put 
in place to help prevent or reduce the likelihood that they fall victim to social media crises 
in general or as a result of Computational Propaganda.  
 
4.1.2.1 Issues of brand identity 
In most of the interviews conducted with social media managers, the most prominent 
theme related to a focus on brand identity, and how political parties can import stringent 
brand management (Ahmed, Lodhi and Ahmad, 2017) practices from the private sector in 
order to improve their social media impact and protect political brands in communications 
crises’.  
As a starting point, it was acknowledged that the principles of brand management on 
social media apply to political parties in the same way they do to corporates, as pointed 
out by respondent 6 (R6): “… they [political parties] are a brand with a reputation that they 
need to build and protect. … the things that we do as social media managers relate to 
protecting brands and creating brand affinity with our audience and at the end of the day 
that is what a political party is, they want to create brand affinity with an audience so that 
audience can vote for them.” 
Respondent 1 (R1) essentially affirms the relevance of brands in the political context as 
postulated by Ahmed, Lodhi and Ahmad (2017). Respondent 3 (R3) brings a little more 
detail to Respondent 6’s example by pointing out how corporates use brand based tools to 
enact effective social media management: “I think to be honest many people say it's 
supposed to be strategic and high level, for me the most important things are really the 
basics, so for example, a brand tone and a good moderation plan. So when I speak to you 
is your approach to reply or not say anything, what kind of plan do you have in place for 
negative and positive experiences?” Further to this, three respondents noted that the 
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) are one of the best parties at effectively at managing 
their brand. They went further to point out that this effectiveness has extended into social 
media, to the point that their single-minded message has rallied like-minded individuals 
around their cause.  
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To this end, Respondent 7 (R7) says: “If you go online, be consistent, have a message 
and stand by it. If you respond to every troll, you’ll never get to why people should think 
you’re interesting and vote for you. … With the EFF next year it's going to be land and 
every EFF person in this country, the only thing they will say is we want the land, you can 
say what you want until you’re blue in the face.”  
Respondent 1 (R1) confirms Respondent 7’s (R7) assessment: “Have a strategy that 
speaks back to your values, stick to your guns on social media, if you’re argumentative be 
that, don’t change because you’re on social media, they [EFF] act on social media just as 
they do in parliament.”  
 
Another theme linked to brand identity is related to how political parties can use their 
brands as a bulwark against attacks. Regarding this, one respondent (R4) noted: 
“Although political organisations do have a level of branding, I do think it’s not as as 
heavily invested in from a protection perspective.”  
 
Brand management in the context of protection, is the notion that continuous investment in 
brand identity, and how stringent adherence to good branding principles can give political 
brands the ability to passively defend against attacks or communications crisis. By 
ensuring good brand management, political parties help social media audiences identify 
that they are potentially dealing with misinformation, because the content they see from 
bad actors does not fit with their brand’s values. Alternatively, good brand management 
can help audiences recognise that a piece of fake content does not originate from the 
brand it is purported to be from because the content does not fit the organisation’s 
corporate identity.  
 
Respondent 5, (R5) affirms this idea with her illustration on the power of good brand 
governance wherein she points out how a social media account she manages experienced 
an account hack. Her team were quickly alerted to the hack by fans of the brand because 
the messages and comments published by their account were not in accordance with the 
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brand’s established tone: “We were getting a lot of messages from fans saying, guys 
what’s wrong, what’s going on, your tone of voice is off, everything is wrong.” 
 
Respondent 2 (R2) reinforces the power of good brand practice by suggesting this allows 
parties to be selective in what misinfortmation they attend to. Respondent 2 does so by 
pointing out that internet users have become savvy and are able to indentify 
unsophisticated computational propaganda: “Internet users are becoming savvy to fakes 
and frauds. They notice if logos aren’t correct and even grammatical errors.”  
Respondent 7 (R7) verifies Respondent 2’s (R2) take on this change: “What I’ve seen in 
the last few years is the general social media population wising up to identifying fake 
accounts and we tend not to react as quickly.” 
Respondent 5 reinforces the idea that strong brands can be selective in their responses to 
social crises as a result of brand power and an acknowledgment that a response can be 
risky because it has potential to bring more attention to the crisis or misinformation: “You 
need to look at your monitoring tools to decide if something is worth responding to. You’ve 
got to look at it like minority versus the majority of stuff, sometimes stuff might have a 
small spike and then die out ...otherwise you risk bringing more eyeballs.”  
 
Respondent 6 however, indicates that some political parties, specifically the EFF, have 
managed to implement branding principles successfully to the extent that they do not need 
to defend themselves in times of crisis. Respondent 6 is the fourth person in our sample of 
eight to positively reference the EFF’s use of social media:  
I’m not sure if it’s the result of the party’s strategy or if it’s a result of the community, but 
they [the EFF] have built a strong brand on Twitter to the point that if you say something 
negative, there is this EFF Twitter army that will defend them. 
 
In contrast to Respondent 6’s glowing assessment, Respondent 1 suggests that the EFF’s 
loyal following may not be the result of good brand practices, but rather the use of 
Computational Propaganda. Respondent 1 alludes to this in their response to whether they 
are familiar with communications crises that have been initiated by bot networks or fake 
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accounts: “Whenever someone tweets something negative about the EFF, there’s a flurry 
of tweets defending them. There is also an increase in social media accounts with partially 
incorrect black names that are tweeting against the EFF. There’s a lot of that right now, 
another thing is we’re headed to election year next year.”  
 
Respondent 1’s assessment is ratified by research conducted by Superlinear and Daily 
Maverick (Haffajee, 2019), which suggests the EFF has engaged in four ‘disinformation 
campaigns’ to date. The data, which was collected over the course of three years, uses 
network analysis to indicate the EFF has been able to mobilise vast networks of Twitter 
users to shape narratives around Pravin Gordhan, VBS Mutual Bank, Eskom and the 
SARS Rogue Unit. In two instances, this social media activity spilled over to traditional 
media. A point of contention however, is whether bot networks, or human curation initiated 
these disinformation campaigns.  
 
The respondent’s identification of the EFF as having good social media capabilities 
coupled with evidence of their Computational Propaganda activities suggest that 
Computational Propaganda is more sophisticated than the respondents think, and that 
some of our respondent’s suggestions, may not be effective mitigation strategies due to 
not having an appreciation of Computational Propaganda’s sophistication. Despite this 
potential flaw, it’s important to point out that the concept of brand identity being an 
important defence mechanism against crises and misinformation is in line with Timothy 
Coombs’ (2007) Situational Crisis Communication Model outlined in Chapter 1. The 
Situational Crisis Communication Model takes the contextual nature of an organisation’s 
reputational threat into account before suggesting response strategies. According to 
Coombs, one of the key aspects affecting an organisation’s ability to respond to a threat is 
the organisations reputation or brand equity at the time of crisis.  
Interestingly, the political party respondent was in close alignment to social media 
managers on the importance of upholding stringent brand management practises in order 
to mitigate against the effects of fake news. The respondent indicates that the biggest 
threat to political parties and media in general is fake news: “Anybody can create 
content and anybody can publish content, so the security of content is not really, well there 
is no security of content really, because of that you have to build your reputation and 
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credibility. Branding and imagery, PR, your image management becomes very important 
so that people know by looking they can pick up what is fake and what is not, I think we’re 
getting better at it.”  
 
The ANC Respondent nevertheless acknowledged that improvement should be made in 
this regard. In terms of consistency in brand tone, the respondent indicates that the party 
has noted the interactive value of social media, so great effort is made to ensure 
consistency before any content is published or announcements are made: “We've had to 
adapt the way in which we communicate because it's quick and because it's immediate, 
everything has got to go at the same time to everybody. So the way we package our 
communication is to be able to prepare adequately for responses to possible issues that 
may come up in whatever we raise.”  
 
With that being said, the respondent also gives an indication that the party also aim to play 
to the strengths of social media, which is its interactivity, suggesting that an overemphasis 
on playing it safe in order to mitigate against brand risk may prevent the party from 
achieving its goals: “In Gauteng we have the highest population of the country 
concentrated in the smallest area space and the majority of those are young people, so if 
you really want to reach citizens and interact with them and have meaningful public 
participation at government level, you’ve got to use social media”. 
The respondent further argues: “As head of communications portfolio in the province my 
role and responsibility in the party is what we call the battle of ideas, which is to discuss 
and engage with society on critical issues and political discourse both internally and 
externally, both in the government and party, the goal is to interact with society.”  
 
The respondent raises an important consideration for political parties about the balance 
between well planned and produced content that conforms with corporate identity, versus 
ephemeral content which is growing in popularity amongst the youth. Ephemeral content is 
raw in-the-moment social media content that disappears within 24 hours (Sheetrit, 2017), it 
serves to communicate authenticity and capture real live situations, taking the form of live 
broadcasts on Facebook and Instagram or short video stories on Facebook, Instagram, 
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SnapChat and WhatsApp. Ephemeral content has been identified as an increasingly 
effective way to connect and engage with millennial social media users (Andrews, 2018), 
which makes striking a balance an important consideration. 
 
4.1.2.2 Communications Alignment 
The second prominent theme uncovered in the content analysis related to communication 
alignment. More specifically, it focuses on how disparate messaging negatively impacts 
political party brands’ social media efforts, and puts these political parties in a position of 
vulnerability. Respondent 8 (R8) touches lightly on communication alignment with 
reference to brand, indicating that documented processes are important for governance 
and communication alignment: “A social media playbook and guide is so important, it 
shows individuals how they show up online. In corporate, you don’t have a problem where 
employees speak for brands unless they’re CEOs, in political parties there are individual 
representatives too.” 
 
Respondent 3 (R3) points out that alignment can act as a defence mechanism, ultimately 
closing gaps that may open political organisations up to misinformation and false 
narratives: “What we need to do is ensure consistency around that truth, authenticity as 
well as an unyielding commitment to living out that truth…a brand has to ensure that all 
platforms and touch points have a level of consistency, so if someone does believe 
something about your brand, you can prove them wrong.”  
 
Respondent 1 (R1) further reinforces the importance of alignment, while pointing out the 
potential pitfalls that come with not having the correct procedures on place. “Parties like 
the ANC will have one area of the organisation tweet something that’s totally out of step 
with what the entire organisation is saying. It’s important to have checks and balances. 
Also don’t have random accounts, the ANC has dormant accounts that aren’t being used, 
they have accounts that are just existing, which ultimately become easy pickings for 
hackers.”  
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Respondent 4 also touches on how hackers and impersonators can aid in the spread of 
misinformation by referring to a recent crisis at the Global Citizen Festival, wherein 
criminals targeted concert goers en masse. Respondent 4 alleges that the 
communications crisis the South African Police Service (SAPS) dealt with was 
exacerbated by a parody account that was impersonating the South African Minister of 
Police. “We see today for example the Global Citizen concert that happened on Sunday 
and the subsequent problems that ensued at various locations including service stations, 
there was a parody account for the Commissioner of Police Bheki Cele, and that parody 
account was leaving comments and people were thinking that this was the official 
minister.”  
 
Hackers are not the only worry for non-aligned political organisations on social media, 
according to two respondents, political party community managers and representatives 
risk being bated into emotive exchanges, leaving themselves at odds with their party’s 
communication objectives. This type of misalignment ultimately creates more opportunities 
for bad actors to capture these exchanges and use them for nefarious purposes. 
Respondent 3 (R3) touches on the potential for individuals to be baited into negative 
exchanges: “It’s so important to have your themes and [content] pillars set out initially so 
your message is clear and you aren’t sort of tempted to sway and put your own view in, 
especially when it’s political.”  
 
Respondent 7 gives context to the importance of alignment amongst key political figures 
by providing some contextual examples. The respondent then proceeds to bolster the 
importance of alignment by providing perspective on its role in one of South Africa’s most 
impactful Computational Propaganda campaigns: “It’s like the DA, there’s a guy in PE, 
Renaldo Gouws, his individual views are always clear, but they don’t always align with the 
DA’s views or policies…You need a core party strategy and then to think of a strategy and 
a process for individuals as well … I think the Gupta campaign was so hard to defuse 
because there was a definite golden thread, and message that ran through all of it. As the 
media, rival political parties and citizens, we were fighting all these individuals, but that 
campaign definitely had a singular golden thread.” 
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 Although Respondent 7 touches on the effectiveness of a Computational Propaganda 
campaign, the respondent inadvertently reinforces the argument for succinct brand identity 
coupled with message alignment which are two key constructs of integrated marketing 
communication, which according to Baalen and Mulder (2016) enables companies to 
integrate promotional mix elements with elements of brand so as to create a unified 
message.  
 
When describing the social media operating structure of the ANC, the political party 
respondent went to great lengths to indicate that the party had well-defined approval 
structures with a centralised communication function at the center: “The use of official 
accounts for content and centralising communications has helped, so in the ANC you have 
dedicated spokespersons. During elections it does get a bit blurred because of the amount 
of work that we do on a daily basis, but still the communication lines are quite defined in 
ANC. So in each structure there's a political head responsible for the content, so that's the 
office of the secretariat where it’s the secretary their deputies and the spokespersons, so 
the three of us are responsible for everything that goes out. In terms of social media you 
would have people that create content whether its visual content it doesn't matter but it 
goes out on approval.”  
 
The respondent does however indicate there are instances in which unsanctioned 
messaging is published. This indication may point to merit in Respondent 3’s assertion that 
those managing the accounts of political parties could risk being baited into negative 
exchanges due to an inability to separate one’s own opinions from those of the party. The 
respondent does however indicate that in instances where this occurs, the party is quick to 
distance itself from such views: “Where you may have seen, or when it [the approval 
process] doesn’t happen and political principals haven’t approved it, then we’re quick to 
say that this is staff of the organisation or whatever. It does create a bit of a PR mess 
sometimes but we do disown PR content that's not approved.”  
 
The respondent goes further to indicate that the party also has issues of alignment 
between individual party brands and the political party brand as indicated by Respondents 
7 and 3: “Another threat is the blurred lines of party position versus personal views. So an 
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official of the party would say something, which is his personal views, which he has a right 
to do, but, if they straddle into areas of policy it becomes really difficult, so that's always a 
threat. It's not possible to… we do have communications protocol, it's in black and white 
it's approved, everybody has them, but you're not always able to police human behaviour. 
At the end of it you find yourself always having to put out fires or reminding people what 
they can and can't do. I think another threat especially for an organisation is when internal 
mechanisms are not as effective as they should be, you then find members turning to 
social media to express frustrations and irritations.”  
 
While approval processes do exist within the party, social media is fast paced, and for an 
organisation aiming to engage with youth on its platforms, consideration should be given to 
process behind reactive engagements on social media where exchanges are rapid and 
require quick thinking. Ultimately this candid response reinforces the importance of 
Respondent 3’s suggestion that political parties set out content pillars and clear policy 
indicating response do’s and don’ts when staff respond from official party accounts. In 
terms of individual versus party views, it may beneficial to either enforce disciplinary 
measures or delineate what party representatives can include in their social media 
biography, such as party affiliations, this is a practice that is common in the private sector. 
That being said, political parties do not operate in a vacuum, robust opinions, ideas and 
debate are core to the arena in which politicians operate. So while there may be merit in 
suggestions from social media managers who suggest individual communication policies 
be implemented, they provide this advice without having an appreciation that debate and 
discourse is a key performance indicator for the political party’s social media team.  
 
The data gathered from social media managers and the political party respondent indicate 
that good brand management practices like adherence to corporate identity and 
communication consistency can help reduce the risk of Computational Propaganda. For 
the ANC at least, this seems to be an area of focus, and may apply to other political 
parties. Unfortunately, a focus on brand identity and alignment of messaging across 
political party brands can only assist to minimise the effects of Computational Propaganda 
in very specific instances, such as instances of misinformation as a result of impersonation 
of accounts or political parties. Other instances relate to when inflammatory content is 
shared and made to look as if it originates from a particular party. While the measure 
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outlined may be effective against these forms of misinformation, they are but two ways of 
combatting Computational Propaganda so that those who come into contact with it are not 
affected by it. The following passages look at respondents’ suggestions on how to actively 
deal with the spread of misinformation as a social media manager. 
 
4.1.3 Defensive Measures 
The common characteristic of themes within the defensive measures cluster is that they 
are a step beyond the passive solutions offered by the social media managers, and entail 
methods in which to actively react and manage communication crises that arise as a result 
of computational propaganda. These measures, when assessed, ostensibly draw on two 
areas in particular: online reputation management and integrated marketing 
communication. 
 
4.1.3.1 Online Reputation Management 
The first point of departure with regard to exploring mitigation strategies for social media is 
whether it is possible to mitigate against misinformation propagated by automation and 
algorithms by changing the perceptions of those who have come into contact with it. The 
general consensus, from six of eight respondents is that this is possible, however, doing 
so would be extremely difficult and would require a multidisciplinary approach. The 
foundation of any multidisciplinary approach would be online reputation management. As 
indicated in Chapter One, online reputation management is the process of monitoring 
media, detecting relevant contents, analysing what people say about an entity and if 
necessary, interacting with customers (Amigo, Artiles, Gonzalo, Spina, Liu and Corujo, 
2010).  
 
Respondent 1’s answer on how a social media crisis should be handled aligns perfectly 
with the online reputation process espoused by Amigo et al (2010): “The first thing about a 
crisis is don’t assume what a crisis is, get to the crux of it, what is the issue? Secondly, 
check where the sentiment is and where most of the complaints are coming from, then 
acknowledge the issue, but don’t ignore while investigating, really do investigate, 
50 
 
communicate it and get to the crux of whatever the crisis could be. In that process keep 
updating people as to where you are in it.”  
 
While respondents have their own methodologies that have been developed within their 
agencies and companies, their responses generally fall within the detect, analyse, interact 
process, however when asked how they would recommend political parties actively 
mitigate against crises brought as a result of misinformation campaigns initiated by bots 
and automation, respondents adapted the online reputation management process to a 
more multidisciplinary approach. Detection and analyses remained, but the third step 
varied.  
 
Respondent three explains the detection aspect: “The hardest thing is people can create 
accounts whether its bots or not, especially with bots faster than you can shut things down, 
so I think in that case the easiest way is to be on really high alert and have all your alerts 
set up so that you get sort of pinged immediately as soon as a bot, and you would know 
it’s a bot because they will probably spit out 20 tweets in two minutes.”  
 
Respondent 5 on the other hand, covers the analysis aspect: “It’s important to first analyse 
volumes, data and sentiment, otherwise you risk bringing more eyeballs, another thing is 
influence, it could be one hundred people tweeting with no followership or one tweeting 
with a big followership of 100 000.”  
 
While not going into detail about the ANC’s online reputation management process, the 
political party respondent indicated that the ANC does engage in monitoring all media 
formats including social media: “So we do have a monitoring system we monitor media as 
a whole and a big part of that is social media. So we monitor the reach, we monitor the 
interactions, we monitor the negative, and the positive and we monitor the issues that 
come up as people engage. When there's topical issues outside of election periods we 
monitor that as well.”  
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The respondent goes on to indicate that the party has been able to identify bots because 
of the way they operate as soon the ANC account publishes content. The respondent had 
the following to say in response to how they identify bot attacks: “It's the way they operate, 
it's immediate, they are issue based and they pick on certain things all the time, so it’s 
easy to identify.”  
 
Further to this, the political party respondent indicates that they, as someone who often 
posts and tweets on behalf of the ANC has been affected by bot campaigns: “There’s quite 
a lot of them. There's always a fight between big parties saying that the DA has a whole 
team of bots and they say the same thing about us. I mean it's impossible to trace and 
police and that sort of thing so people do get away with a lot.” 
 
Continuing with the online reputation management process; following the analysis step, 
respondents deviated in their responses relating to what action should be taken thereafter.  
According to Respondent 1 the best method is to battle content with content: “You need a 
strong strategy around your messaging. What content can you put out there to refute 
claims being made and use different avenues, partnerships and networks to help that 
message reach as many people as possible. Then also use a media strategy, take the 
fake news head on and create content that identifies and debunks it.”  
 
Respondent 7 focuses on the importance of having relationships with social media 
platforms in order to report bot networks and malicious accounts: “I think a lot of it is know 
your enemy, know what you’re up against, if there are short term tactics, like if you come 
up to a Twitter bot network … try and have relationships in place with the platforms so you 
can say, hey, we’ve come across these accounts and believe these accounts to be 
malicious.”  
 
Respondent 6 suggests notifying online communities of misinformation and having the 
organisations’ accounts verified.“A simple thing to do is get all your accounts verified. Sort 
of like a nice technical thing is to you know, make sure that there's no confusion … 
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continuously communicate to your audience and community that these are you official 
channels. These are our official accounts and if you see anything that looks untoward from 
other accounts it's fake … just ignore it. It's very tricky because with social media there's 
equal power across the board, so the only thing you can do is communicate, we’re official , 
this is not official.” 
 
In providing the above solution Respondent 1 inadvertently touches on a flaw inherent in 
the idea of social distribution of content that aims to debunk fake news on social media; 
social media by its very nature allows users to self-select, because of this it is difficult to 
assess who has come into contact with junk news if one wishes to give those people a 
different perspective.  
 
Respondent 4 touches on this: “I was doing an interview on Al Jazeera and the discussion 
was, is social media subjective or objective and I’m like by its very nature it’s subjective 
because you self-select, because you’re using the search parameters to look for what you 
want to look for, you see what you want to see and it’s almost given a platform for like-
minded individuals to find each other.”  
 
Secondly, the only way to reach these individuals that come into contact with 
misinformation en masse would be via a paid promotion strategy, which may invariably 
raise skepticism (Yaylagul, 2018). Respondent 4 goes on to offer a unique insight into 
actively dealing with Computational Propaganda as a result of having their brand fall victim 
to bots during Bell Pottinger’s White Monopoly Capital Computational Propaganda 
campaign (Khoza, 2018): “We had a tax dispute with SARS last year which we won this 
year, basically SARS were saying we owed them R2 billion. What happened was, some of 
the WMC bots got hold of that and started pushing their narrative that we aren’t playing 
[ball] with government, we’re white monopoly capital, that became a thing and that spread 
on a bot network including a lots of websites like WMC exposed. What we did to counter 
that was just to be frank, go into traditional media, push it out a soon as possible and to 
also change your SEO strategy quite heavily to combat it.”  
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By including search engine opitimisation as a tactic, Respondent 4’s response outlines a 
possible approach toward dealing with Computational Propaganda as a result of 
automation and algorithms, the first and only response to do so. Search Engine 
Optimisation (SEO) can succinctly be described as the use of various techniques 
marketers and web developers use in order to make their websites rank higher on popular 
search engines (Matošević, 2019). SEO in this context entails targeting specific keywords 
so Respondent 4’s brand messaging appears prominently in searches relating to white 
monopoly capital; this gives the respondent the opportunity to have their message read 
first, it also reduces the impact of Computational Propaganda by reducing the amount of 
traffic going to those sites. Respondent 4’s response crystalizes the importance of a 
multidiscplinary approach to dealing with Computational Propaganda, an insight which will 
be explored further in the following passages. 
 
Although the political party respondent acknowledges that the Computational Propaganda 
or fake news serves as a big threat to political parties they indicate that there are not any 
plans in place to deal with the matter despite being able to identify it. The respondent says 
the follow regarding defensive measures to deal with computational propaganda: “I must 
say, not that I know of, if it's there it's top secret high level stuff, but I don't know anything 
about that. Yeah so I think everybody is struggling with it and I don't think anybody has got 
an absolute answer as to how to deal with them. As a party we don’t have any 
relationships with the social networks, maybe as a state, but not as a party.” 
 
4.1.3.2 Communication Integration 
Integration of brand messages has become an important tenet of modern marketing 
communication as seen with the rise of Integrated Marketing Communication (IMC) during 
the late nineties and early two thousands. The central concept to IMC and subsequent, 
more strategic theories relating to communication integration, is that a single-minded 
message, across multiple media forms, is more impactful than disparate ones (Baalen and 
Mulder, 2016). This idea of integration is encapsulated by Bruhn’s (2008, p. 17) definition 
of IMC which is: 
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“a process of analysis, planning, organization, implementation and monitoring that 
is oriented toward creating unity from diverse sources of internal and external 
communication with target groups to convey a consistent impression of the 
company or the company’s reference object”.  
Subsequent theories of IMC and the more strategic IC have their basis in integration, a 
concept that the respondents of this study also identify as being important to combatting 
the effects of Computational Propaganda. The theme of integrating messages and using 
multiple channels to communicate to end-users was the fourth most popular theme to 
come out of the content analysis. Respondent 7 touches on this: “You need to begin 
engaging with influencers on the platforms as well as media partners to try and mitigate 
and contain the matter by saying look, this is our side of things.”  
 
Respondent 6 warns against an over-reliance on social media suggesting that using other 
platforms such as websites can assist in turning the tide against Computational 
Propaganda: “Another tactic that can be used is always refer back to a website, a credible 
web presence to reaffirm the credibility so say to your community, if this statement is not 
on our website, then its untrue… Don’t be too reliant on your social media presence.”  
Respondent 8 suggests doing the same, albeit more aggressively: “What I would do to 
mitigate against misinformation if I were a political party, would be to bake the facts into 
every piece of communication that goes out and link an information portal at every turn.”  
Respondent 7 references KFC in the UK and their handling of supplier change which led to 
a stock outage, resulting in closed stores across the country and a trend for the 
#KFCCrisis hashtag (Topping, 2018). The respondent indicates that KFC turned the crisis 
into a positive by rolling out a print ad which swopped the words KFC to FCK, wittingly 
using its powerful brand name to admit failure and subsequently trending again and 
earning one billion impressions this time with positive sentiment (Griner, 2018): “There’s 
room to use other channels, as digital people we rely on digital too much and forget the 
real value that a great print advert can do.”  
 
Respondent 1, shows the importance resolving crises in action and not just message, a 
practice which can ostensibly be carried out when debunking misinformation too: “It’s 
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important to take corrective action by linking back to what the company does so as to 
ensure it doesn’t happen again. It shouldn’t just play out on social media, social media is 
just another tool.” 
 
Integrating messages and delivering them across multiple forms of media like television, 
radio, print and coupling this with consistency has become a popular method for building 
brands. Based on the insights provided by the respondents, this may also be a viable 
approach for brands in terms of crisis, whether it be self-inflicted or the result of 
Computational Propaganda. The effectiveness of using multiple channels beyond social 
media to reduce the impact of Computational Propaganda is further reinforced when 
considering that algorithmic filtering is central to how social media platforms operate. What 
this means is that unique content is distributed to users based on their preferences, so 
information debunking fake news may never reach its intended end user.  
 
In terms of communication integration the political party respondent indicates an 
appreciation for distributing a unified message: “We still do rely heavily on traditional 
mediums … Over the years we've had to be able to sort of adapt the way in which we 
engage, so it's almost got to be simultaneous.  In the past we would just issue press 
statement and be interviewed we now do everything at once so when I issue a written 
statement I also do a video recording of the main thrust of this statement as I know society 
can engage with it or media would engage”.  
 
This appreciation for distributing a unified message across social media platforms 
indicates the ANC may be well positioned to take the social media managers’ advice in 
using these channels to debunk misinformation.  
 
A rebuttal to the use of other media channels to distribute information debunking fake 
news may be that some users, by nature of actively consuming fake news, aren’t 
interested in information that may debunk their wrongly held beliefs, a point raised by 
respondent 8: “I see something that supports my belief system, I don’t want to hear a 
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counter argument, then I want to share it with everyone else to show them I’m right. 
People really want to share things that prop themselves up. There may be instances 
where people have been able to nip things in the bud, but I think the only thing you can do 
is make all the information available and give a link to it like Snope, I think snope is 
amazing and I’m seeing more and more of it in threads where people are using it to 
debunk misinformation.”  
 
Clearly the discussion around algorithmic filtering and beliefs is nuanced, although this 
theme was present in the research, it surprisingly did not feature prominently.  However, 
given that a critical modernism paradigm was chosen to underpin this research, it is 
important to unpack algorithmic filtering, censorship versus freedom and the power 
dynamics at play in computational propaganda, a look at these issues follows. 
 
4.1.4 Contextual Considerations 
4.1.4.1 Engagement and Algorithmic Filtering 
As indicated in Chapter 1, an important premise of the research conducted relates to 
political parties having a plan in place to deal with Computational Propaganda. The 
rationale behind having a plan is that social media platforms may not be fast enough to 
respond to bad actors on social media. Additionally, the fast moving nature of social media 
allows bad actors to continuously find new loopholes to exploit. As Louise Matsakis (2019) 
explains, companies like Facebook continue to play “whack-a-mole” with agents of 
Computational Propaganda. Given these circumstances, my research proposed that 
political parties should use communication techniques as their first line of defence.  
Because social media platforms value engagement to sell advertising, it is difficult for them 
to curb Computational Propaganda. The main drivers of engagement are algorithms, 
which are being exploited for the purposes of computational propaganda. When asked if 
social media platforms are doing enough to curb Computational Propaganda, respondent 
2 indicated:  “No. They are for-profit companies for whom engagement trumps trust.  20k 
people fighting over a fake tweet is better for Twitter than hiring more team members to 
verify accounts.”  
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Respondent 8 paints an even more sceptical picture of Facebook. “Facebook sells 
eyeballs, reach and frequency, if they have almost two billion people on Facebook and five 
hundred or six hundred million of them are fake, then it’s not in their best interest to tell you 
or to get rid of them, so they’re conflicted from a business interest point of view.”  
 
Respondent 1 echoes the sentiments of Respondents 2 and 8 but makes a fairer 
assessment by portraying the conundrum social media platforms find themselves in: “Bots 
are odd. It’s good for social networks and bad for them. On one side it inflates their user 
numbers so advertisers approach them. Meanwhile they generate distrust towards the 
social networks. They’re not doing enough but they won’t do enough because its serves 
them not to.”  
 
Although it is easy blame social media platforms, Respondent 5 believes doing so is 
unfair, and that Facebook, Instagram and Twitter have removed or suspended malicious 
accounts in the past, provided users report them. The respondent goes on to point out that 
the sheer scale of these networks make it nearly impossible to stay up-to-date on how bad 
actors are manipulating their platforms: “Their [Facebook’s] two-way communication is 
really good with that and they really come to the party, but it is up to the consumer. I don't 
know if Facebook’s gonna know every single thing with what goes on with their millions of 
users, unless you bring it to the attention. It's just not practical, you can't police the 
internet.”  
 
Respondent 6 shares respondent 5’s sentiment: “… social media is this contradiction 
because everyone has freedom of speech. In my mind I think there's a limited amount of 
things that platforms can do because the more you do that the more you limit people's 
right to freedom of speech. … I think the responsibility lies with the consumer to figure out 
the real from the wrong.”  
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Respondent’s 5 and 6 responses touch on a critical debate taking place in the United 
Kingdom where Computational Propaganda and its effects have led the House of Lords to 
debate whether social media networks should be held to the same standards to which 
publishers are held. BBC journalist Amol Rajal (2016) describes Facebook’s role from the 
perspective of publishers succinctly. “The world's biggest platform, increasingly, has the 
role once fulfilled by news publishers, without the legal restrictions and social obligations.” 
If the UK parliament and publishers succeed with their efforts, platforms like Facebook and 
Twitter will be held responsible for “[f]ake news, extremist content, online bullying, 
harassment and copyright infringement that occurs on their platforms” (Brown, 2018). 
 
4.1.4.2 Freedom of speech and censorship 
Regulating the creation and spread of misinformation creates a conundrum for social 
media platforms, especially where users curate and distribute fake news, not out of 
malicious intent, but out of belief. UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of 
Expression, Professor David Kaye (2018), notes that increased legislation may lead 
companies to over-regulate their platforms, thereby limiting space for debate, art, politics 
and other forms of expression. Such regulation could unintentionally galvanise unwitting 
arbiters of misinformation under the belief that they are being victimised as a result of 
hidden agendas. Respondent 8 provides a real world example of a similar scenario: “The 
whole thing around infowars that helped galvanize the [Far] right against these platforms is 
because people were asking why are platforms censoring them and not doing the same on 
the left. There’s always a gap between censorship and freedom of speech and it's really 
hard to find that line.”  
 
Respondent 8 also points out that political parties like the ANC, risk aiding censorship by 
reporting accounts they deem to be spreading misinformation. They go on to say that the 
final decision on whether to remove these reported accounts, should sit with the social 
media platforms. 
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4.1.4.3 Conclusion  
Mitigating against Computational Propaganda is extremely complex, as noted in the 
research results. However, respondents in this study suggest that limiting risk is possible, 
even if there is no silver bullet for solving the problem. Instead, there are preventative 
measures and defensive measures political parties can take. The chosen route any 
political party takes must be done while taking social networks’ bias for engagement and 
practices of algorithmic filtering into account. Furthermore, political parties must be 
cognisant of issues relating to freedom of speech and censorship as some of the 
suggested defensive measures entail having relationships with representatives at these 
social networks in order to report them. However, a close relationship may lead political 
parties to encourage censorship, especially if political parties are government incumbents.
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5 . Chapter 5 
5.1 Research Findings and Recommendations 
The research conducted provides some interesting outcomes with regard to how political 
parties can tackle computational propaganda online. Social media managers from some of 
the country’s pre-eminent social media teams provided insight into how they believe social 
media crises should be handled. They also gave insight into how they believe a crisis 
stemming from Computational Propaganda should be navigated, with Respondents having 
similar opinions on how to handle orthodox social media crises but divergent opinions  on 
crises resulting from Computational Propaganda. Despite the divergence of opinion, all the 
social media managers agreed that addressing Computational Propaganda is a complex, 
nuanced, and multidisciplinary task.  
The research provided some guidance on how political parties can try to mitigate against 
Computational Propaganda, covering four areas political parties can focus on, (1) brand 
identity; (2)communication alignment; (3) online reputation management ; and (4) 
communication integration. 
The study also illustrates the power dynamics at play with regard to the phenomenon of 
Computational Propaganda. Events like the Arab Spring were celebrated as social network 
wins since they seemed to have facilitiated a shift of power from incumbent governments 
to the disenfranchised masses, just as social networks shifted power away from brands 
and into the hands of consumers. However, events like the Gupta bots campaign and 
Cambridge Analytica scandals indicate that the same networks that facilitated a shift of 
power to the masses, have also unwittingly facilitated a power shift to rich and powerful 
bad actors who are able mimic mass action with bots and algorithms. Both kinds of shifts 
in power result from social networks deciding who sees what, which then suggests that 
instead of shifting power from elites to the masses, power shifted from governments and 
traditional businesses to social networks. Political parties find themselves playing a 
balancing act in this context, as they have to navigate a landscape in which they need to 
appeal to the masses, while protecting themselves against bad actors, all while standing 
on the shifting sands of social media platforms that have become the world’s most popular 
method of communication. Although this appears to be a daunting task, the research 
gathered indicates that doing this successfully is possible.  
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5.1.1 Findings as they Relate to the Research Aims and Objectives  
At the outset of this study, the intended aim was to provide insight to political parties on 
how they could mitigate against malicious online brand attacks. In order to reach this goal, 
this study explored how Computational Propaganda manifests itself online, what strategies 
political parties are using to mitigate Computational Propaganda, and which digital brand 
risk mitigation strategies political brands can employ to mitigate the against consequences 
of computational propaganda. What follows are answers to these research objectives 
based on the data gathered.  
1. How does computational propaganda manifest itself online? 
The research focused specifically on bots as the most easily identifiable form of 
computational propaganda because the use of algorithms and curation is a lot more 
targeted and tied to users’ beliefs and interests. Computational Propaganda using 
algorithmic filtering and curation are much harder to identify given their sophistication, as 
illustrated in the Cambridge Analytica scandal in which victims were only aware of the 
attack once a whistle-blower exposed Cambridge Analytica and further investigated which 
Facebook apps had been used (Hern, 2018).  
The findings of this research indicate that bots manifest in a multitude of ways for a 
multitude of purposes, from bots that are used to leak news, to agenda-based bots that 
reply to specific subject matter, to wide sock-puppet networks popularised during the 
“white monopoly capital” leaks misinformation campaigns. All but one respondent indicated 
that they are familiar with bots and have personally come into contact with bots in their 
work. The research further revealed that other types of digital brand risk are also on the 
rise, from accounts imitating brands, to account hacks. Surprisingly, it also showed that 
respondents were aware of curation and algorithms as well as the censorship versus 
freedom of speech debate, which has inadvertently allowed these more sophisticated 
forms of computational propaganda to continue unabated.  
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2. What strategies are political parties using to mitigate computational propaganda 
risks? 
Based on the research, the sample of one political party indicates that an effort is being 
made to ensure that stringent brand identity policies are being implemented in order to 
help users identify fake content that is made to look like it originates from the political 
party. In addition to this, great efforts are being made to ensure communication alignment 
between the party’s various social media accounts and its staff to help users identify 
misinformation that is not in line with party policies. Unfortunately, although they make a 
good start, these mitigation strategies only account for specific instances of Computational 
Propaganda. Based on the interview with the political party respondent one can surmise a 
level of apathy in the battle of misinformation, but perhaps none of the South African 
misinformation campaigns were effective enough to warrant defensive action from the 
party, and this may change.  
The political party respondent revealed that agencies are contracted during times of high 
political activity. These agencies help to manage accounts and may serve as a mitigation 
strategy in itself, given the systematic crisis communications processes all agency-based 
respondents employ. Finally, the research indicates that although there is an appreciation 
of the need to mitigate against Computational Propaganda, there is not a tangible 
appreciation of how to develop active defensive systems against it. 
 
3. Which digital brand risk mitigation strategies can political brands employ to 
tackle the brand consequences of Computational Propaganda? 
The research uncovered two types of strategies to help mitigate against the consequences 
of social media. Firstly, preventative measures were considered important. Preventative 
measures serve to reduce the likelihood of a crisis arising as a result of Computational 
Propaganda and include brand identity and communication alignment. Brand identity 
(Keller 2013) measures entail using stringent brand management practices on social 
media such as ensuring every piece of content abides to the political party’s corporate 
identity rules. In other words the political party must use logos, correct tone of voice, 
correct language and only distribute content that aligns with the party’s values. 
Communication alignment entails ensuring communication consistency on all media 
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platforms. For example, it suggests that individual representatives of political parties 
should not stray too far from the party’s policy. 
Secondly, defensive strategies were considered relevant; these require action from the 
political party’s social media teams. Defensive strategies include online reputation 
management espoused by Amigo et al. (2010), which entails the detection, analysis and 
response to crises. Detection and analysis will help party’s to determine what response 
should be implemented. Tied to response is communication integration as defined by 
Bruhn (2008), or the use of a wide range of media in a unified mannner in order to 
overcome algorithmic filtering, which may limit the reach of the political party’s reactive 
statement.  
While engaging in these defensive measures, it is important for political party social media 
teams to take context into account. The context will determine the extent to which 
defensive measures are taken because political parties risk curtailing the freedom of 
speech of those it deems to be spreading misinformation. Alternatively keeping its 
messaging to social media platforms risks having only a few people see their reactive 
statements, additionally, large groups of loyal supporters may have no need for the party 
to debunk fake news because they trust the party. Therefore, depending on the context 
and nature of the crisis, political parties must consider media channels beyond social 
media. 
The use of online reputation management and unifying one’s message across multiple 
platforms is by no means new, but highlighting these two avenues as credible strategies 
which may help inspire political parties implement this low hanging fruit. General 
consensus amongst social media managers is that the best response to any 
communications crisis is to have a plan, even if it is not completely fool-proof, it reduces 
the likelihood of compounded the crisis as a result of inaction. Surprisingly, one potential 
mitigation strategy that did not emerge from the research is the use of bots and automation 
to assist in the fight against misinformation. The respondents acknowledged that bots are 
able to distribute messages widely at great speed, and for this reason it is possible to use 
bots to flag keywords relating to misinformation and either report them, or tweet to every 
user that responds to misinformation content, outlining why a piece of content is fake 
news. The potential reasons why this wasn’t suggested may be due to cost, time and 
technology implications which the respondents may feel, fall out of political party’s 
competency. 
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5.1.2 Recommendations for Future Research 
The research conducted focused on Computational Propaganda and exploring mitigation 
strategies for political parties in online contexts, based on the outcomes and engagements 
with political parties. A critical area of research that can be conducted is the investigation 
into social media crises communications strategies political parties have in place as 
compared to those in the private sector. In conducting this research report it was found 
that the value of expertise provided by social media managers was rather limited, which 
may be a result of Computational Propaganda being a relatively new phenomenon, 
whereas an established subject like general crisis communication may lead to better 
transfer of insight on both ends.  
 
In order to achieve this transfer of insight, the study would require a larger sample from 
political parties, a clear clarification on what constitutes a crisis, and specific scenarios to 
which the political party and private sector respondent can reply. Thereafter, brand risk 
mitigation strategies for Computational Propaganda can be revisited with a larger political 
party sample and specific Computational Propaganda scenarios. 
 
5.1.3 Recommendations for Practice 
Based on the research conducted, recommendations for political parties would be to firstly 
institute preventative measures such as improve party wide compliance to organisational 
brand identity on official social media accounts. In addition to this, an engagement protocol 
needs to be established outlining when and how the political party’s staff are to respond in 
terms of reactive and continuous engagement. This protocol must also be contrasted with 
guidelines on when responses must be escalated for approval. In addition to this, it is 
advisable that every individual party representative use a playbook designed by the 
political party in order to guide their engagements. This playbook, while allowing 
individuals to engage in robust debate, should outline critical policy related subject matter 
that should not be engaged upon and rather be referred back to more official channels.  
65 
 
Secondly, in order to institute defensive measures, political parties must investigate the 
manner in which computational propaganda operates whether, be it via bots, curation or 
algorithms. Doing so will allow parties to identify new ways in which computational 
propaganda adapts or is manifesting. Following this, it is advised that political parties put in 
measures to detect increased or anomalous levels of computational propaganda activity, 
which they can analyse. With regard to analysis, parties need to determine what level of 
misinformation distribution is negligible, what level requires consistent monitoring and what 
level requires intervention. In terms of the intervention phase, there should be criteria 
determining what misinformation activities require a statement distributed on social media, 
versus what level of misinformation requires an integrated response across multiple media 
channels. These recommendations can serve as a foundation with which to tackle crises 
that arise as a result of computational propaganda. 
 
5.1.4 Conclusion 
Research indicates that computational propaganda is growing in prominence the world 
over and measures taken by countries like Italy and their online task team show the 
importance of dealing with this phenomenon. It is critical that South African political parties 
are cognisant of this as South Africa draws closer to the forthcoming National Elections. 
This research study was conducted in order to explore and bring possible mitigation 
strategies against computational propaganda to the attention of political parties. 
Through a worldview of critical modernism (Mumby, 1997), this research explores  
potential mitigation strategies by using semi-structured interviews (Cohen D, 2006) with 
social media managers and a political party representative. These interviews were 
conducted using purposive non-probability sampling (Laws, Harper and Marcus, 2007).  
Using thematic analysis (Flick, 2015), the study uncovered four different mitigation 
approaches, namely; (1) brand identity; (2)communication alignment; (3) online reputation 
management ; and (4) communication integration. In addition to this, the two contextual 
considerations of algorithmic filtering and engagement, as well as freedom of speech and 
censorship were uncovered. While the outcomes of the research may not be entirely 
groundbreaking, they do outline important areas on which political parties can focus.  
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Appendixes: 
5.3 Appendix A: Social Media Interview Question Guide 
1. How	long	have	you	been	a	social	media	community	manager?	
2. In	your	opinion	what	are	key	aspects	of	the	work	you	do?	
3. Have	you	ever	experienced	a	social	media	crisis?	
4. How	would	one	effectively	manage	a	social	media	crisis?	
5. Do	you	think	there	are	any	practices	within	corporate	social	media	management	that	political	parties	
could	gain	from?	
6. Are	you	familiar	with	communications	crises	that	have	been	initiated	by	bot	networks	or	fake	accounts?	
If	so,	please	describe	an	instance	you’re	familiar	with.	
7. As	a	social	media/community	manager	do	you	believe	its	possible	to	influence	perceptions	of	those	who	
come	into	contact	with	these	misinformation	campaigns	on	social	media?	
8. As	a	social	media/community	manager,	how	would	you	recommend	political	parties	mitigate	against	
misinformation	campaigns	initiated	by	bots?	
9. Do	you	believe	that	social	networks	are	doing	enough	to	reduce	the	impact	of	these	misinformation	
campaigns?	
 
5.4 Appendix B: Political Party Interview Question Guide 
1. How	important	is	social	media	to	the	communications	performance	of	your	organisation?	
2. What	do	you	see	as	the	largest	social	media	threats	to	political	parties?	
3. Are	you	familiar	with	social	media	bots?	
4. Has	your	party	been	affected	by	misinformation	campaigns	by	political	bots?	
5. If	so,	how	were	you	able	to	indentify	these	attacks?	
6. Do	you	have	any	plans	in	place	to	mitigate	against	the	actions	of	social	media	bots	and	the	
spread	of	misinformation?	
 
5.5 Appendix C: Social Media Interview Transcript 
Respondent	1	research	interview 
 
• How	long	have	you	been	a	social	media	community	manager?	
Since	2011,	right	now	my	job	entails	reviewing	content,	developing	content	strategy,	so	messaging	strategy,	
looking	at	competitors	analysis,	I	do	social	media	audits	and	paid	media	analysis.	In	terms	of	community	
management	I	now	do	reporting	in	order	to	see	if	we’re	in	line	with	the	communication	strategy	and	I	do	crisis	
management. 
 
• In	your	opinion	what	are	key	aspects	of	the	work	you	do?	
I	would	say	the	key	aspects	of	the	work	I	do	for	corporates	is	finding	out	where	the	target	market	is,	because	the	
danger	is,	if	you’re	not	where	they	are,	they’re	still	going	to	talk	about	you	regardless	of	whether	you	have	an	
account	or	not.	So	you	need	to	be	where	they	are	so	you	can	join	the	conversation.	If	they	are	to	post	something	
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that’s	unfavourable		then	you	have	a	chance	to	attend	to	it		before	it	becomes	a	crisis.		Another	thing	is	that,	
communication	as	such,	just	the		whole	concept	of	PR	and	marketing,	it’s	not	about	bringing	people	to	a	
platform,	its	about	going	to	where	people	are,	that’s	the	basis	of	communication.	Social	media	is	just	a	tool,	so	it	
shouldn't	be	seen	as	a	different	thing	altogether.	So	if	that’s	where	people	are...so	if	they	are	for	example	on	
twitter..so	if	we	do	research	and	found	out	that	your	competitors,	your	target	market	and	the	people	that	
you		want	to	reach	are	on	twitter,	then	be	on	twitter	if	they’re	on	facebook	be	on	facebook..	And	also	what	are	
you	objectives?	So	firstly	you	decide	where	are	they,	then	you	go	there,	then	you	decide	why	are	you	on	there?	
Are	you	on	there	to	push	product,	are	you	on	there	to	change	perceptions,	are	you	on	there	to	join	conversations?	
Uhm,	are	you	on	there	to	be	on	trend	as	well,	so	you	have	to	have	a	very	clear	cut	goals	on	why	you’re	on	the	
platforms	you’re	on.	Then	the	last	thing	is	to	stick	to	your	values,	the	danger	with	social	media	is	that	because	its	
so	noisy,	you	might		end	up	wanting	to	be	a	Nando’s	when	you’re	actually	a	signature	restaurant,	you	know	what	
I	mean?	So	stick	to	your	values,	stick	to	what	your	value	proposition	is.	The	thing	is	you’re	just	using	this	platform	
to	further	carry	out	your	business	goals. 
 
• Have	you	ever	experienced	a	social	media	crisis?	
 
Yes	I	have,	lots!	Haha!	So	many.	Uhm	so,		one	of	the	clients	I	manage	is	a	bank,	I’ll	use	this	one	because	it	has	a	
nice	learning.	What	happened	is	that	the	bank	has	a	technical..what	is	it..they	reset	and	update	their	systems,	so	
when	this	happens,	there’s	a	high	chance	that	there	will	be	a	black-out,	so	you	wont	be	able	to		do	online	
banking,	you’ll	go	to	certain	ATMs	and	they	won’t	work.	So	what	they	do	is	try	to	do	this	late,	so	lets	say,	sunday	
evening	until	monday	morning,	but	there’s	sometimes	a	possibility	that	they	go	over	the	time	they’ve	allocated,	
most	of	the	time	its	month	end,	so	on	a	monday	you	have	people	trying	to	pay	employees	and	they	can’t	because	
they	can’t	access	[they’re	online	banking].	So	initially	what	the	bank	used	to	do,	is	not	tell	people	they’re	doing	
system	upgrades.	They	would	do	it	and	hope	that	there	won’t	be	any	glitches.	Everytime	there’s	always	a	glitch.	
In	previous	years	when	there	was	no	social	media,they	could	get	away	with	it.	People	would	complain	wherever	
they	would	complain,	maybe	go	to	HelloPeter	or	you	know,	complain	amongst	each	other,	but	with	the	rise	of	of	
especially	twitter,	what	do	people	do?	Remember	our	banking		behaviour	isn’t	according	to	set	times,	there	are	
people	partying	and	want	to	book	an	Uber	at	midnight	and	they’re	nothing.	Why	I	say	there’s	a	learning.	A	
couple	of	months	later,	so	we	went	through	that	crisis,	press	releases	were	sent,	journalists	were	spoken	to,	
tweets	went	out,	systems	went	back	online.	A	couple	of	months	later	we	indicated	to	client	that	they	should	
inform	customers	that	systems	won’t	be	available	and	we	didn’t	get	a	much	backlash,	because	people	knew	to	
plan	around	these	issues.	Communication	made	such	a	huge	difference. 
 
• How	would	one	effectively	manage	a	social	media	crisis?	
First	things	first,	is	you	need	to	understand	the	crux	of	the	crisis,	what	are	people	complaining	about	really?	The	
first	thing		about	a	crisis	is	don’t	assume	what	a	crisis	is,	get	to	the	crux	of	it,	what	is	the	issue?	Secondly,	check	
where	the	sentiment	is	and	where	most	of	the	complaints	are	coming	from,	then	acknowledge	the	issue,	but	
don’t	ignore	while	investigating,	really	do	investigate,	communicate	it	and	get	to	the	crux	of	whatever	the	crisis	
could	be.	In	that	process	keep	updating	people	as	to	where	you	are	in	it.	If	its	an	investigation	that	won’t	be	over	
a	day,	you	kind	of	like	take	people	into	your	confidence	as	to	where	you	are.	Keep	people	updated	otherwise	they	
they	tend	to	create	their	own	narrative.	Miway	are	a	good	example	when	they	had	their	hoax	E-mail	situation,	
they	updated	step	by	step,	and	indicated	that	they	had	someone	looking	into	the	authenticity	of	the	E-mail	,	they	
took	us	into	their	confidence	every	step	of	the	way.	Take	people	through	the	process	because	people	will	create	
their	own	narrative.	So	after	acknowledging	and	taking	people	into	your	confidence,	give	feedback.	If	there	is	a	
long	term	issue	as	a	result	of	the	crisis	don’t	just	rely	on	social	media	or	PR	activity,	what	are	you	doing	on	the	
ground?	What	are	you	doing	beyond	the	affected	parties	as	an	organisation?	The	most	important	thing	is	
continuous	communication,	do	not	flame,	do	not	throw	anyone	under	the	bus,	especially	if	its	young	junior	
people	managing	your	accounts.	That’s	nonsense	because	someone		must	sign	it	off.	Also	don’t	be	too	defensive	
and	be	too	hung	up	on	the	legalities.	You’re	dealing	with	human	stuff,	so	people	don’t	care	if	you’re	right	in	terms	
of	the	law	if	they	say	you’re	not	being	human.	Yes	you	might	be	right	but	you’re	being	human.	Hence	it’s	
important	to	get	to	the	Crux	what	is	the	crisis?	Lastly	it's	important	to	learn	from	your	mistakes	don't	repeat	
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them.	One	example	is	outsurance	with	their	mother’s	day	post	only	to	make	the	same	mistake	with	a	father’s	day	
post,	H&M	is	another	example.	It’s	important	to	take	corrective	action	by	inking	back	to	what	the	company	does	
so	as	to	ensure	it	doesn’t	happen	again.	It	shouldn’t	just	play	out	on	social	media,	social	media	is	just	another	
tool. 
 
• Do	you	think	there	are	any	practices	within	corporate	social	media	management	that	political	parties	
could	gain	from?	
Yes	have	a	strategy	and	stick	to	it	,	Also	have	a	strategy	that	speaks	back	to	your	values.	For	example	the	e	f	f	you	
can	see	that	have	community	managers	If	you	look	at	the	different	accounts	the	language	is	pretty	much	the	
same	And	it	kind	of	also	feedsback	back	to	what	the	party	stands	for.	When	you	look	at	a	spokespeople	and	their	
leadership	the	conversation	is	quite	the	same.	Branding	is	the	same	and	how	they	operate	is	the	same	they	all	
wish	people	happy	birthday,	they’re	sending	condolences	to	important	people's	families.	What's	interesting	as	it's	
not	just		rest	in	peace	to	their	own	members	it’s	rest		in	peace	to	other	political	people.	Other	great	artists	and	
things	like	that,	They	obviously	have	a	very	strong	strategy	and	don’t	around		for	election	time.	What's	smart	
about	them	is	their	press	releases	are	also	immediately	on	social	networks.	So	have	a	strategy	that	A	speaks	back	
to	your	values,	Stick	to	your	guns	on	social	media	if	you’re	argumentative	be	that,	don’t	change	because	you’re	
on	social	media,	they	act	on	social	media	just	as	they	do	in	parliament.	Another	thing	which	is	very	important,	is	
they	need	to	consider	looking	at		to	feedback,	also	there	isn’t	alignment	in	their	communication	which	results	in	
them	not	coming	across	as	authentic.	Social	is	something	you	can	plan,	don’t	be	in	a	hurry	to	say	things	or	be	the	
first	person	to	say	things,	no	one	will	care	to	remember	who	was	the	first	person	or	brand	to	make	an	
announcement,	but	they	certainly	will	remember	if	you	make	a	mistake	with	those	announcement.	There	are	no	
awards	for	rushed	content.	Pull	each	other	together,	plan	content.	Parties	like	the	ANC	will	have	one	area	of	the	
organisation	tweet	something	that’s	totally	out	of	step	with	what	the	entire	organisation	is	saying.	It’s	important	
to	have	checks	and	balances.	Also	don’t	have	random	accounts,	the	ANC	has	dormant	accounts	that	aren’t	being	
used,	they	have	accounts	that	are	just	existing,	which	ultimately	become	easy	pickings	for	hackers.	Have	a	
content	process,	an	approval	process	and	an	alignment	with	values. 
 
• Are	you	familiar	with	communications	crises	that	have	been	initiated	by	bot	networks	or	fake	
accounts?	If	so,	please	describe	an	instance	you’re	familiar	with.	
 
Yes,	currently	whenever	someone	tweets	something	negative	about	the	EFF,	there’s	a	flurry	of	tweets	defending	
them.	There	is	also	an	increase	in	social	media	accounts	with	partially	incorrect	black	names	that	are	tweeting	
against	the	EFF.	There’s	alot	of	that	right	now,	also,	another	thing	is	we’re	headed	to	election	year	next	year. 
 
• As	a	social	media/community	manager	do	you	believe	it’s	possible	to	influence	perceptions	of	those	
who	come	into	contact	with	these	misinformation	campaigns	on	social	media?	
Definitely,	there	are	studies	that	show	electronic	word	of	mouth	is	strong,	so	if	I	see	an	article	for	example	-	I	
once	saw	an	argument	between	two	journalists.	The	one	journalist	wrote	about	how	the	EFF	used	to	use	Adrian	
Basson,	then	Jacques	Pauw	published	information	on	where	Malema	stays	and	who	bankrolls	Malema,	then	
another	journalist	decided	to	expose	sources	so	they	started	having	a	fight.	So	now	if	I’m	an	EFF	supporter	who	
aligns	with	the	EFF	because	they’re	pro-poor,	honest,	aren’t	corrupt.	If	I	find	out	they	are	corrupt	and	have	new	
“Gupta’s”	supporting	them.	If	I	read	that	tweet	without	question,	I	might	not	vote	for	the	EFF,	that’s	because	
people	don’t	read	anymore,	people	don’t	read	articles	anymore.	People	will	still	argue	with	you	even	if	you	say,	
read	the	article	this	is	fake	news.	People	now	get	outraged	very	quickly,	we	don’t	question.	If	you	look	at	most	of	
the	social	media	crises	that	have	happened	in	the	past	couple	of	months,	some	of	them	have	been	based	on	fake	
news,	fake	E-mails	and		things	like	that.	Social	media	is	all	about	perceptions	so	you	have	to	fight	this.	It’s	
important	for	political	parties	to	know	the	role	fake	news	plays	and	also	handle	and	manage	it	immediately	and	
not	say	“oh,	people	won’t	read	that.” 
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• As	a	social	media/community	manager,	how	would	you	recommend	political	parties	mitigate	against	
misinformation	campaigns	initiated	by	bots?	
It’s	not	about	stopping	them,	teitter	have	tried	to	remove	fake	accounts,	so	did	facebook.	It’s	important	to	
remember	that	there	are	people	behind	these	fake	accounts	making	money	off	them.	The	important	thing,	to	
remember,	whetehr	its	a	bot	spreading	stuff	or	something	being	said	that	wasn’t	supposed	to	be	said,	the	
internet	never	forgets.	You	need	to	treat	it	the	same	way.	A	you	need	a	strong	strategy	around	your	messaging.	
What	content	can	you	put	out	there	to	refute	claims	being	made	and	use	different	avenues,	partnerships	and	
networks	to	help	that	message	reach	as	many	people	as	possible.	Then	also	use	a	media	strategy,	take	the	fake	
news	head	on	and	create	content	that	identifies	and	debunks	it.	Don’t	use	it	as	your	primary	content	strategy,	
your	main	will	be	aligned	to	your	brand	values,	then	your	secondary	approach	would	be	debunking	myths	-	this	is	
where	consistency,	credibilty	and	authenticity	is	important	it	will	help	people	identify	fake	news.	Don’t	say	what	
you	are,	show	us.	Listen,	identify	issues,	then	show	in	action	so	people	will	defend	you	due	to	the	trust	you’ve	
built.	It’s	not	just	about	them.	Naysayers	are	everywhere,	its	just	a	matter	of	how	you	approach,	saying	
something	is	not	true	isn’t	a	strategy,	show	people. 
 
• Do	you	believe	that	social	networks	are	doing	enough	to	reduce	the	impact	of	these	misinformation	
campaigns?	
No,	they’re	competing	for	numbers.	Bots	are	odd.	It’s	good	for	social	networks	and	bad	for	them.	On	one	side	the	it	
inflates	their	user	numbers	so	advertisers	approach	them.	Meanwhile	they	generate	distrust	towards	the	social	
networks.	They’re	not	doing	enough	but	they	won’t	do	enough	because	its	serves	them	not	to. 
 
Respondent	2	research	interview 
 
How	long	have	you	been	a	social	media	community	manager? 
I	was	an	online	editor	which	included	community	management	from	2013 
 
In	your	opinion	what	are	key	aspects	of	the	work	you	do? 
As	an	online	editor,	my	main	role	was	to	create	and	promote	both	editorial	and	commercial	digital	content	that	
would	add	value	to	the	life	of	the	reader.	As	a	social	media	and	community	manager,	I	needed	to	grow	the	social	
communities	and	make	sure	it	was	an	engaged	audience	and	not	just	a	large	stagnant	one.	I	also	had	to	answer	
questions	and	resolve	complaints.	 
 
Have	you	ever	experienced	a	social	media	crisis? 
Yes.	Several. 
 
How	would	one	effectively	manage	a	social	media	crisis? 
It	depends	entirely	on	the	kind	of	crisis	and	source	of	it.	If	we,	as	a	brand/company,	had	made	a	mistake	it	was	
easy	to	resolve.	We	would	apologise	earnestly	and	honestly,	say	that	was	should	not	have	done	what	we	did,	say	
that	we	wouldn't	do	it	again	and	then	let	them	know	what	we	had	done	in	order	to	stop	that	mistake	from	
happening	again	i.e.	what	processes	are	now	in	place.	If	the	wrongdoing	was	large	enough,	we	would	also	
donate	money	to	a	relevant	cause	in	order	to	show	we	were	serious	about	the	apology	and	did	not	want	to	profit	
from	it.	 
 
If	it	was	a	crisis	that	was	unrelated	to	our	behaviour	as	a	brand/company,	or,	even	worse,	if	it's	a	company	
behaviour	that	management	will	not	agree	to	change/it's	not	feasible	to	change,	it's	more	difficult.	 
 
If	it's	an	outside	crisis	mentioning	the	brand,	then	the	best	way	forward	it	to	write	the	facts	in	a	very	clear	way,	
avoiding	ambiguous	language	and	explaining	why	you	want	to	clarify	the	situation.	If	possible,	include	ways	for	
individuals	to	see	for	themselves	that	you're	telling	the	truth.	 
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Do	you	think	there	are	any	practices	within	corporate	social	media	management	that	political	parties	could	
gain	from? 
There	must	be	but	I'm	not	familiar	political	comms. 
 
Are	you	familiar	with	communications	crises	that	have	been	initiated	by	bot	networks	or	fake	accounts?	If	so,	
please	describe	an	instance	you’re	familiar	with. 
When	I	managed	a	publishing	brand,	scammers	would	create	a	copy	of	our	website	selling	a	weight-loss	product.	
Once	they	had	credit	card	details,	they'd	just	keep	debiting	the	accounts	until	the	cards	were	cancelled.	
Obviously,	this	was	a	disaster	for	the	brand.	People	were	saying	we	were	the	scammers	or	asking	us	to	process	
their	refunds.	We	couldn't	find	the	scammers	as	they	used	international	ISPs	and	we	didn't	have	the	tech	or	legal	
support	to	track	them	down.	 
 
As	a	social	media/community	manager	do	you	believe	its	possible	to	influence	perceptions	of	those	who	come	
into	contact	with	these	misinformation	campaigns	on	social	media? 
Yes.	Internet	users	are	becoming	savvy	to	fakes	and	frauds.	They	notice	if	logos	aren't	correct	and	even	
grammatical	errors.	Once	we	posted	screenshots	and	a	warning	that	we	were	a	publishing	site	and	would	only	
sell	magazines	and	event	tickets	through	secure	third	parties,	people	usually	had	a	positive	view	of	us	as	taking	
care	of	them	and	looking	out	for	them.	 
 
As	a	social	media/community	manager,	how	would	you	recommend	political	parties	mitigate	against	
misinformation	campaigns	initiated	by	bots	or	fake	accounts? 
They	should	point	out	the	general	ways	to	spot	spam,	bots	and	scammers.	Logos	that	are	outdated,	incorrect	or	
pixelated.	Huge	followings	with	only	a	few	tweets.	Links	to	sites	that	look	like	news	sites	but	that	nobody	had	
ever	heard	of.	Let	them	know	to	check	the	url.	Look	at	the	language.	Ask	for	verification	before	reposting. 
 
Do	you	believe	that	social	networks	are	doing	enough	to	reduce	the	impact	of	these	misinformation	
campaigns? 
No.	They	are	for-profit	companies	for	whom	engagement	trumps	trust.		20k	people	fighting	over	a	fake	tweet	is	
better	for	Twitter	than	hiring	more	team	members	to	verify	accounts.	 
 
Respondent	3	Research	Interview 
 
• How	long	have	you	been	a	social	media/community	manager?	
I've	working	for	5	and	half	years,	I	started	out	in		agency	at	a	junio	level	firstly	as	a	moderator	and	creating	alot	
of	content	for	social	media	pages,	I	spent	alot	of	time	on	facebook,	on	twitter,	publishing,	researching	and	
writing	the	content	calendars	and	so	forth,	that	was	a	year	and	a	half.	I’ve	been	here	at	the	bank	for	four	and	a	
half	years,	it’s	a	lot	more	strategic			because	we	work	in	the	group	team	a	lot	of	work	is	focused	on	how	do	we	
help	other	country	departments	to	setup		a	presence	on	social	media	and	best	practice		tool	kits	and	how	they	
help	them	in	terms	of	naming	conventions		and	what	kind	of	content	to	post		Android	allowing	them	to	do	what	I	
need	to	do	and	be	free	but	also	giving	them	guidelines	on	how	to	operate	but	still		be	free	and	think	about	what’s	
topical	in	their	world	because	they	would	know	that	bit. 
 
• In	your	opinion	what	are	key	aspects	of	the	work	you	do?	
I	think	to	be	honest	many	people	say	it	supposed	to	be	strategic	and	high	level		show	me	the	most	important	
things	are	really	the	basics		so	for	example,	a	brand	tone	and	a	good	moderation	plan.		So	when	I	speak	to	you	is	
your	approach	to	reply	or	not	say	anything,	what	kind	of	plan	do	you	have	in	place	for	negative	and	positive	
experiences		For	the	positive	if	you're	running	a	big	campaign	are	you	getting	all		hands	on	Deck	So	that	you	can	
create	lots	of	engagement	You	want	to	speak	to	people	alot	or	do	you	want	them	to	ask	you	questions.	Are	you	
starting	a	conversation	or	are	they	When	there	is	a	crisis	you	have	FAQs	setup	with	the	pr	team	If	you	know	this	is	
a	crisis	newsroom	have	they	helped	to	formulate	a	statement	with	legal	team	so	whatever		goes	out	to	media	is	
consistent	with	what	you	find	on	social	media.	 
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• Have	you	ever	experienced	a	social	media	crisis?	
The	easiest	easiest	one	is	the	downtime	that	we	experience	I	think	it	was	a	month	and	a	half	ago,	ATMS	went	
down	and	credit	cards	went	down	,	people	were	stuck	at	restaurants	and	petrol	stations,		people	bought	things	
and	were	stuck	without	the	ability	to	pay.	The	worse	thing	for	us	was	wondering	if	we	could	have	known	ahead	
of	time	if	the	downtime	was	going	to	happen	and	could	we	have	planned	appropriately.	We	have	seen	
preventative	messaging	over	the	app	or	via		email	to	say	this	is	going	to	go	down	at	this	time,	at	least		people	
knew	that	options	that	would	obviously	be	a	(inaudible)	scenario.	And	if	we	didn’t	know	that,	what	were	we	
going	to	do	aside	from	apologising.	Could	we	have	sent	money	vouchers	or	done	payments	on	behalf	of	people	so	
they	could	claim	it	back.	So	those	are	the	types	of	things	that	happen	when	its	a	crisis,	that’s	probably	the	last	
one	we’ve	had	this	year.	The	most	important	thing	is	to	manage	the	service	queries	so	can	people	actually	make	
payment	or	are	they	physically	stuck	so	they	can’t	do	anything.	Then	the	second	is	obviously	the	reputational	risk,	
so	if	you’re	tracking	sentiment,	something	that	could	be	positive	turns	very	negative	This	is	where	I	think	the	
moderation	and	the	service	aspect		comes	in	to	play	and	people	don’t	want	to	see	copy	paste	responses	that	look	
like	a	bot	that	says	high	tshepiso	sorry	for	the	inconvenience	but	actual	solutions,	why	dont	you	go	to	the	app	
and	do	this,	is	there	someone	you	can	ask	to	pay	so	you	can	pay	them	back,	can	we	send	you	voucherts,	have	you	
tried	the	money	wallet,	you	know.	Things	like	that,	practical	answers	
 
• How	would	one	effectively	manage	a	social	media	crisis?	
I	think	process	is	the	best	also	because	something	always	happen	when	you’re	in	the	service	industry.	down	time	
always	happens	but	i	think	there’s	no	excuse	to	not	have	a	solid	plan	so	when	it	hits	no	one	is	running	around	we	
don’t	have	to	wait	to	get	approvals	from	x	y	and	z	before	we	can	go	out	and	make	a	statement.	I	think	it	first	
definitely	have	an	approved	set	of	people	who	come	together	to	try	and	deal	with		it,	who	in	the	social	team	and	
who	in	the	PR	team,	like	have	a	crisis	team	set	up	so	when	things	happen	you	just	call	on	those	people	everytime,	
one	because	they	will	have	experience	and	know	how	to	handle	things,	two	because	they	can	help	the	whole	
process	go	alot	faster.	The	second	thing	is	to	have	moderation	FAQ	document	in	place,	byt	now	you	know	what	
people	will	ask	so	you’re	prepared	for	those.	Then	its	what	positive	step	you	can	take	afterward	to	help	soften	the	
blow	do	you	send	vouchers	to	say	sorry,	stuff	like	that	but	have	that	all	set	up	upfront	so	you’re	not	tryong	to	run	
around	to	sort	things	out,	have	all	those	things	defined	and	then	deploy.	Also	know	that	there	there	are	resources	
to	answer	the	calls,	monitoring	twitter,	those	sorts	of	things. 
	
• Do	you	think	there	are	any	practices	within	corporate	social	media	management	that	political	parties	
could	gain	from?	
Yeah	i	think	because	its	political	people	make	it	very	personal,	and	make	it	about	the	person	and	the	one		good	
thing	about	corporate	is	that	shouldn’t	necessarily	be	your	personal	view	but	what	the	brand	stands	for,	the	job	
is	the	view	of	what	the	brand	stands	for	so	i	know	alot	of	the	time	is	really	hard	in	political	campaigning	to	
differentiate	the	person	from	the	party	necessarily	especially	if	you’re	trying	to	elect	the	person	you	buy	into	their	
values	but	i	think	its	important	to	define	that,	is	it	a	personal	campaign	like	Obama	in	this	case	you’re	voting	for	
him	and	because	you	buy	into	what	he	says	or	is	it	something	that	you’re	campaigning	like	Mmusi	Maimane	does	
then	you’re	campaigning	for	the	DA	so	he	should	sort	of	take	a	stance	on	what	the	party	stands	for	and	not	
necessarily	try	to	push	his	personal	views.	Corporate	is	quite	good	at	that	uhm,	what	is	the	view	of	the	company	
overall	so	even	if	my	opinion	might	be	different	as	I’m	working	on	it,	it’s	solid	and	I	understand	this	is	where	you	
draw	the	line	in	terms	of	being	overly	emotive	for	example	because	maybe	we	can’t	show	that	we’re	being	casual	
and	fun	because	that’s	not	we	stand	for,	we’re	about	heritage	and	structure	and	being	an	old	bank	in	a	good	
way,	which	means	we	know	what	we’re	doing	and	we’re	not	going	to	take	silly	chances	whereas	a	brand	like	
capitec	is	really	new	so	they	can	be	fun	and	playfull,	I	don’t	think	people	would	expect	them	to	be	serious	because	
it’s	not	who	they	are	so	i	think	yeah	its	very	important	to	decide	if	its	personal	or	behalf	of	a	party	and	if	it	is	on	
behalf	of	a	party,	just	have	clear	rules	and	maybe	content	themes	and	pillars	that	says	when	it	comes	to	the	
people	this	is	what	we	talk	about,	when	it	comes	to	service	delivery	we	entertain	these		questions	and	queries	
and	not	others.	When	it	comes	to	our	political	messaging,	do	we	use	a	certain	person	as	a	spokesman	or	do	we	
take	the	approach	of	I	don’t	know,	like	testimonials	of	people	on	the	ground,	like	what’s	the	stance,	whatever	the	
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message	is,	whatever	your	approach,	it	is	consistent,	like	you’re	not	getting	Maxine’s	view	today	and	Standard	
Banks	view	tomorrow,	that	way	people	know	what	to	expect. 
 
• Are	you	familiar	with	communications	crises	that	have	been	initiated	by	bot	networks	or	fake	
accounts?	If	so,	please	describe	an	instance	you’re	familiar	with.	
I	have	a	personal	one	definitely,	virgin	active	gym	was	dealing	with	a	crisis	about	something	happened	in	their	
stores,	i	think	somebody	was	wearing	a	t-shirt	and	they	told	him	to	leave	because	they		thought	it	was	
inappropriate	and	I	remember	the	sheer	volume	of	queries	coming	in	meant	they	were	unable	to	handle	getting	
to	everyone	and	I	think	for	them	what	was	most	important	was	to	let	people	know	that	they	were	heard.	They	
opted	pt	use	a	bot	for	the	initial	response,	to	be	like,	thanks	so	much,	we	hear	what	you	have	to	say,	we’re	
working	on	it	we’’l	release	a	statemnt	shortly.	For	them	it	was	important	that	,	say	they	couldn’t	get	to	everyone	
within	a	one	hour	period,	they	didn’t	want	to	wait	five	hours	just	because	they	didn’t	have	enough	people	
because	obviously	they’re	not	geared	up	for	that	stuff	because	it	doesn’t	happen	to	them	often.	Yeah,	so	that	
was	the	one	time	when	I	think	they	used	it	quite	effectively.	They	know	people	get	irritated	when	you	take	time	
just	to	like	initially	acknowledge,	they	used	it	for	that,	where	I	think	it	was	good	though,	was	that	afterwards	the	
folow	ups	were	quite	personal	so	you	know	it	wasn’t	a	bot.	So	that	was	a	good	example	of	using	the	bot	for	initial	
response	to	keep	people	at	bay,	and	then	following	up	with	a	proper	personal	engagement.	I	think	it	was	
positive,	but	i	might	be	biased	because	I	work	in	social	media	so	I	thought	that	was	like	a	clever	way	to	handle	
stuff.	I	guess	if	you’re	on	the	outside	and	you	don’t	know	this	stuff	you’ll	sort	of	be	indifferent	and	it	may	not	
make	a	difference	because	you’ll	be	irritated	regardless.	Speaking	from	a	specialist	point	of	view	i	believe	that	
was	a	clever	way	to	use	a	bot,	yeah. 
 
• As	a	social	media/community	manager	do	you	believe	its	possible	to	influence	perceptions	of	those	
who	come	into	contact	with	these	misinformation	campaigns	on	social	media?	
 
Yeah	definitely,	that’s	why	its	so	important	to	have	your	themes	and	pillars	set	out	initially	so	your	message	is	
clear	and	you		aren’t	sort	of	tempted	to	sway	and	put	your	own	view	in	especially	when	its	political	if	everyon’es	
got	their	own	preference	and	it	is	difficult	at	times	to	remove	yourself	as	the	social	media	person	to	remove	
yourself	and	remember	you’re	speaking	on	behalf	of	someone	else	and	speaking	on	behalf	of	a	brand	if	you	are	
managiing	an	account	say	for	a	company	or	a	political	party. 
 
• As	a	social	media/community	manager,	how	would	you	recommend	political	parties	mitigate	against	
misinformation	campaigns	initiated	by	bots?	
I	think	its	a	really	hard	one,	the	hardest	thing	is	people	can	create	accounts	whether	its	bots	or	not,	especially	
with	bots	faster	than	you	can	shut	things	down	so	i	think	in	that	case	the	easiest	way	is	to	be	on	really	high	alert	
and	have	all	your	alerts	set	up	so	that		you	get	sort	of	pinged		immediately	as	soon	as	a	bot,	and	you	would	know	
its	a	bot	because	they	will	probably	spit	out	20	tweets	in	two	minutes	and	then	you	know	that’s	obviously	not	a	
person	so	i	think	have	alertxs	set	u	p	and	have	a	team	with	enough	physical	bodies	that	can	sit,	report	accounts	
so	they	can	get	shut	down	and	i	think	have	a	good	relationship	with	the	platform	partners	in	whichever	country	
so	in	South	Africa	we	have	facebook	africa	head	office,	so	for	example	we	don’t	have	a	twitter	head	office,	so	
who’s	the	office	rep	for	twitter?	Have	them	on	hand,	have	htier	contact	details	make	sure	so	when	you	have	a	
crisis	you	can	contact	and	sya	here	are	these	five	twitter	handles	that	have	come	up,	we’ve	reported	them,	please	
help	us	take	them	down	asap,	you	know	because,	of	misinformation	and	propaganda.	Other	than	that,	I	mean,	
it’s	really	hard	to	sorto	of	warn	people	unless	you	were	gonna	send	out	a	tweet	saying	please	be	aware	of	fake	
news	circulating,	you	know,	from	these	accounts,	but	if	anything	that	would	probably	send	people	to	those	
accounts	because	the	natural	curiosity	means	you	want	to	go	and	find	out	what	they’re	saying.	So	I	think	a	sort	
of	background	approach	to	just	ry	and	get	them	shut	down	and	reported	is	probably	the	safest	easiest	way	to	
attend	to	it. 
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• Do	you	believe	that	social	networks	are	doing	enough	to	reduce	the	impact	of	these	misinformation	
campaigns?	
I	think	probably	as	of	2018	yes,	i	think	before	that	no,	I	feel	like	they	didn’t	really	understand	especially	facebook,	
didnt	really	understand	the	extent	to	which	people	were	literally	putting	out	sheer	nonsense.	People	were	
misappropriately	using	incorrect	images	and	incorrect	copy	or	messages	and	putting	them	together	uhm	and	
posts	were	just	going	viral,	but	I	think	ever	since	then,	especially	since	what	happened	with	cambridge	analytica	
and	facebook	I	think	all	the	social	networks,	especially	facebook,	are	really	on	it	now,	i	know	that	the’yve	actually	
gone	on	a	whole	mission	deploying	new	people	and	engineers	to	develop	code	and	have	ai	algorithms	to	identify	
things	sooner	and	faster	so	they	can	automatically	shut	down	accounts,	delete	posts,	images	and	so	on,	before	
the	public	even	has	a	chance	to	report	it	as	fake.	So	I	think	that’s	going	a	really	long	way	in	the	right	direction	
becuase	it	teaches	the	computers	not	only	different	languages	with	copy,	but	also	identify	images	because	I	tihnk	
getting	code	to	read	the	text	and	take	down	is	not	that	complicated	in	2018,	but	i	think	being	able	to	view	a	
video	for	example,	with	terrorist	activity	with	isis,	where	people	were	getting	beheaded,	for	video	in	order	to	read	
that	and	say,	oh,	here’s	a	person,	plus	there’s	plus,	plus	there’s	a	behading,	oh	this	probably	means	its	something	
bad	lets	remove	it.	That	I	think	is	a	really	smart	move,	because	all	people	are	gonna	do	is	outsmart	the	machines	
and	find	another	way	and	do	funny	things	in	the	videos	to	trick	the	machine	leanring	to	think,	oh	here’s	a	cute	cat	
and	a	baby	you	know,	then	throw	in	the	horrific	scene	for	example,	and	let’s	be	honest,	human	nature	is	people	
are	curios	and	they	are	gonna	want	to	watch	it	anyway	so	i	think	using	the	tech	to	do	it	automatically,	before	a	
person	needs	to	report	you	know	something	as	misinformation	is	probalby	the	best	way,	plus	they	can	do	it	at	
much	greater	scale	than	any	human	can	do,	yeah. 
 
Respondent	4	Research	Interview	 
• How	long	have	you	been	a	social	media	manager?	
So	I’ve	been	involved	in	social	media	for	9	years	since	2009	and	that's	specifically	using	it	as	a	social	media	
manager	and	not	from	a	personal	consumption	perspective,	if	its	from	a	personal	consumption	perspective	
it	goes	back	to	2005.	So	my	first	role	was	working	publicity	for	a	movie	franchise	and	developing	an	online,	a	
virtual	community	around	that	to	get	generate	hype	before	it	got	released,	but	at	the	same	time	i	was	also	
working	extensively	with	restaurants	and	cement	companies	to	try	and	navigate	and	understand	social	
media	from	a	brand	perspective	 
• In	your	opinion	what	are	key	aspects	of	the	work	you	do?	
So	in	terms	of	my		work	let's	start	let's	talk	about	the	day	to	day	and	then	cover	the	broader	strategic	
objectives.	It	is	essentially	to	to	manage	the	reputation	of	the	brand	I	work	for	and	to	ensure	that	there	isn't	
any	misinformation	around	the	brand,	secondly,	where	this	is	negative	sentiment,	my	job	is	to	understand	
what	that	is	and	to	see	how	we	can	deal	with	it	so	that	we	can	give	a	positive	brand	experience,	not	
necessarily	just	for	consumers	but	for	all	stakeholders.	Internal	stakeholders,	external	stakeholders	including	
civil	society,	uh,	advocacy	groups,	government	et	cetera.	Understanding	the	brands	online	reputation	
whether	it	has	positive	sentiment	and	how	that	plays	out	on	the	line	whether	it	be	broadcast	platforms	
online	or	dialogue	platforms	online,	including	social	media. 
 
• Have	you	ever	experienced	a	social	media	crisis?	
	Yes,	I’ve	experienced	multiple	social	media	crises	over	the	last	9	years,	I’ll	just	rattle	off	a	few	from	the	early	
days	until	now.	With	a	pharmaceutical	brand,	a	few	years	ago	one	of	the	challenges	we	had	was	that	an	
importer	brineging	in	what	can	be	considered	to	be	grey	product	and	not	importing	through	the	proper	
channels	such	as	getting	sabs	approvals	and	selling	that	product,	the	problem	with	that	product	was	that	
the	veracity	of	the	health	claims	couldn’t	be	proven	purely	because	it	did	not	go	through	those	official	
channels,	so	it	created	a	lot	of	distrust	in	that	product,	this	was	5	or	6	years	ago.	For	a	large	retailer,	a	crisis	
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i	dealt	with	was	hiring	practises	and	preferences		and	how		that	retailer	dealt	with	that	with	regards	to	
transformation.	I’ve	dealt	with	crises	in	terms	of	explosions	at	facilities,	where	there	were	damages.	Loss	of	
life	et	cetera. 
 
• How	would	one	effectively	manage	a	social	media	crisis?	
Ok,	so	if	we	were	to	define	a	crisis	or	any	issue,	what	is	a	crisis?	It	is	a	negative	change	or	a	negative	
disruption	in	what	is	assumed	to	be	the	norm,	so	that	would	be	a	crisis	and	it	could	scale	from	a	bad	
customer	experience	to	something	that	might	be	a	little	trivial	like	you	bought	an	expired	loaf	of	bread	from	
a	retail	outlet,	to	catastrophic	loss	of	life	or	property	and	materially	affects	a	businesses	ability	to	operate,	
so	that’s	how	we	would	define	a	crisis	the	resolution	however	there	are	certain	commoanlities,	the	first	
commonality	is	being	able	to	understand	the	context	to	understand	what	went	wrong	and	also	understand	
the	extent	of	that	damage	also	to	not	necessarily	contain	the	message,	but	be	able	to	focus	a	singular	
narrative	that	comes	out	of	it	and	that	narrative	needs	to	be	centralised	so	part	of	that	mitigation	strategy	
is	that	the	message	is	controlled	from	a	sense	that	only	certain	individauls	comment	on	it,	certain	platforms	
comment	on	it	and	in	the	process	we	eliminate	doubt	confusion	et	cetera.	So	what	we’ve	done	is	all	our	
platforms	are	centralised	and	individual	operating	model	entity,	say	for	example,	in	Gabon	cannot	just	do	
something	or	say	something	without	approval	which	is	important	because	you	contain	the	message.	It’s	
also	important	that	our	employees	are	educated	to	say	this	is	how	we	manage	theses	risks	because	there	
are	safety	risks	and	we	don’t	want	to	cause	undue	panic,	and	that’s	also	important,	its	important	that	we	
dont	treat	channels	separately,	so	we	have	a	single	narrative	across	channels,	so	a	press	release	will	never	
contradict	a	social	media	update,	will	never	contradict	a	statement	on	radio,	so	its	very	important	that	
message	is	consistent,	that	message	is	spread	across	and	we	try	to	do	as	much	extensive	communication	as	
possible,	so	that	not	only	do	we	address	the	crisis	on	the	platform	in	which	it	plays	out,	but	also	on	
ancialliary	platforms	and	that’s	something	I	don’t	think	brands	take	seriously.	If	there’s	a	crisis	for	example	
on	twitter	they	will	contain	their	messaging	to	twitter,	but	twitter	could	be	the	starting	point	and	extend	
them	to	other	platforms,	so	how	do	you	mitigate	that?	
 
You	might	have	an	issue	because	of	a	print	ad	that	plays	out	in	various	platforms,	like	whatsapp	groups	and	
you	can’t	monitor	that,	so	you	try	and	spread	your	message	as	far	as	possible	and	you	try	and	make	it	as	
accessible	as	possible,	becuase	you’ll	never	perhaps	be	able	to	correct	what	happens,	but	you	can	have	a	
credible	voice	in	there	and	part	of	that	credible	voice	is	also,	before	that	crisis	happens	to	proactively	build	
credibility	within	that	platform,	so	when	things	happen,	you	do	have	a	voice	and	this	is	something	we	saw	
from	BP,	when	they	had	the	gulf	oil	crisis,	believe	it	was	in	2010,	what	happened	was,	because	they	had	no	
official	presence,	they	allowed	these	parody	and	rogue	accounts	to	come	in	a	create	this	concusion.	It's	not	
something	that’s	stayed	in	2010,	we	see	today	for	example	the	global	citizen	concert	that	happened	on	
sunday	and	the	subsequent	problems	that	ensued	at	various	locations	including	service	stations,	there	was	a	
parody	account	for	the	commissioner	of	police	Bheki	Cele,	and	that	parody	account	was	leaving	comments	
and	people	were	thinking	that	this	was	the	official	minister	of	police	leaving	official	comment	on	it	and	that	
tends	to	go	out	of	hand,	I	mean	similarly	now	there’s	a	video	circulating	of	what	some	say	was	an	angry	ex-
girlfriend	who	obstructed	a	wedding	in	east	london	and	that	footage	is	going	around	and	now	there’s	a	new	
spin	on	it	where	people	are	saying	it	was	an	ANC	meeting,	so	there’s	obviously	a	racist	and	political	agenda	
in	terms	of	depicting	this	video.	That	video	is	from	london	and	its	about	concert	goers	who	got	angry	
because	the	artist	didn’t	pitch	up,	but	yet	all	of	this	tends	to	fester	and	ciruclate	and	it's	sad	because	we	live	
in	what	some	people	term	a	post	truth	world.	I’ve	seen	it	happen	personally	where	we	had	an	incident	at	
one	of	our	plants	last	year.	A	hydrogen	tank	ruptured	so	it	was	quite	a	loud	noise	and	a	few	people	were	
affected	by	shock	because	of	the	noise,	but	that	was	the	extent	of	the	injuries,	people	were	taking	a	refinery	
explosion	in	Mexico	where	there	was	this	massive	fireball	and	loss	of	life	and	attributing	it	to	the	incident	
last	year.	When	I	corrected	them,	including	media	agencies,	they	didnt	do	anything	about	it	because	
engagement	rates	were	so	high.	They	didn’t	care	about	the	truth,	they	cared	about	engagement,	so	that’s	
part	of	the	challenge	around	it.	 
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• Do	you	think	there	are	any	practices	within	corporate	social	media	management	that	political	
parties	could	gain	from?	
I	think	there’s	a	lot	of	practises	the	one	practice	could	be	the	sanctity	of	the	brand	and	how	the	brand	is	
depicted	so	brands	understand	that	we	invest	a	lot	in	the	corporate	identity,	the	Insignia	the	logo	and	
there’s		value	in	that	there’s	equity	in	that	so	we’re	very	protective	of	that		and	how	it	is	displayed	on	
platforms	 
 
And	while	[political]	organisations	do	have	a	have	a	level	of	branding	I	do	think	it	not	as	as	uhm	heavily	
invested	in	from	a	protection	perspective		so	oftent	you	might,	it’s	not	to	say	it	doesn’t	happen,	the	EFF	
submitted	a	statement	two	days	ago	to	distance	themselves	from	people	who	wear	EFF	insignia	while	
committing	acts	that	the	EFF	do	not	condone	so,	so	there	is	discussion	around	it,	but	brands	are	more	
consistent	with	that.	It’s	the	branding	practises	around	civil	society	and	how	they	could	learn	from	that,	I	
mean	simple	things	like	consistent	use	of	a	hashtag	for	example,	on	something	online	,	i	notice	that	if	civil	
society	and	advocacy	movements	were	consistent	with	CI	and	Branding	and	empowering	their	people	with	
those	guidelines,	that	would	make	for	a	more	empowering	conversation	especially	if	you	are	going	to	use	
digital	communication	to	create	awareness	around	a	cause,	so	those	are	some	of	the	principles	I	think	that	
uh,	political	parties	can	learn	from	brands.	Othwer	practises	as	well	is	a	customer	centric	aproach	[chuckles]	
to	understand	constituents	needs	and	deliver	on	that	uh,	I	saw	some	interesting	research	last	week	that	
spoke	about	“what	are	the	top	priorities	from	a	polling	perspecitve	and	what	are	the	messages	that	political	
parties	use”	and	the	disconnect	between	that,	what	people	value	in	terms	of	service	delivery,	safety	et	
cetera	and	what	party	messaging	is	and	that	disconnect	between	that	market	research	and	messaging	
research	so	I	think	there’s	alot	of	that	as	well	where	politcal	parties	can	learn	from	brands.	I	do	think	
political	parites	tend	to	use	social	media	as	broadcast	platforms	as	well	if	you	look	at	the	sa	governemnt	
twitter	account	for	example,	it	will	not	share	anything	except	what	it	publishes	or	what	it	subsidiary	
accounts	publish,	so	theres	no	sense	of	engaging	and	there’s	no	response	to	comments.	So	while	social	
media	is	definitely	not	representative	of	a	country’s	sentiment	it	does	capture	a	part	of	it.	So	it	would	be	
imortant	to	consider	the	dialogue	component	of	social	media,	if	you’re	asking	people	to	self	select	their	
experience	and	follow	you,	then	give	them	something	that’s	valid. 
 
• Are	you	familiar	with	communications	crises	that	have	been	initiated	by	bot	networks	or	fake	
accounts?	If	so,	please	describe	an	instance	you’re	familiar	with.	
So	what	happened	is	we	had	a	tax	dispute	with	SARS	last	year	which	we	won	this	year,	bassically	SARS	were	
saying	we	owed	them	R2	billion	for	oil	purchases	and	uhm,	what	happend	was,	some	of	the	WMC	bots	got	
hold	of	that	and	started	pushing	their	narrative	that	we’re	aren’t	playing	[ball]	with	government,	we’re	
white	monopoly	capital,	our	CFO	is	an	afrikaner	man,	so	that	became	a	thing	and	that	spread	on	a	bot	
network	including	a	lot	of	webssites	like	WMC	exposed,	a	lot	of	Gupta	Bots	stuff,	all	that	is	shut	down	now	
becuase	all	their	funding	is	gone	there,	but	for	a	long	time	i	was	dealing	with	that	and	how	this	message	
was	spread	out	across	this	bot	network	and	that	was	kind	of	scary	for	a	while,	but	luckily,	what	we	did	to	
counter	that	was	just	to	be	frank,	go	into	traditional	media	push	it	out	a	soon	as	possible	and	to	also	change	
your	SEO	strategy	quite	heavily	to	combat	it.	That	was	a	funny	experience.	So	that’s	one,	the	other	is	the	
conversation	around	WMC	and	how	that	was	played	out.	I’ve	seen	the	US	bots	around	the	US	elections	
spread	alot	of	fake	news,	and	fake	news	around	Obama,	Hillary,	fake	news	about	Islam	as	well,	I’ve	seen	a	
lot	of	that	and	I	think	that,	because	I’m	close	to	it	from	a	faith	perspective,	[the	lies]	it’s	so	evident.	Alot	of	it	
is	really	ridiculous,	what’s	sad	is,	people’s	ability	to	hold	on	to	that	and	believe	it	because	of	what	social	
media	does.	So	a	few	years	ago	I	was	doing	an	interview	on	Al	Jazeera	and	the	discussion	was,	is	social	
media	subjective	or	objective	and	I’m	like	by	its	very	natures	its	subjective	becuase	you	self	select,	because	
you’re	using	the	search	parameters	to	look	for	what	you	want	to	look	for,	you	see	what	you	want	to	see	and	
it’s	almost	given	a	platform	for	like	minded	individuals	to	find	each	other.	There	were	always	people	who	
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believed	the	world	was	flat,	the	only	difference	now	is	the;yve	found	solidarity	and	some	form	of	uhm,	well,	
other	idiots	who	think	the	world	is	flat	and	that’s	what	social	has	done,	by	its	very	nature	it’s	found	like	
minded	people	to	engage	in	a	virtual	community,	to	share	a	collaborate	and	to	reinforce	beliefs.		
So,	at	Al	Jazeera	at	the	time,	I	was	talking	about	search	terms	if	you	search	for	something	you’ll	find	it	and	it	
will	either	confirm	a	bias	or	negate	the	bias,	but	you	don’t	search	for	things	you	don’t	want	to	believe	in,	
because	you	don’t	want	to	read	stuff	that	does	not	confirm	the	bias,	that’s	harder.	If	you	fundamentally	
believe	that	the	government	is	corrupt	any	misinformation	that	proves	that	point	you’ll	take	it	on,	it’s	the	
same	with	farm	murders,	if	you	honestly	think	there	is	a	genocide,	if	you	find	a	little	girl	from	Louisiana	that	
was	slapped,	then	slap	onto	and	ad	to	say	boycott	Spur,	you	will	believe	that	without	question.	It’s	harder	to	
question	the	things	we	believe	than	it	is	to	question	the	things	we	don’t	believe.		 
 
• As	a	social	media/community	manager	do	you	believe	it's	possible	to	influence	perceptions	of	
those	who	come	into	contact	with	these	misinformation	campaigns	on	social	media?	
It	is	a	difficult	job	to	change	perception	and	change	behaviour,	because	you	cannot,	especially	on	a	social	
media	platform,	if	you	think..first	of	all	I	think	people	are	sceptical	of	brands	and	they	understand	that	
brands	have	an	agenda	as	well,	brands	are	not	altruistic,	they’re	not	just	here	for	the	good	of	society,	
brands	are	there	because	they	are	pro-profit	agencies	so	they’re	there	to	make	money,	so	you	should	be	
sceptical	when	a	brand	engages	you,	but	at	the	same	time,		as	a	brand	we	need	to	consider	that	just	
because	we	might	have	a	version	of	the	truth	does	not	mean	that	someone	will	accept	that	truth	so	what	
we	need	to	do	is	ensure	consistency	around	that	truth,	authenticity	as	well	as	an	unyielding	commitment	to	
living	out	that	truth	because	the	idea	of	loyalty	is	so	tainted	these	days,	that	your	impression	of	the	brand	is	
based	on	the	last	impression	of	that	brand.	So	all	the	equity	a	brand	might	have	built	up	over	years,	doesn’t	
matter	anymore,	so	a	brand	has	to	ensure	that	all	platforms	and	touchpoints	have	a	level	of	consistency.	So	
that	if	some	does	believe	something	about	your	brand,	you	can	prove	them	wrong.	 
 
• As	a	social	media/community	manager,	how	would	you	recommend	political	parties	mitigate	
against	misinformation	campaigns	initiated	by	bots?	
It's	tough,	but	I	live	by	three	principles	whenever	I	create	content	for	social	media,	whatever	I	do	has	to	be	
credible	for	the	brand	and	that	extends	to	everything.	The	second	thing	is,	if	we’re	looking	to	create	content	
or	build	relationships,	it	has	to	be	sustainable,	it	can’t	be	once	off,	I’m	looking	for	something	we	can	build	
over	time.	The	last	thing	which	may	answer	your	question	around	misinformation,	is,	whatever	content	we	
create	must	be	of	value	to	the	user	so	when	we	correct	someone,	is	it	because	of	our	ego,	is	it	because	we’re	
self	serving,	or	is	it	because	it	adds	value	to	the	person	who	has	this	perception	of	you,	and	we	need	to	
change	that	perception.	To	add	to	that	I’d	say	a	deeper	level	of	transparency	instead	of	choosing	what	you	
will	engage	with	versus	what	you	won’t	engage	with.	I	would	campaign	for	transparency	I	would	campaign	
for	openness	I	would	campaign	for	a	demystification	of	manifestos	of	opinions,	of	positions,	have	an	opinion	
and	stick	to	it	until	you	realise	its	doesnt	work	for	you.	But	don’t	be	contradictory	and	play	yourself	too	often	
and	that’s	what	happens,	political	parties	need	to	die	on	their	sword	in	terms	of	their	principles,	or	they	
need	to	be	agile	enough	to	adjust	and	adapt,	but	the	moment	you	flip	flop,	the	moment	you	become	a	foil	
and	don’t	deal	with	all	your	criticism	and	all	your	concerns	you	lose	your	credibility,	that’s	what	I	would	do.	I	
think	clarity	of	focus	is	important	because	you	end	up	alienating	more	people.	Discovery	is	going	through	
the	same	thing	right	now	with	their	bank,	with	the	calls	to	boycott	discovery.	The	sad	thing	about	that	is	
those	who	need	to	empower	and	enable	transformation	are	the	ones	with	the	economic	clout	to	put	a	
barrier	to	it	and	that’s	what’s	happening.	So	with	the	calls	to	boycott	discovery	and	stuff	like	that	they	cant	
mete	out	their	transformation	agenda	but	at	the	same	time	are	they	doing	enought	o	win	over	the	new	
customer	and	the	new	clients	and		to	change	their	customer	base		and	that’s	difficult	because	if	you	flip	flop	
you	end	up	losing	both	sides	not	just	one,	because	you	can’t	be	everything	to	everyone. 
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• Do	you	believe	that	social	networks	are	doing	enough	to	reduce	the	impact	of	these	
misinformation	campaigns?	
No,	I	mean	there's	a	few	things	they	can	do	very	easily,	I	see	good	intent,	but	right	now	you	need	a	lot	more	
than	that,	right	now	you	need	a	deep	investment	in	humans	that	can	fact	check,	need	better	integration	
with	uhm,	the	sort	of	tools	and	accounts	out	there	that	do	fact	checking,	whether	its	with	snopes	or	an	
africa	check	or	something	like	that	,you	need	partnerships	like	that	to	the	point	that	a	social	media	platform	
can	easily	see	if	something	is	about	to	trend	and	stop	it	while	its	gaining	momentum,	so	what	happens	right	
now	with	africa	check,	it	relies	on	consumers	to	pose	the	question	in	order	to	initiate	the	research,	whereas	
if	you	aggregate	this	stuff	as	the	network	and	you	have	a	partnership	with	these	trusted	organisations,	it	
will	go	a	long	way	towards	addressing	these	issues.	I	mean,	twitter	has	done	some	work	recently	to	close	
down	some	of	the	bot	accounts,	but	it's	one	thing	to	close	down	an	account	but	its	another	to	address	
something	that’s	out	there.		I	imagine	that	if	there’s	a	disturbing	image	going	around	that’s	been	contested	
that	the	platform	puts	a	watermark	over	it	immediately,	saying,	listen,	this	is	unverified	or	whatever	and	
that	should	become	the	norm,	maybe	its	even	to	the	extent	that	we	want	to	share	something,	and	if	we	
intend	to	share,	there’s	a	block	that	comes	up	saying	this	is	fake	news	to	discourage	sharing.	 
 
At	the	moment	it's	pretty	sexy	to	hate	facebook,	its	cool	to	hate	facebook,	it's	like	when	people	say	facebook	is	
dying,	which	has	been	a	trend	the	last	four	of	five	years.	If	anything	I	think	there	will	never	be	another	facebook,	
in	terms	of	how	ubiquitous	it	is	all	encompassing.	You	get	niche	platforms	that	come	up	and	I	can	accept	that,	
secondly,	facebook	has	transcended	social	media	and	become	a	part	of	everday	life.	We	don’t	celebrate	the	
things	anymore,	if	you	look	at	E-mail,	its	become	part	of	life,	to	the	point	that	we	don’t	even	notice	because	
we’re	on	it	so	often.	We	never	articulate	that	“I	am	going	on	facebook	anymore”	its	life,	its	routine,	so	I	think	
thats	what	has	happened	from	what	facebook	started	of	being	to	what	it	is	right	now	and	part	and	parcel	of	that	
is,	“are	they	doing	enough?”	no	one	does	enough	because	of	you	were	doing	enough	it	wouldn’t	be	a	problem,	
but	I	do	think	they	have	mechanisms	in	place	which	they	have	invested	in	to	start	dealing	with	this.	I	think	
another	issue	with	the	problem	is,	its	not	just	their	responsibility,	as	we	see,	those	who	want	to	propagate	fake	
news	will	intentionally	propagate	it.	There	is	this	notion	that	people	are	unknowingly	or	unwittingly	doing	it.	
Often,	we	perpetuate	it	as	individiduals,	so	how	does	a	platform	react	to	that,	because	its	always	reactionary.	
Mcquail	spoke	about	this	about	20	to	30	years	ago,	where	says	technology	will	lead	and	regulation	will	follow	
and	thats	what	happens,	our	tech	gets	developed	faster	than	what	regulation	can	keep	up	with	it	that’s	why	
right	now	there’s	a	discussion	around	whether	netflix	should	pay	tax	in	South	Africa.	What	does	that	look	like,	
regulation	following	technology	is	not	new.	You	will	always	lead	with	content,	technology	then	regulation,	so	the	
platforms	are	similar.	We	as	user	fo	the	platform	will	also	dictate	the	usage	of	that	platfrom.	So	recently	I	readn	
an	article	around	how	teenagers	are	using	instagram	to	set	up	events.	So	we	will	dictate	how	platforms	will	be	
used,	then	the	platform	look	at	what	to	upweight	in	order	to	monetize	it,	but	when	they	downweight	that,	they	
risk	the	people	not	using	the	platform	anymore	which	is	part	of	the	challenge.	So	instagram	took	stories	from	
snapchat	and	twitter	changed	the	favourit	to	likes	because	that’s	what	facebook	does,	as	time	goes	we	will	see	a	
lot	more	of	that	as	platforms	clamour	for	eyeballs.	At	the	end	of	the	day	the	consumers	will	decide.	No	matter,	
how	much	you	invest,	the	users	decide	and	that’s	why	google	plus	is	now	dead	which	gives	me	comfort,	if	google	
cant	get	something	like	that	right,	then	we’re	ok.	Googles	clever	as	well	because	with	most	of	what	they	do,	they	
believe	utility	first	then	monetisation	after,	so	they	have	a	high	product	utility	rate,	gmail,	maps	and	its	all	free,	
then	later	we	monetise	it.	 
Journalism	has	been	affected	by	this,	for	example	the	New	York	times	or	the	Washington	Post	one	of	them	
started	capping	the	amount	of	words	in	an	article	because	its	a	world	of	engagement	and	instant	gratification	
and	they	have	to	adapt	or	they	will	die	and	that’s	what’s	happeneing.	There’s	an	interesting	article	written	
around	2009	by	a	guy	named	Rafiq	Copeland	and	in	2009	the	biggest	accounts	were	the	media	accounts	that	
decided	to	be	on	social	media	because	they	brought	influence	from	traditional	media.	CNN	brought	all	their	
equity	and	trust,	then	brought	it	to	social	networks.	Have	you	watched	this	week's	episode	of	The	Patriot	Act.	
This	weeks	episode	of	the	patriot	act	is	great,	it	covers	social	networks	and	how	they	are	problematic	because	
they	look	for	the	protection	of	publishers	but	they	also	want	to	be,	because	they’re	content	creators,	and	then	
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uh,	so	the	entire	thing	is	about	how	they	value	freedom	of	expression	and	freedom	of	speech	and	in	doing	so	
they	try	and	distance	themselves	from	the	responsibility	they	have.	
	So	this	week's	episode	is	Unbelievable	especially	when	it	comes	to	the	historical	context	of	the	internet	in	the	
early	ninetees	and	what	legisltion	was	created	to	protect	consumers	and	how	social	media	platforms	are	
blurring	those	lines.	
Respondent	6	Research	Interview	
• How	long	have	you	been	a	social	media	manager?	
So	about	8	years	now,	I	started	in	a	social	media	agency	as	a	community	manage,	then	just	climbed	the	
ranks	junior,	senior,	brand	manager	and	then	a	social	media	accont	lead	and	now	head	of	department.	How	
the	brand	manager	element	works	is	you’re	looking	after	a	collection	of	brands,	so	that’s	what	brand	
manager	means	in	our	context	and	interms	of	brands	we	work	on	pharmacueticals,	Insuraance,	Banking	
and	Telecommunications 
 
• In	your	opinion	what	are	key	aspects	of	the	work	you	do?	
Set	of	a	department	a	lot	of	my	work	is	less	operational	So	it's	about	managing	the	team	support	in	this	
team	making	sure	that	From	day	to	day	they	are	fine	and	everything	is	in	order	Healthy	Miss	any	crisis	
escalation	so	I	don't	really	mean	that	if	a	client	is	escalating	I	mean	it	from	a	community	perspective	Sophie	
example	today	we	had	an	incident	with	Jack	Parow	on	one	of	our	brands	Helping	the	team	with	how	do	we	
do	deal	with	that	and	what's	the	steps	And	how	to	liaise	with	clients	and	type	of	stuff	I	mean	I	also	
integrated	apartment	with	the	rest	of	the	agency	Silver	lining	them	with	the	media	guys	the	analytics	guys	
and	the	strategy	department	So	basically	I'm	the	bridge	between	the	other	teams	and	my	department.	I	
think	for	all	brands	whether	you've	got	an	active	presence	on	social	media	or	not	your	audience	is	on	social	
media.	Why	the	actively	be	part	of	that	conversation	or	you	can	not	take	part	in	the	conversations.	At	the	
end	of	the	day	I	think	for	most	brands	taking	part	of	the	conversation	Cannot	control	what	a	consumer	
things	but	you	can	mould	and	direct	the	conversation	In	a	certain	Direction	If	you're	part	of	the	conversation	
So	I	think	that's	the	value	for	most	brands.	For	some	brands	depending	on	the	brands	identity	and	the	
brands	objectives,	an	active	direct	involvement	in	social	media	may	not	be	the	best	option,	you	could	use	
social	media	purely	to	monitor	reputation	Or	it	could	be	really	paid	focused	and	really	advertising	and	
focused	and	you	don't	really	want	to	build	communities.	So	there's	a	lot	of	variables	you	need	to	take	into	
account	but	either	way	Whether	it's	direct	to	indirect	I	think	there's	a	space	for	every	brand	on	social	media,	
there's	a	case	to	be	made.	But	depending	on	your	objectives	that	determines	how	entrenched	you	become.	 
 
• Have	you	ever	experienced	a	social	media	crisis?	
 
Recent	example	at	the	beginning	of	the	year	on	one	of	our	FMCG	brands,	There	was	a	very	topical	
conversation	that	was	happening	in	the	country	and	we	made	a	post	about	it.	It	wasn't	direct	commentary	
but	we	tried	to	leverage	the	situation	but	then	it	came	over	as	very	insensitive.	So	yeah,	the	post	went	out,	
we	got	a	lot	of	negative	sentiment	and	then	it	was	a	matter	of	trying	to	contain	the	scenario	and	trying	to	
contain	the	brand	damage.	So	it	wasn't	an	issue	of	a	customer	complaining	it	was	a	piece	of	content	that	
we	as	a	brand	agency	were	accountable	for	that	was	posted	out	so,	In	that	sense	it	was	around	aligning	
with	client	so	why	did	the	post	go	out,	what	was	the	reason	reasoning	behind	the	post	and	what	was	the	
intention,	Aligning	with	the	PR	partner	in	terms	of	how	do	we	address	this	in	the	social	media	space,	then	
dealing	with	questions	around	do	you	remove	the	post	Do	we	put	out	a	public	statement	to	do	we	directly	
reply	to	everyone	that	complained	about	the	content	and	And	kind	of	the	recovery	process	for	the	brand	so	
now	that	the	incident	has	happened	what	do	we	do	to	mend	the	brand	reputation.	So	there's	really	two	
types	of	crises	that	we	deal	with	the	one	is	that	comes	from	a	marketing	message	where	that	be	a	post	a	
billboard	or	a	customer	issue	that	then	escalates	on	social	media.	 
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• How	would	one	effectively	manage	a	social	media	crisis?	
I	think	the	funny	thing	is	that	most	me	social	media	agencies	will	tell	you	that	you	only	need	a	social	media	
crisis	plan	when	you	have	a	social	media	crisis.	What	is	the	things	that	we	push	with	client's	which	is	a	tricky	
thing	because	a	lot	of	clients	don't	have	it	in	place	Is	a	crisis	comms	plan,	a	lot	of	the	bigger	client's	will	have	
a	crisis	comms	plan	in	general	But	very	seldom	in	my	experience	do	they	have	a	social	media	crisis	comms	
plan	that	aligns	with	the	overall	corporate	crisis	comms	plan	.So	a	big	thing	that	we’ve	started	with	our	
newer	clients	before	we	built	communities	or	we	start	engaging	is	to	build	a	social	media	crisis	comms	plan.	
The	crisis	comms	plan	leads	into	a	FAQ	space	so	what	are	the	top	types	of	complaints	that	you	get	as	a	
brand,	what	are	the	standard	responses?	We	ensure	that	be	align	with	the	business,	we	try	to	ensure	that	
we	reply	the	same	way	that	someone	in	a	customer	care	call	centre	would	reply	because	consistency	is	very	
important	But	then	we	also	build	up	for	every	brand	Court	case	by	case	scenario	so	if	this	happens	this	is	
how	you	should	respond	to	it	and	if	this	becomes	a	crisis	what	would	be	step	A	B	and	C.	So	when	a	crisis	hits	
it's	not	“oh	my	goodness	what	do	we	do	now”	its	not	a	case	of	we’re	just	running	around	nobody	knows	
what’s	happening,	Important	to	know	who's	responsible	for	what	in	that	scenario,		who	is	the	PR	agency,	
who	is	the	corporate	comms	person	internally	and	And	how	do	we	get	messages	approved	because	the	last	
thing	you	want	in	that	scenario	is	to	get	stuck	with	message	approval.	So	the	content	not	going	out	because	
you're	not	getting	the	right	person	approving	it	timeously,	because	time	is	of	the	essence	when	it	comes	to	
these	scenarios.	The	longer	the	time	you	take	to	respond	to	a	crisis	the	more	unfortunately	the	consumer	
infers	guilt,	on	the	brand	side	the	longer	you’re	silent	the	more	damage	that	you	do	so	that’s	something	we	
always	try	and	prevent. 
 
On	my	side	it's	interesting	especially	on	certain	channels	there's	more	of	a	culture	around	hostility	than	
others	so	twitter	has	become	notorious	as	a	platform	where	brands	get	lambasted	and	you	literally	have	
people	that	trawl	brand	pages	looking	for	brands	possibly	saying	something	insensitive,	with	some	sort	of	
racial	flare	there’s	actually	some	people	that	live	on	this	and	once	they’ve	found	those	brands	they	try	to	
make	a	scene,	especially	with	twitter	it	happens	a	lot.	It's	an	interesting	thing	I	don't	want	to	infer	that	its	a	
cultural	thing	You	could	align	it	with	people's	Obsession	with	fame	and	being	in	the	limelight,	because	of	a	
lot	of	the	time	people	want	that	recognition	that	I'm	the	one	that	recognise	this	brand	problem.	To	be	
honest	alot	of	people	get	a	sense	of	affirmation	around	it. 
On	the	positive	side	there’s	a	lot	more	accountability,	there	isnt	any	place	for	brands	to	hide	anymore	so	
that’s	the	positive	side	of	it,	but	i	do	think	there	needs	to	be	balance,	I	do	think	you	get	some	consumers	
that	complain	and	aggrevate	the	situation	for	the	sake	of	doing	it.	But	at	the	end	of	the	the	day	the	principle	
of	it,	that’s	the	success	of	social	media,	for	your	brand	to	work	you	need	to	be	transparent.	If	you’re	not	
you’re	going	to	be	caught	out.	 
 
• Do	you	think	there	are	any	practices	within	corporate	social	media	management	that	political	
parties	could	gain	from?	
I	think	if	you	look	at	the	political	party	as	a	brand,	at	the	end	of	the	day	it	is	a	type	of	brand	It's	a	specific	
type	of	brand	but	at	the	end	of	the	day	they	are	a	brand	with	a	reputation	that	they	need	to	build	and	
protect.	At	the	end	of	the	day,	the	things	that	we	do	as	social	media	managers	relate	to	protecting	brands	
and	creating	brand	affinity	with	our	audience	and	at	the	end	of	the	day	that	is	what	a	political	party	is,	they	
want	to	create	brand	affinitty	with	an	audience	so	that	audience	can	vote	for	them.	To	be	honest	most	of	it	
is	applicable	to	the	political	space.	20	variable	with	political	parties	is	that	there	are	lots	of	sensitivities	and	I	
think	there	are	lot	of	topics	that	they	have	to	be	careful	of.		I	think	a	lot	of	the	time	political	parties	play	in	
the	space	of	commentary	and	thought	leadership,	brands	do	as	well	but	I	think	with	most	of	the	brands	that	
we	work	with	It's	less	about	giving	commentary	on	a	particular	topic	and	it's	more	about	we	are	brand	and	
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this	is	what	we	stand	for,	I	think	was	political	parties	and	maybe	a	little	bit	more	tricky	because	they’re	
expected	to	have	an	opinion	on	certain	things.	
	Example	Coke	there's	no	expectation	that	they	should	have	an	opinion	on	everything,	Yes	there	are	certain	
things	they	do	depending	on	what's	related	to	them,	Is	check	the	Sugar	Tax	as	an	example,	that	something	
is	relevant	to	the	brand	but	the	state	of	the	economy	is	not	something	that's	really	want	to	them.	When	it	
comes	to	a	political	party	they	need	to	have	an	opinion	and	a	substantiated	opinion	when	it	comes	to	
everything,	Which	I	think	makes	it	more	tricky	Especially	from	a	crisis	comms	perspective	because	they	really	
really	have	to	have	a	well	structured	structured	plan	and	comment	on	what	is	their	position	on	basically	
every	type	of	topic	because	politics	covers	everything.	 
I’ll	be	honest	I	don’t	actually	follow	any	political	brands	on	social	media	so	I’m	not	sure	of	the	tactics	they	
employ,	but	I	an	familiar	with	the	EFF	on	twitter,	I	know	that	they	have	a	very	active	community	on	twitter	
and	they’re	very	protective	of	the	brand	on	twitter.	I’m	not	sure	if	it’s	the	result	of	the	party’s	strategy	or	if	
its	a	result	of	the	community,	but	they’ve	built	a	strong	brand	on	twitter	to	the	point	that	if	you	say	
something	negative,	there	is	this	EFF	twitter	army	that	will	defend	them,	but	I’m	not	sure	if	its	the	result	of	
the	audience	or	actually	an	active	tactic	which	is	tricky.	I	think	would	also	makes	it	tricky	on	social	media	is	
that	if	you're	not	the	target	market	you	won't	see	it	especially	if	we’re	talking	about	advertising.	Any	brand	
that’s	using	paid	advertising	we’re	not	going	to	see	it	because	we’re	not	that	target	market.	Obviously	
they’re	looking	at	a	specific	audience	that	they’re	trying	to	build	an	affinity	with	which	you	won’t	see	if	
you’re	not	part	of	that	audience. 
What	I	do	think	political	parties	should	be	wary	of	over	engaging	on	social	media,	that’s	a	general	brand	
practice.	Be	active	with	your	community	and	attend	to	queries,	but	be	wary	of	spam.	Like	over	
communicating,	that’s	a	principal	we	follow	with	our	brands,	quality	over	quantity	and	have	a	structure	and	
content	strategy	where	you	have	three	or	four	posts	a	week	that	are	very	powerful	with	a	lot	of	substance,	
instead	of	twenty	tweets	a	day.	Always	have	a	clear	idea	on	why	you’re	there,	have	a	stance	and	try	not	to	
get	involved	where	you	haven’t	figured	out	your	stance,	especially	if	you	have	trouble	aligning	it	to	your	
overall	purpose.	If	you	fail	to	do	so	you	come	across	very	vague. 
 
• Are	you	familiar	with	communications	crises	that	have	been	initiated	by	bot	networks	or	fake	
accounts?	If	so,	please	describe	an	instance	you’re	familiar	with.	
We	haven’t	experienced	anything	directly,	you	often	hear	of	accounts	that	are	bots	and	they’re	automating	
content	and	its	fake	profiles.	From	our	perspective	we	deal	with	a	lot	of	fake	account	work	in	the	sense	that	
we	are	often	the	guys	that	are	escalating	the	issues	to	Facebook.	Our	clients	often	contact	us	and	say	you	
know	these	are	the	four	accounts	that	are	imitating	the	brand	Please	try	to	get	them	shut	down,	so	we	kind	
of,		so	a	lot	of	the	times	we’re	not	the	victims	of	it	but	we	see	the	repercussions	of	it	and	we	try	with	the	
client	to	kind	of	solve	it. 
• As	a	social	media/community	manager	do	you	believe	its	possible	to	influence	perceptions	of	those	
who	come	into	contact	with	these	misinformation	campaigns	on	social	media?	
Yes	I	guess	you	could	but	it's	difficult	right.	The	problem	is	that	trust	has	been	broken	so	as	soon	as	people	
realise	that	they've	been	hacked	For	that	the	messaging	was	insincere	And	then	you	come	back	with	guys	
this	is	what	happened	this	is	the	situation	It's	tricky	because	now	you	have	to	rebuild	the	relationship	Before	
they	can	trust	you	again	So	yes	it	is	possible	but	it's	a	long-term	recovery	that	journey	that	you	have	to	take	
your	customers	on. 
On	a	lot	of	our	brands	the	problem	is	that	Information	on	the	internet	is	equal	value.	A	consumer	doesn't	
differentiate	between	what	is	more	true	than	something	else	right,		and	this	is	a	problem,	we	have	a	lot	of	
problems	with	the	some	of	the	global	brands	where	they	will	take	content	from	another	region	and	
someone	will	go	photoshop	that	image	and	make	it	come	from	the	local	market	which	is	tricky	because	it	
look	like	it	comes	from	the	brand,	it	looks	very	authentic,	it’s	got	the	brand	name,	if	you	research	it	you	even	
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see	there	was	some	sort	of	incident	but	then	the	local	instance	was	never	touched	by	it.	It	was	never	a	thing,	
so	doxxing	happens.	 
 
• As	a	social	media/community	manager,	how	would	you	recommend	political	parties	mitigate	
against	misinformation	campaigns	initiated	by	bots?	
I	think	a	brand	needs	to	do,		a	simple	thing	to	do	is	get	all	your	accounts	verified.	Sort	of	like	a	nice	technical	
thing	is	to	you	know,	make	sure	that	there's	no	confusion	that	you	are	the	brand	and	that	you	are	seen	as	
the	real	account	so	getting	that	blue	tick	is	a	relatively	simple	thing,	to	get	depending	on	how	big	your	
account	is	we’ve	never	dealt	with	political	parties	so	not	sure	if	they	can	get	verified	I	would	be	my	first	port	
of	call	is	to	make	sure	that	my	account	looks	as	reputable	as	possible.	On	an	ongoing	basis	to	a	search	for	
Imposter	accounts	report	those	accounts	and	try	and	shut	them	down	And	continuously	communicate	to	
your	audience	and	community	that	these	are	you	official	channels.	These	are	our	official	accounts	and	if	you	
see	anything	that	looks	untoward	from	other	accounts	it's	fake	just	ignore	it.	It's	very	tricky	because	with	
social	media	there's	equal	power	across	the	board,	so	the	only	thing	you	can	do	is	communicate,	we’re	
official	,	this	is	not	official.	I	think	another	tactic	that	can	be	used	is	always	refer	back	to	a	website,	a	
credible	web	presence	to	reaffirm	the	credibility	so	say	to	your	community,	if	this	statement	is	not	on	our	
website,	then	its	untrue,	at	the	end	of	the	day	its	a	little	harder	to	hack	or	impersonate	a	website.	Don’t	be	
too	reliant	on	your	social	media	presence,	try	to	push	it	to	a	website	where	you	can	have	credible	
information	and	your	community	can	also	use	it	as	a	reference	point	as	the	truth	of	the	brand	because	that	
is	one	place	where	you	can	control	the	narrative.	A	hub	basically. 
In	terms	of	bots	just	disseminating	information,	I	think	you	need	t	use	data	to	inform	you	approach.	You	can	
use	a	social	listnening	tool	to	do	this.	What	a	social	listening	tool	does	is	it	can	track	keywords	for	a	brand	so	
you	can	put	in	key	sensitive	topics	as	search	terms,	you	analyse	that	and	dependent	on	the	volumes	you	
determine	if	you	want	to	engage	or	not.	If	topics	are	getting	lots	of	volume	and	its	negative,	then	yes	maybe	
I	need	to	respond	and	attend	to	those,	but	if	its	a	small	amount,	it	might	not	be	feasible	to	attend	to	it	
directly,	but	the	only	way	is	to	look	at	the	data,	analyse	and	then	determine	what	you	engage	with	and	
what	you	don’t.	 
 
• Do	you	believe	that	social	networks	are	doing	enough	to	reduce	the	impact	of	these	misinformation	
campaigns?	
At	the	end	of	the	day	social	media	is	this	contradiction	because	everyone	has	freedom	of	speech.	In	my	mind	I	
think	there's	a	limited	amount	of	things	that	platforms	can	do	because	the	more	you	do	that	the	more	you	limit	
people's	right	to	freedom	of	speech.	So	I	think	education	is	important	from	a	platform	perspective.		A	platform	
like	Facebook	needs	to	educate	its	community	around	the	potential	dangers.	At	the	end	of	the	day	I'll	be	honest	
I	think	the	responsibility	lies	with	the	consumer	to	figure	out	the	real	from	the	wrong,	because	I	don't	think	the	
platform	should	be	responsible	for	it.	It's	too	big	of	a	job	and	the	more	they	try	to	limit	that	the	more	defeats	the	
purpose	of	what	social	media	is.	
	
Respondent	7	Research	Interview 
• How	long	have	you	been	a	social	media	manager?	
So	I've	been	on	social	since	since	2007	and	then	my	first	of	a	job	in	social	media	was	in	2010	when	I	did	work	
for	a	telecoms	company,	then	I	did	some	work	for	a	paid	television	service	and	then	some	strategy	for	
another	telco,	mostly	social	strategy	and	content	strategy.		I	currently	do	social	media	strategy	for	FMCG	
brands.	Adding	all	my	social	media	experience	together	I	would	say	it's	6	for	7	years 
 
• In	your	opinion	what	are	key	aspects	of	the	work	you	do?	
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So	my	current	role	entails	deciphering	a	client	brief	then	assessing	what	the	current	potential	market	for	
that	client	is	and	what	that	target	market’s	digital	footprint	is		and	then	to	try	plan	messages	that	will	reach	
those	people	both	on	a	channel	level	and	on	an	emotional	level	so	whatever	we	post	will	resonate.		
So	on	a	macro	level	the	key	aspects	of	social	media	in	general,	I	think	one	of	the	easiest	answers	is	customer	
care	on	social	media	,	we’ve	become	conditioned	to	think	it's	now	a	customer	care	channel.			In	general	I	
think	just	being	active	and	posting	if	you	think	of	brands	a	normal	person	I	think	social	exists	as	a	middle	
funnel	function.	it's	not	quite	going	to	close	the	deal	but	it's	definitely	helps	a	customer	because	they've	
been	through	and	awareness	they’ve	now	encountered	your	brand	your	brand	because	they	follow	you	for	
whatever	reason	and	then	you	sort	of	transition	into	harder	marketing	push	onto	them. 
 
• Have	you	ever	experienced	a	social	media	crisis?	
So	within	my	professional	work	I've	been	fortunate	enough	not	to	experience	a	crisis	but	in	my	personal	
context	I	have.	Before	Twitter	became	the	angry	hateful	place	that	it	is	now,	there	was	a	news	story	that	
Angelina	Jolie	had	a	double	vasectomy	because	she	had	breast	cancer.	I	was	22	at	the	time	and	I	tweeted	
that	Angelina	without	breasts	is	pointless,	an	industry	colleague	saw	it	and	her	friend	had	been	diagnosed	
with	breast	cancer	the	day	before.		I	backed	down	very	quickly	because	the	industry	colleague	was	the	first	
one	who	see	it	but	from	there	it	just	spiralled	out	of	control.	If	it	had	happened	now	i	would	be	fired. 
In	some	of	my	personal	work	in	working	in	telecommunications	I	must	say	that	the	telecommunications	
brands	are	constantly	hated	on	Twitter	so	it's	not	as	singular	crisis	but	eternal	often	there's	a	lot	of	hate	
directed	towards	telecommunications	brands	on	social	media		and	just	trying	to	move	that	sentiment	needle	
is	almost	impossible.	What	we	found	was	there	were	two	decided	communities,	there	was	one	that	would	
regularly	engage	every	day,	we’d	put	up	find	the	phone	puzzle	and	people	would	actually	wait	for	it	and	we	
give	like	fifty	bucks	airtime	or	twot	gigs,	you	know	it	was	nothing	really	meaningful	as	a	prize	but	its	
something	that's	better	than	work.	Then	you’d	get	people	that	would	come	in	for	individual	issues,	hi	my	
phones	stolen,	hi	my	phone’s	dead,	hi	my	phone	won’t	work		and	it	wasn’t	a	finite	crisis,	but	it	was	just	
trying	to	move	that	needle	and	up	until	the	account	left	we	never	managed	to	lift	the	sentiment. 
 
• How	would	one	effectively	manage	a	social	media	crisis?	
So	i	think	initially	it	really	is	to	understand	what	really	is	the	problem	that’s	going	on	here.	Is	it	an	employee	
issue,	do	people	dislike	an	ad,		what’s	actually	the	problem.	If	you’re	an	agency	partner	then	work	closely	
with	your	client,	because	your	client	contact	may	not	be	in	the	department	where	the	crisis	emanates	from,	
but	it	will	be	important	to	be	close	to	them	because	they	would	have	to	bring	the	relevant	managers	in.	
Uhm,	and	then	you	need	to	begin	engaging	with	influencers	on	the	platforms	as	well	as	media	partners	to	
try	and	mitigate	and	contain	the	matter	by	saying	look,	this	is	our	side	of	things	and	I	think	if	possible	
engage	the	offended	party	possible	offline	and	directly,	like	look,	what	actually	happened,	but	in	order	to	do	
that	directly	you	need	not	only	your	marketing	contact	but	also	the	relevant	manager.	We	have	an	FMCG	
brand	and	one	of	their	brands,	which	turns	out	to	be	a	brand	that	we	don’t	handle,	did	it	incorrectly.	They	
just	shut	down	everything	and	it's	kind	of	the	argument	that	innocent	people	don’t	run	but	guilty	people	do,	
and	it	really	got	away	from	them,	they	weren't	able	to	say	look	if	you’ve	got	product,	bring	it	to	these	
locations,	we’ll	get	rid	of	it.	They	caught	up	with	that	after	a	week	but	the	initially	it	got	away	from	them.	It	
also	reinforced	the	notion	that	they	knew	that	they	had	screwed	up	and	it	seemed	like	they	were	careless	so	
they	knew	something	was	wrong.	If	they	rather	would	have	been	transparent	and	said,	look,	we	don’t	know	
what’s	happened	but	we’re	stopping	everything	and	most	times	people	are	ok	with	that.	If	you	look	at	the	
KFC	debacle	earlier	on	in	the	UK	this	year,	they	changed	suppliers	and	couldn’t	meet	demand	so	they	had	to	
close	all	their	branches	and	they	kept	on	putting	out	messaging	like,	this	is	what	we	know	so	far,	this	store	
has	stock,	and	the	one	where	they	turned	the	whole	thing	around	was	when	they	took	out	an	ad	where	the	
bucket	of	chicken	said	FCK	instead	of	KFC	and	the	brand	manager,	it	must’ve	been	a	hell	of	a	thing	to	sign	
off	an	ad	where	your	brand	literally	says	fuck,	in	brand	CI	and	everyone	saw	it	and	first	thing	they	did	was	
take	out	their	phone,	tweet	it	and	it	goes	viral,	but	everyone	came	out	smiling	and	the	brand	emerged	
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positively.	They	owned	their	crisis	and	they	came	out	and	gave	an	honest,	human	apology	at	the	end.	Social	
media	is	not	real	life,	only	a	small	part	of	the	population	is	on	twitter,	but	those	people	on	twitter	are	a	
noisy	bunch,	they’re	naturally	narcissistic	and	want	to	tell	people	their	thoughts	so	not	everything	that’s	a	
crisis	on	social	media	is	a	full	crisis,	but	if	it	becomes	a	full	crisis	you	then	need	to	bring	in	other	channel	
partners	and	channel	to	deal	with	that.	Enterprise	is	a	good	example,	what	they’ve	done	now	is	provide	in	
store	flyers	showing	that	they’ve	cleaned	the	factory.	They’ve	a	real	world	crisis	that	started	on	social,	
contained	it	there	eventually	and	now	their	messaging	is	totally	in	store,	I	notice	that	they	haven’t	done	it	
online.	So	there’s	room	to	use	other	channels,	as	digital	people	we	rely	on	digital	too	much	and	forgot	the	
real	value	that	a	great	print	advert	can	do. 
• Do	you	think	there	are	any	practices	within	corporate	social	media	management	that	political	
parties	could	gain	from?	
I	think	the	fundamentals	dont	change	whether	you’re	a	person,	commercial	brand	or	political	brand.	So	
setting	up	a	voice,	determining	what	you	stand	for	and	believe	then	communicate	that,	uhm,	unlike	a	lot	of	
corporate	brands,	I	don’t	think	political	brands	need	to	respond	to	every	single	response	on	social	because	
the	nature	of	that	space	is	inherently	emotional	and	in	south	africa	people	will	be	tweeting	nasty	things	at	
the	eff	all	day	and	the	account	doesn’t	need	to	respond	to	it,	they	don’t	need	to	respond	to	that,	uhm,	but	I	
do	think	they	need	the	same	structures	in	place	in	terms	of,	this	is	who	manages	the	account,	this	is	the	
structure	and	hierarchy,	and	this	is	who	gets	involved	in	terms	of	a	social	media	crisis.	I	think	one	of	the	
things	we	don't	think	of	and	I’ve	only	just	thought	of	it	now,	but	a	lot	of	corporates	have	individual	social	
media	policies	in	terms	of	how	you	may	act	as	yourself.	I	think	political	parties	should	set	those	up	as	well.	
What	are	the	holy	cows	that	you	may	not	touch	uhm.	It’s	like	the	DA,	there’s	a	guy	in	PE,	Renaldo	Gouws,	
his	individual	views	are	always	clear,	but	they	don’t	always	align	with	the	DA’s	views	or	policies.	Its	like	our	
most	followed	people	in	South	Africa	are	politicians,	Razzmatazz	is	up	there,	Helen	Zille,	so	what	are	those	
people	saying,	how	are	they	acting,	and	is	it	in	line	with	the	party?	You	need	a	core	party	strategy	and	then	
to	think	of	a	strategy	and	a	process	for	individuals	as	well. 
 
• Are	you	familiar	with	communications	crises	that	have	been	initiated	by	bot	networks	or	fake	
accounts?	If	so,	please	describe	an	instance	you’re	familiar	with.	
Uhm,	the	one	that	I’ve	seen	recently	is	the	emergence	of	fake	accounts	going	after	individuals,	so	the	one	
last	week	or	the	week	before	went	after	the	cartoonist	jerm,	and	an	anonymous	account	tweeted	work	he	
had	done	years	ago	and	asked	his	current	employers	like	guys,	how	do	you	employ	someone	like	this	and	it	
was	pretty	distasteful.	The	perpetrator	had	been	hiding	behind	a	fake	account.	What	I’ve	seen	in	the	last	
few	years	is	the	general	social	media	population	wising	up	to	identifying	fake	accounts	and	we	tend	not	to	
react	as	quickly.	There	was	a	time	around	the	trump	election	era,	and	then	there	were	articles	of	the	spear	
artist	Ayanda	Mamabulu	dying	in	a	hail	of	bullets.	You’d	have	people	say	no,	that’s	not	a	real	account,	look	
at	the	link,	but	still	the	odd	person	would	still	share	it.	As	a	population	people	are	a	lot	better	at	calling	that	
out,	but	any	crisis	stemming	directly	is	not	off	hand,	but	one	thing	I	can	think	of	is	MiWay,	where	an	
assessor	allegedly	wrote	some	defamatory	comments	about	a	customer	who	had	had	an	incident	and	out	of	
anger	he	basically	faked	an	Email,	so	not	sure	where	that	falls	into,	but	he	created	a	crisis	through	fake	
content	even	though	it	was	through	his	own	identity.	 
What	I’ve	started	to	notice	here	is	that	we	haven’t	had	the	mass	botnets,	there’s	currently	a	thing	where	
there’s	BLF	supporters	and	there’s	a	net	run	from	that	but	its	not	very	sophisticated,	the	content	chos	and	
changes,	it's	not	as	sophisticated	as	the	Gupta	bots	were	and	people	spot	it	quickly	and	its	multi	racial,	multi	
class	people	that	spot	it,	everyone	does.	 
 
• As	a	social	media/community	manager	do	you	believe	its	possible	to	influence	perceptions	of	
those	who	come	into	contact	with	these	misinformation	campaigns	on	social	media?	
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Yes,	quite	easily.		In	a	post	trump	era,	the	first	part	is	the	segments	that	exist.	There’s	this	pyramid	diagram	
that	show	the	groups,	left	and	right	wing,	that	different	media	fall	into,	I	think	it	has	BBC	and	Bloomberg	at	
the	top	as	most	trustworthy	and	centerist	breitbart	in	the	bottom	left	and	maybe	daily	beast	on	the	bottom	
right,	and	people	find	what	it	is	that	sort	of	agrees	with	them	and	lean	hard	into	that,	so	those	silo	exist	and	
with	social	its	very	easy	to	shut	out	what	you	don't	agree	with.		
So	what	I’m	not	sure	of	and	I	know	Cambridge	Analytica	did	this,	people	who	are	one	percent	on	your	side,	
can	you	hook	them?	Because	if	they’re	one	percent	maybe	we	can	move	them	to	a	two	percent,	I’m	just	not	
sure	if	we	can	nudge	people	who	aren’t	interested	in	us	as	a	political	brand	for	sure.		Yes	I	think	it's	a	hard	
slog	but	possible,	its	just	easier	depending	where	I	am	on	the	political	spectrum	in	relation	to	you	‘truthful’	
information,	its	just	easier	for	people	to	fall	more	and	more	into	the	confirmation	bias. 
 
• As	a	social	media/community	manager,	how	would	you	recommend	political	parties	mitigate	
against	misinformation	campaigns	initiated	by	bots?	
I	think	a	lot	of	it	is	know	your	enemy,	know	what	you;re	up	against,	if	there	are	short	term	tactics,	like	if	you	
come	up	to	a	twitter	bot	network,	umh,	try	and	have	relationships	in	place	with	the	platforms	so	you	can	
say,	hey,	we’ve	come	across	these	accounts	and	believe	these	accounts	to	be	malicious,	that	enters	the	
dangerous	realm	of	ruling	parties	shutting	down	people	they	don’t	agree	with,	but	that	decision	sits	with	
twitter.	The	other	thing	that	I’ve	seen,	and	I’m	just	trying	to	think	bank	to	the	trump	situation	is,	and	
actually	I	think	the	Gupta	campaign	was	so	hard	to	defuse	because	there	was	a	definite	Golden	thread	ad	
message	that	ran	through	all	of	it.	As	the	media,	rival	political	parties	and	citizens,	we	were	fighting	all	
these	individuals,	but	that	campaign	definitely	had	a	singular	golden	thread.	So	I	think	as	a	political	party	
it's	important	to	have	the	one	thing	you’re	standing	on.	We	can	see	it	miles	away,	with	the	EFF	next	year	it's	
going	to	be	land	and	every	EFF	person	in	this	country,	the	only	thing	they	will	say	is	we	want	the	land,	you	
can	say	what	you	want	until	you’re	blue	in	the	face.	If	you	go	online,	be	consistent,	have	a	message	and	
stand	by	it.	If	you	respond	to	every	troll,	you’ll	never	get	to	why	people	should	think	you’re	interesting	and	
vote	for	you	and	your	political	party	brand. 
 
• Do	you	believe	that	social	networks	are	doing	enough	to	reduce	the	impact	of	these	
misinformation	campaigns?	
No,	that’s	all	you	have	to	write,	no.	Uhm,	twitter	has	a	massive	sexual	harassment	and	terrorism	problem	and	
they	say	they’re	trying.	Yesterday	the	New	York	times	came	out	with	facebook's	latest	screw	up	and	its	data	
leakage	to	other	companies,	which	allowed	marketers	to	see	your	personal	data	and	share	it	on	to	other	
companies.	The	one	thing	I	saw	the	other	day,	is	the	social	media	companies	have	all	our	data	and	why	do	they	
have	that	data	and	a	google	executive	off	the	cuff	said,	and	said,	no	one	said	we	couldn’t	have	that	data.	We	
allowed	that	data	to	manipulate	us.	Facebook	have	now	signed	with	Africa	Check	in	South	Africa,	uhm	but	then	
it	emerged	recently	in	the	UK	that	their	truth	partners	were	basically	only	used	when	there	was	a	crisis	and	not	
to	consistently	monitor	for	malicious	content,	so	are	they	doing	enough,	no.	I	think	Facebook	is	the	worst	
offender	by	many	miles	uhm,	google	tried	to	clean	itself	up,	but	that	more	of	a	legal	thing	than	an	effort	to	
genuinely	clean	up	its	act.	
	
Respondent	8	Research	Interview 
• How	long	have	you	been	a	social	media	manager?	
Community	manager	specifically,	I	started	out	in	tech	startups	in	Cape	Town,	I	worked	for	a	couple	of	
incubators	but	the	main	one	was	a	88	mph.	What	88	mph	does	is	there	look	for	startups	in	from	Kenya	
South	Africa	and	they	basically	operate	as	an	incubator	where	they	bring	these	startups		into	residency	and	
they	have	specialist	mentors	from	sales	marketing	and	I	was	part	of	the	team	handling	the	social	media.	So	
a	lot	of	it	was	community	management	some	strategy	setting	up	their	profiles	figuring	out	how	they	could	
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go	to	market	using	social	media,	yeah	so	I	was	basically	the	social	media	lead	during	that	time.	Incubator	
ended	a	few	of	the	small	businesses	stayed	on	and	I	was	consulting	to	them	on	a	freelance	basis.	I	was	
looking	to	move	to	Joburg	then	I	found	a	permanent	role	at	McCann	The	title	for	the	role	was	community	
manager	on	a	large	Automotive	account.	I	moved	from	community	management,	to	social	media	manager,	
then	senior	social	media	manager	and	now	social	media	director	so	int	total	I’ve	been	doing	social	for	6	
years.	In	total	I’ve	worked	on	automotive,	airlines,	media	a	wide	amount	of	industries. 
 
• In	your	opinion	what	are	key	aspects	of	the	work	you	do?	
So	currently	my	work	revolves	around	business	operations	it	centres	around	integration	which	covers	
planning	it	covers	things	like	social	media	process	and	governance	in	addition	to	scope	of	work	for	new	and	
existing	clients.	Another	aspect	is	figuring	out	how	we	expand	social	into	different	departments	within	the	
agency.	Then	broadly	speaking	the	importance	of	social	media	to	customers	falls	under	4	categories.		Data	
which	is	reporting	and	analytics,	Strategy	which	are	audits,	social	media	strategies	and	playbooks.	Then	
Engagement	which	is	social	influencers,	community	management,	then	you’ve	got	Content	and	production.	
The	crux	of	it	is	from	a	omni-channel	perspective	and	this	is	how	you	try	to	view	corporate	communications,	
as	a	brand	you	have	a	story	to	tell,		so	it	really	it	lends	itself	to	storytelling	because	you	can	reach	any	
individual	on	their	mobile	at	any	given	time.	Without	regurgitating	what	you’ve	heard	before	and	giving	you	
the	same	sort	of	messaging,	the	honest	truth	is	that	social	media	is	contextual	advertising	because	you	can	
serve	the	right	message	to	the	right	person	at	the	exact	right	time.	The	second	thing	about	social	media	is	
these	conversations	are	happening	with	or	without	you,	so	you	can	choose	to	participate	in	them	and	have	
some	degree	of	control	in	that	narrative	or	you	could	choose	to	put	your	head	in	the	sand,	but	either	way	
that	conversation	is	going	to	take	place.	I	think	any	misstep	for	any	brand	is	about	to	happen	it's	just	a	
matter	of	time,	you	can	be	the	best	brand	in	the	world	with	the	best	story	but	something	is	going	to	break	
down	at	some	point,	but	if	you	have	an	established	community	and	an	established	reputation	online,	then	I	
think	being	able	to	mitigate	any	mishaps	or	miscommunication	or	crises	that	come	about	may	be	easier.	As	
opposed	to	O	damn	they	mentioned	us	on	social	media	we	need	to	get	on,	let's	go	set	up	a	profile	and	and	
and.	So	in	terms	of	those	two	perspectives	I	think	the	one	allows	you	to	tell	your	story	and	the	second	is	
about	being	able	to	mitigate	any	issues	that	might	arise	for	your	brand.	The	thing	about	social	media	in	
corporate	communications	is	that	you	sort	of	want	to	mimic	people's	native	behaviours	online.	Think	about	
it,		if	I	have	a	great	experience	if	I	go	to	Old	Trafford	to	watch	a	game,	the	first	person	that	I'm	going	to	
message	about	my	experience	is	my	wife.	By	the	same	token,	if	I	get	into	a	problematic	situation	I	want	to	
get	onto	the	phone	and	contact	someone	who's	going	to	help	me.	It's	the	same	thing	if	you	have	a	problem,	
as	a	brand	you	can	literally	tweet	something	out	and	it's	like	sending	a	WhatsApp	to	thousands	of	people,	
there	are	10	million	people	active	online,	so	you	can	literally	broadcast	a	message	to	millions,	so	if	you’re	a	
brand	like	enterprise,	you	can	literally	get	ahead	of	an	issue	by	putting	your	public	statement	online. 
 
• Have	you	ever	experienced	a	social	media	crisis?	
So	yes	and	no,	I've	actually	been	pretty	blessed	over	the	past	6	years.	It's	never	been	to	the	extent	of	
something	where	there's	been	loss	of	life.	I	think	the	one	thing	was	with	a	food	brand	where	there	were	
issues	with	someone’s	food	we	got	the	PR	team	involved	and	that	was	handled	fairly	well.	Another	we	had	
just	inherited	an	alcohol	brand,		and	as	these	brands	usually	do,	they	had	an	event	with	an	instagram	booth	
where	people	could	go	in	take	pictures	and	share	them	automatically.	What	happened	was	that	someone	
went	in	with	a	very	misogynist	picture	which	made	it	look	like	the	brand	had	generated	the	content	but	that	
was	before	we	had	the	account	handover. 
Another	issue	was	a	campaign	in	which	we	generated	a	campaign	against	child	and	women	abuse	for	16	
days	of	activism,	because	we	did	it	for	an	alcohol	brand	we	had	to	deal	with	some	blowback	in	terms	of	
people	saying	alcohol	brands	perpetuate	abuse,	other	people	also	indicated	that	the	campaign	money	
would	be	better	spent	actually	helping	victims	of	abuse.	To	mitigate	against	these	issues,	which	we	
anticipated,	we	actually	set	up	a	social	media	war	room	to	check	sentiment,	have	enough	community	
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management	hands	on	deck	and	have	all	the	necessary	people	needed	for	approvals.	I	think	we	did	fine	as	
our	sentiment	over	the	campaign	was	positive. 
 
• How	would	one	effectively	manage	a	social	media	crisis?	
I’m	Fortunate	in	the	sense	that	I'm	part	of	a	global	network	so	I	have	a	lot	of	this	crisis	communication	IP	
that	is	handed	to	me	and	we	have	an	entire	chapter	that's	based	on	reputation	management.	How	our	
agency	structure	works	is	that	we	have	agencies	within	the	network	that	support	one	another,	so	
fortunately	we	have,	or	are	connected	to	a	PR	agency	which	is	one	of	the	best	in	the	world.	Our	mandate	
would	as	a	first	port	of	call	be	to	involve	our	PR	agency,	but	aside	from	that	we	have	a	crisis	management	
protocol	which	every	business	should	have	and	this	has	a	number	of	scenarios	which	are	informed	by	a	
frequently	asked	questions	document.	The	emergency	protocol	then	kicks	in	whenever	something	is	over	
and	above	the	FAQ.	So	I	will	community	managers	are	able	to	identify	when	something	is	out	of	the	
parameters	of	the	FAQ	document	and	then	the	emergency	protocol	will	kick	in.	So	we've	got	what	we	call	
green,	yellow	and	red	level	threats,	It's	a	little	organogram	and	it	breaks	down,	If	it's	green	then	the	
community	manager	responds	according	to	the	FAQ.	If	it's	yellow	then	they	respond	according	to	the	FAQ	
but	with	each	within	each	step	they	would	need	to	notify	and	get	approval	from	the	client,	on	our	side,	
those	people	will	be	the	head	of	social,	the	head	of	client	service,	then	it	would	be	the	marketing	director	
and	or	the	PR	person,	so	everyone	is	notified	and	monitored	over	a	period	of	time.	In	terms	of	identifying	if	
something	is	yellow	and	red,	we	have	a	two	page	scorecard	which	asks	a	series	of	questions	and	grade	the	
answers.	Some	questions	for	example	are	what	is	the	size	of	that	persons	following,	what	is	the	severity	of	
the	issue	at	hand,	and	so	you	grade	each	answer	and	come	out	with	a	score	and	from	that	you’ll	be	able	to	
understand	whether	something	is	green	yellow	and	red.	When	its	red	its	extremely	serious	and	we	have	to	
craft	something	with	relevant	stakeholders	within	two	hours	regardless	of	what	it	is,	a	response	must	go	out	
within	two	hours	of	identifying	the	issue.	This	is	something	brands	get	wrong,	because	they	don’t	
communicate,	at	the	end	of	the	day,	the	more	information	customers	have	the	calmer	they	are	about	
situation.	So	firstly	have	a	recognition	of	the	problem,	you	don’t	need	to	have	the	answer.	You	can	come	in	
an	say	thank	you	for	notifying	us	we	have	the	PR	team	working	on	this	and	will	get	back	to	you	as	soon	as	
we	can.	The	second	thing	is	keep	it	human,	whats	wrong	with	telling	someone	you	have	the	entire	business	
trying	to	figure	the	issue	out.	Brand	will	try	to	be	too	selective	with	what	they	put	on	social	media,	when	
they	develop	their	brand	personality	and	tone	of	voice,	they	will	say	we	need	to	be	human	and	authentic,	
but	when	its	time	to	respond	to	a	crisis	then	all	of	a	sudden	you	revert	to	a	corporate	cold	response	and	
people	are	not	idiots,	they	can	pick	up	when	you’re	not	been	authentic	and	I	think	there	is	scope	for	brands	
to	be	during	crisis.	So	it’s	recognise,	acknowledge,	grade,	inform	relevant	stakeholders	which	comes	in	the	
form	of	reaching	out	to	the	global	network	to	find	precedent	on	existing	responses	from	similar	situations,	
then	we	would	craft	the	response	with	PR,	legal,	client,	etc	and	while	this	is	happening	our	newroom	
environment	would	go	into	crisis	mode	where	we	do	live	real	time	listening	via	the	screens	on	our	newsroom	
walls.	So	essentially	what	we	do	is	set	up	relevant	topics	to	monitor	the	crisis	in	real	time	and	depending	on	
the	severity	of	the	protocol	we	will	gather	the	necessary	approvals	and	then	we	do	hourly	sentiment	reports,	
has	sentiment	shifted,	what	are	people	talking	about	and	who	is	talking	about	it.	Then	finally	you	can	look	
at	pulling	relevant	influencers	if	there	are	relationships	and	try	to	discuss	the	matter	in	person	with	the	
person	affected	so	they	can	get	clarity	or	the	full	story	so	you	can	start	to	get	ahead	of	it.	The	we	can	do	
daily,	monthly	reports	until	we’re	ahead	of	it.		The	last	thing	you	want	is	to	sit	there	and	go,	now	what!? 
 
• Do	you	think	there	are	any	practices	within	corporate	social	media	management	that	political	
parties	could	gain	from?	
 
Lot’s,	Strategy.	I	don’t	believe	any	political	party	has	a	social	media	playbook	and	I	will	not	take	on	a	social	
media	account	with	any	brand	in	any	country	if	it	does	not	have	a	social	media	strategy	and	no	one	knows	a	
brand	better	than	the	individuals	in	it,	so	we	can	craft	one	based	on	best	practice	in	a	collaborative	process	
and	you	get	to	an	outcome	that’s	the	best	o	of	both	worlds,	and	the	reason	I	say	this	is	because	I	don't	
believe	you	can	be	on	social	media	without	having	these	four	five	things.	The	one	is	a	strategic	objective,	
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why	are	you	on	social	media	in	the	first	place,	understand	the	end	goal	then	you	understand	the	means	to	
communicate	it.	So	if	it	is	to	generate	leads,	a	lot	of	what	you	do	will	be		steeped	in	paid	media,	you’re	
making	link	ads	and	a	lot	of	it	is	based	on	driving	traffic	to	websites,	It's	all	centred	around	user	Journeys	
and	user	experiences,	closing	the	feedback	loop,	and	in	addition	to	this	you’re	focusing	on	customer	care	
and	how	to	bring	the	cells	data	in.	In	other	words	your	end	goal	basically	shapes	your	approach.	So	for	
political	parties	[your	strategy]	would	be	votes,	like	how	do	we	get	votes?	There	has	to	be	an	objective,	
there	can	be	multiple	objectives	but	the	core	one	would	be	we	need	to	win	the	elections	and	to	do	that	we	
get	people	to	vote.	It	can	be	above	the	line,	billboard,	PSA’s,	radio	interviews,	there’s	a	whole	ecosystem.	
Then	on	social	one	of	those	components	can	be	buy-in	and	belief,	we	need	to	get	people	to	buy	in	and	
believe,	so	how	do	they	do	that	if	they	don’t	know	what	it	is.	The	second	thing	is	content	themes	and	
content	pillars	and	this	will	come	out	of	your	marketing	activity	plan,	which	as	a	brand	you	need	to	have	-	
these	are	the	rallies	we	go	to,	these	are	the	times	we’re	on	702	and	you	map	that	out	for	the	rest	of	the	year	
which	will	help	you	leverage	your	bursts	on	social.	Then	your	actual	rally	will	have	its	own	campaign	strat,	
what	are	we	doing	before,	what	are	we	doing	during	and	what	are	we	doing	after?	Mmusi	might	know	
what	he’s	doing	next	tuesday,	but	does	the	party	as	a	whole	know?	It’s	important	to	map	this	out	so	you	
have	alignment.	Third	point	is	tone	and	persona,	so	who	is	the	DA	what	do	they	sound	like,	how	did	they	
show	up	online,	then	you	have	a	consistency	of	that	on	their	websites.	Trick	with	political	parties,	and	that's	
why	a	social	media	playbook	and	guide	is	so	important	is	that	it	shows	individuals	how	they	show	up	online.	
In	corporate	you	don’t	have	a	problem	where	employees	speak	for	brands	unless	they’re	CEOs,	in	political	
parties	there	are	individual	representatives.	So	if	Helen	believes	colonialism	helped	progress	and	Mmusi	
doesn’t	then	they	need	to	have	an	agreement	that	she	won’t	bring	it	up,	so	you	need	dos,	don’ts	and	guard	
rails.	Then	the	last	thing	is	an	FAQ	doc.	To	summarise,	political	parties	need	those	four	things	and	based	on	
what	I	see	online	I	doubt	they	have	them.	Then	you	can	take	it	further	and	develop	user	journeys,	how	do	
we	take	people	from	awareness,	to	consideration,	to	usage	and	advocacy,	then	build	it	into	your	strategy,	
because	thinking	of	these	things	will	give	you	elements	within	your	campaign	to	think	about	instead	of	bulk	
messages	and	cold	calling. 
 
• Are	you	familiar	with	communications	crises	that	have	been	initiated	by	bot	networks	or	fake	
accounts?	If	so,	please	describe	an	instance	you’re	familiar	with.	
When	I	know	is	pizzagate	2016	election	Trump	is	going	up	against	Hillary	and	Russia	is	already	trying	to	
influence	it	with	their	bots	a	specific	piece	of	information	comes	out,	so	they’re	talking	about	Hillary’s	E-mail	
and	how	she	had	private	government	information	hosted	on	a	private	server	at	her	home.	2016	the	FBI	
raided	a	government	department	and	out	of	that	A	fake	bot	pretending	to	be	a	Jewish	lawyer,	leaked	that	
the	democratic	party	was	working	with	certain	corporates	as	part	of	a	human	trafficking	ring.	So	these	bots	
tooks	those	E-mails	and	communications	and	theorised	that	in	the	E-mails	certain	keywords	were	code	for	
human	trafficking	ring.	One	of	those	E-mails	mentioned	cheese	pizza	which	was	said	to	be	code	for	a	child	
trafficking	ring.	It	spread	like	wild	fire	and	you	had	all	these	conspiracy	websites	and	infowars	publishing	it	
as	fact,	so	you	had	a	whole	investigation	into	democrats	E-mails	because	of	this. 
 
 
• As	a	social	media/community	manager	do	you	believe	it's	possible	to	influence	perceptions	of	
those	who	come	into	contact	with	these	misinformation	campaigns	on	social	media?	
 
I	don’t	think	you	can	hey.	To	the	point	of	computational	propaganda	and	bots	is	to	make	people	who	come	
into	contact	with	it	think	that	there	is	a	much	higher	proportion	of	it	out	there	than	what	it	actually	is.	Social	
media	has	an	information	hierarchy,	people	are	talking	about	different	things	so	you	have	a	population	of	a	
million	which	is	100%	and	maybe	5%	talking	about	sports,	10%	percent	talk	about	politics	and	what	you	do	
with	computational	propaganda	is	you’re	essentially	making	a	conversation	amongst	a	very	small	group	of	
people	seem	a	lot	bigger	than	it	is.	If	you	can	mobilise	3%	of	twitter	to	talk	about	something,	it	will	seem	like	
everyone	is	talking	about	it,	so	I	think	the	bot’s	mandate	is	just	that.From	that	perspective	I	think	it's	very	
difficult.	You	can	get	ahead	of	it	and	put	out	a	factually	correct	statement,	but	can	you	mobilise	hundreds	of	
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people	to	share	or	change	the	narrative	over	time?	I	think	you	can	do	so	over	time	because	people	forget	a	
week	later,	they	come	and	go	very	quickly,	You	can	do	is	create	resources	that	people	can	easily	access	
where	they	can	get	the	correct	information	and	make	it	readily	and	easily	available	to	as	many	people	as	
possible.	Then	maybe	you	can	work	with	influences	and	people	with	larger	statures	and	get	them	to	help	
you	drive	it,	or	you	can	make	the	information	available	to	them	and	hope	they	do	the	right	thing	and	
reference	it.	If	a	bot	comes	out	and	says	you’re	a	rapist,	and	you	say	you’re	not,	how	do	you	defend	against	
that	aside	from	generating	a	fact	sheet	on	what	has	actually	happened.	The	other	thing	you	get	is	
polarisation	of	political	beliefs,	people	are	becoming	more	and	more	defensive	of	their	positions	-	its	difficult	
to	change	a	persons	perceptions	in	person,	I’m	not	sure	you	can	do	it	online.	What	happens	is,	the	moment	I	
see	something	that	supports	my	belief	system,	I	don’t	want	to	hear	a	counter	argument,	then	I	want	to	
share	it	with	everyone	else	to	show	them	I’m	right.	People	really	want	to	share	things	that	prop	themselves	
up.	There	may	be	instances	where	people	have	been	able	to	nip	things	in	the	bud,	but	I	think	the	only	thing	
you	can	do	is	make	all	the	information	available	and	give	a	link	to	it	like	snope,	I	think	snope	is	amazing	and	
I’m	seeing	more	and	more	of	it	in	threads	where	people	are	using	it	to	debunk	misinformation,	the	only	
problem	then	is	that	people	will	say	snope	is	owned	by	the	elistist	leftist	media	and	you	can’t	get	away	from	
that.	I	do	however	think	a	disproportionate	amount	of	these	discussions	are	happening	online. 
 
• As	a	social	media/community	manager,	how	would	you	recommend	political	parties	mitigate	
against	misinformation	campaigns	initiated	by	bots?	
So	the	points	I	raised	earlier	about	making	the	correct	information	available	is	important,	but	what	I	would	
do	to	mitigate	against	misinformation	if	I	were	a	political	party,	would	be	to	bake	the	facts	into	every	piece	
of	communication	that	goes	out	and	link	to	the	information	portal	at	every	turn.	It’s	important	because	
that’s	where	your	media	goes,	so	you	just	have	subtleties	in	your	communications	to	that	debunk	the	
misinformation	spread	about	you.	I	think	its	hard	for	political	parties	because	its	easy	to	hate	them	online.	
Its	harder	for	them	than	for	normal	brands	because	Mmusi	and	Helen	have	to	make	you	like	them	and	their	
party.	I	wan’t	to	believe	in	Mmusi	and	then	I	see	Helen	and	whats	going	on	in	Cape	Town,	there’s	a	
disconnect,	so	its	harder	for	political	parties.	The	other	thing	is	why	are	political	party	personalities	too	
personal,	why	don’t	they	link	out	to	the	DA’s	manifesto	at	when	ever	they	talk	about	party	issues?	 
 
• Do	you	believe	that	social	networks	are	doing	enough	to	reduce	the	impact	of	these	
misinformation	campaigns?	
No,	absolutely	not.	I	think	human	verification	is	absolutely	important,	I	think	there	is	so	much	they	can	do,	but	
what	they	tend	to	do	is	cherry	pick	the	things	they	want	to	go	after.	Sort	of	Tumblr	and	nudity,	on	tumblr,	they’ve	
removed	artistic	nudity	and	nipples,	but	you	can	get	all	the	white	supremacy	content	you	want.	The	whole	thing	
around	infowars	that	helped	galvanize	the	right	against	these	platforms	is	because	people	were	asking	why	are	
platforms	censoring	them	and	not	doing	the	same	on	the	left.	There’s	always	a	gap	between	censorship	and	
freedom	of	speech	and	it's	really	hard	to	find	that	line.	I	don’t	know,	there’s	probably	a	lot	of	stuff	they	can	do	
but	there	might	be	a	need	for	more	access	to	more	information,	you	might	need	a	trifecta	of	verification,	
information	verification,	location	verification	and	device	verification,	but	then	it	means,	does	twitter	get	access	to	
your	location,	but	even	if	you	do	that,	they	will	find	other	loopholes	to	exploit	it,	like	how	there	are	now	click	
farms	with	hundreds	of	humans	with	hundreds	of	devices	and	sim	cards	that	are	now	bypassing	two	step	
verification.	Apart	from	that	facebook	sells	eyeballs,	reach	and	frequency,	if	they	have	2	billion	people	on	
facebook	and	five	hundred	or	six	hundred	million	of	them	are	fake,	then	its	not	in	their	best	interest	to	tell	you	or	
to	get	rid	of	them,	so	they’re	conflicted	from	a	business	interest	point	of	view.	It’s	never	going	to	be	perfect,	but	
they	certainly	can	do	more.	Big	companies	are	pulling	their	budget	in	order	to	have	transparency.		 
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5.6 Appendix D: Political Party Interview Transcript 
• 				How	important	is	social	media	to	the	communications	performance	of	your	organisation?	
 
In	recent	years	we've	had	to	sort	of	switch	to	be	able	to	use	social	media	platforms	more	efficiently	and	
effectively	as	opposed	to	your	traditional	mediums	we	still	do	rely	heavily	on	traditional	mediums.	As	head	of	
communications	portfolio	in	the	province	and	my	other	role	and	responsibility	in	the	party	is	what	we	call	the	
battle	of	ideas	which		to	discuss	and	engage	with	society	on	critical	issues	and	political	discourse	both	internally	
and	externally,	both	in	the	government	and	party,	the	goal	is	to	interact	with	society.		So	we	do	engage	with	
society	a	lot.	Over	the	years	we've	had	to	be	able	to	sort	of	adapt	the	way	in	which	we	engage,	so	it's	almost	got	
to	be	simultaneous.		in	the	past	We	would	just	if	you	a	press	statement	and	be	interviewed	we	now	do	everything	
at	once	so	when	I	issue	a	written	statement	I	also	do	a	video	recording	of	the	main	thrust	of	this	statement	as	I	
know	Society	within	gauge	with	it	or	media	would	engage	with	it	we	then	also	go	to	social	media	immediately	
and	I	also	do	voice	recordings	and	different	multimedia.		so	we've	had	to	adapt	the	way	in	which	we	
communicate	because	it's	quick	and	because	it's	it's	immediate	everything	has	got	to	go	at	the	same	time	to	
everybody.		so	the	way	we	package	our	communication	is	to	be	able	to	prepare	adequately	for	responses	so	
possible	issues	that	may	come	up	in	whatever	we	raise.	So	we	sort	of	do	a	360	turn	around	before	we	
communicate	anything,	where	as	in	I	think	in	the	past	it	was	sort	of	a	wait	and	see	approach	and	it	was	because	
of	the	time	lapse	it	was	easier	to	prepare.	Because	there	is	no	time	lapse	so	now	it's	not	as	easy,	so	now	you	are	
often	faced	with	things	that	you	are	not	adequately	prepared	for.	So	the	media	space	is	changing	and	the	way	
society	engages	with	content	is	also	changing	quite	rapidly	and	I	think	political	parties	have	got	to	adapt	if	they	
want	to	stay	relevant		and	I	think	as	ruling	party	we	have	more	of	a	responsibility	to	do	it	because	we’re	the	
governing	party	as	well	as	a	political	party.	It's	not	always	easy	to	make	that	distinction	but	we	try	to.	social	
media	is	very	critical	a	large	amount	of	the	population	engages	with	social	media	as	opposed	to	those	that	
engage	with	traditional	forms	of	media	and	also	it's	younger	people	that	engage	with	social	media.	SOe	let	me	
talk	about	Gauteng	specifically,	in	Gauteng	we	have	the	highest	population	of	the	country	concentrated	in	the	
smallest	area	space	and	the	majority	of	those	are	young	people,	so	if	you	really	want	to	reach	citizens	and	
interact	with	them	and	have	meaningful	public	participation	at	government	level,	you’ve	got	to	use	it.	So	we	do	
have	a	monitoring	system	we	monitor	media	as	a	whole	and	a	big	part	of	that	is	social	media	so	we	monitor	the	
reach	we	monitor	the	the	interactions	we	monitor	the	negative,	the	positive		we	monitor	the	issues	that	come	up	
as	people	engage.		me	we	and	then	when	there's	topical	issues	outside	of	relation	periods	we	monitor	that	as	
well	we	do	have	agencies	that	assist	us	depending	on	the	periods	that	we	in	so	for	elections	we	do	because	I'm	
election	strategy	is	based	on	research	so	we	do	have	agencies	that	we	use	but	outside	of	elections	we	do	make	
use	of	agencies	but	not	to	the	extent	that	they	are	responsible		for	campaigns	but	during	elections	they	would	be. 
 
• 		What	do	you	see	as	the	largest	social	media	threats	to	political	parties?	
 
	I	think	not	just	in	social	media	but	in	media	as	a	whole	is	fake	news	anybody	can	create	content		in	anybody	
publish	content,	so	the	security	of	content	Is	not	really,		well	there	is	no	security	of	content	really	so	because	of	
that	you	have	to		build	your	reputation	and	credibility.	Branding	and	Imagery,	PR,	your	image	management	
becomes	very	important	so	that	people	know	by	looking	they	can	pickup	what	is	fake	and	what	is	not	I	think	we	
getting	better	at	it	so	for	instance	the	use	of	official	accounts	for	content	centralising	communications	has	helped	
so	in	the	ANC	you	have	dedicated	spokespersons	during	elections	it	does	get	a	bit	blurred	because	of	the	amount	
of	work	that	we	do	on	a	daily	basis	but	still	the	communication	lines	are	quite	defined	in	ANC. 
 
So	in	each	structure	there's	a	political	head	responsible	for	the	content	so	what's	the	office	of	the	secretariat	so	
its	the	secretary	and	their	deputies		and	the	spokespersons	so	the	three	of	us	are	responsible	for	everything	that	
goes	out	so	you	would	have	people	at	create	content	with	its	visual	content	it	doesn't	matter	but	it	goes	out	on	
approval	on	approval	of	the	political	principles	that's	really	how	we	do	it	and	where	you	may	have	seen	or	what	it	
doesn’t	happen	and	political	principals	haven’t	approved		it	then	we’re	quick	to	say	that	this	is	staff	of	the	
organisation	or	this	is	whatever.	it	does	create	a	bit	of	a	PR	mess	sometimes	but		but	we	do	this	own	PR	content	
that's	not	approved. 
 
	in	terms	of	managing	political	vs	party	brands	we	all	work	in	one	team	so	that	we	have	as	much	energy	as	
possible	it's	not	always	easy	to	do	because	for	instance	there	would	be	things	that	the	president	as	an	example	
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would	be	responsible	for	in	his	official	capacity	completely	so	for	instance	today	he's	gone	to	Mozambique	and	
that	is	his	responsibility	as	the	state	president	the	ANC	May	or	may	not	be	aware	of	it	at	all	and	if	it	is	purely	
because	it's	there	to	state	it	doesn't	involve	the	party	at	all	but	we	do	he's	communications	teams	he	doesn't	
have	a	presidency	communications	team	in	an	ANC	communications	team	his	communications	team	or	with	him	
24/7		so	we	do	work	together	it's	just	that	at	times	the	answer	may	not	be	aware	of	what	he's	doing.		another	
threat	is	the	Blurred	Lines	of	party	position	vs	personal	views	year	so	an	official	of	the	party	would	say	something	
which	eye	is	personal	views	which	he	has	a	right	to	to	do	but	if	they	struggle	into	areas	of	policy	it	becomes	really	
difficult	so	that's	always	a	threat	it's	not	possible	to	have	everyone	singing	from	the	same	hymn	sheet	we	do	
have	communications	protocol	it's	in	black	and	white	it's	approved	everybody	has	them	but	you're	not	always	
always	able	to	police	human	behaviour	at	the	end	of	it	so	you	find	yourself	always	having	to	put	out	fires	or	
reminding	people	what	they	can	and	can't	do	I	think	another	threat	especially	for	an	organisation	is	because	I	
was	is	not	using	or	when	internal	mechanisms	are	not	as	effective	as	they	should	be	you	then	find	members	
turning	to	social	media	to	other	fuse	and	Express	frustrations	and	irritations	and	that	sort	of	thing	so	the	
management	of	of	internal	conflict	is	not	easy	it's	always	under	threat 
 
• 	Are	you	familiar	with	social	media	bots?	
 
I	am	[laughs]		yeah	there's	quite	a	lot	of	them	I	guess	they	serve	a	particular	purpose	it	was	certain	extent	
sometimes	they	say	things	that	people	want	to	say	but	can't	so	the	anonymity	allows	them	to	to	say	what	they	
want	to	say	what	they	want	to	ever	they	want.		that's	all	I	can	say	about	but	I	think	there's	always	a	a	fight	
between	big	parties	saying	that	the	DA	has	a	whole	team	of	of	bots	they	say	the	same	thing	about	us	yes	it's	of	
course	I	mean	it's	impossible	to	to	trace	and	police	and	that	sort	of	thing	so	people	do	get	away	with	a	lot. 
 
• Has	your	party	been	affected	by	misinformation	campaigns	by	political	bots?	
 
	Not	misinformation	a	lot	of	stuff	that	supposed	to	stay	internal	finds	it's	way	out	through	Bots		so	not	really	fake	
stuff	[laughs]	they	actually	say	lot	of	true	things,	and	its	not	stuff	that	people	aren’t	supposed	to	know,	its	
information	that	will	come	out	eventually	so	it's	like	leaked. 
 
• 	If	so,	how	were	you	able	to	indentify	these	attacks?	
 
	it's	the	way	they	operate	it's	immediate	they	are	issued	based	and	they	pick	on	certain	things	all	the	time	its	easy	
to	identify. 
 
• Do	you	have	any	plans	in	place	to	mitigate	against	the	actions	of	social	media	bots	and	the	spread	of	
misinformation?	
 
	sure	I	must	say	not	that	I	know	of	if	it's	there	it's	top	secret	high	level	stuff	but	I	don't	know	anything	about	that	
yeah	so	I	think	everybody	struggling	with	it	and	I	don't	think	anybody	is	got	an	absolute	answer	as	to	how	to	deal	
with	them.	As	a	party	we	don’t	have	any	relationships	with	the	social	networks,	maybe	as	a	state,	but	not	as	a	
party. 
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5.7 Appendix E: Communication Misalignment 
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